


# A COUNTRY WITHOUT LEADERS IS NOT A COUNTRY



REPORT ON VIOLENCE AGAINST POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND COMMUNAL LEADERS. SIX MONTHS OF TRANSFORMATION.

SUPPORTED BY:





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
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# PRESENTATION



In the first six months of 2020, the health emergency experienced by Colombia, and the entire world, has transformed political participation in different ways and to different degrees. The situation has forced all actors in society, particularly those who seek to influence public life and political decision-making, to modify their actions and strategies in the face of a new, ever changing reality, whose final effects are still unknown. Without eschewing social distancing, new mechanisms have had to be devised to guarantee checks and balances. It was necessary to create new forms of generating an impact from within communities while, at the same time, social problems have become more pressing but are hidden from sight due to the unprecedented health and economic crises. In Colombia, for instance, the election of Communal Action Boards (JAC)<sup>1</sup> –one of the first building blocks of democracy– was postponed without a clear route to guarantee citizen participation at the most local level.

This scenario is taking place in a post-conflict period, after the signing of the Peace Agreement

in 2016. Though this event opened a window of opportunity to put an end to violence, this objective seems more distant every day. The violence, particularly that exercised against leaders, is explained not only by the historical conflict against different Illegal Armed Groups (GAI), but by the sum of multiple factors and structural causes, of weak institutions unable to face the diverse, local, regional, and national interests that seek to attack various leaders in order to seize or perpetuate power. Despite the multicausal origins of violence, in the public discourse, it seems that all the violence is originated by the armed conflict, which simultaneously explains and conceals everything.

Thus, given its constant monitoring of violence against political, social, and communal leaders, the Electoral Observation Mission –MOE Colombia– presents this report on the security situation during the first semester of this convulsed 2020. The report warns that the course of the year has been marked by serious aggressions against social leaders who have suffered the highest levels of an increasingly lethal violence.



The numbers registered during the most restrictive period of social distancing and lockdowns show a general decline in acts of violence against leaders and military actions from illegal armed groups. However, in Colombia, even under extreme sanitary measures, attacks against civilians in general and local leaders in particular is a phenomenon that has not ceased.

Because violence against leaders has not let up, with this report, MOE seeks to highlight not only the figures of what has happened throughout the first half of the year, but also the impact that acts of violence have on victims and, in the case of social leaders, on their communities.

The importance of this report is that to bear witness to an increase in the number of aggressions against social leaders, as evidence shows,



is to reveal the intent to attack the processes that underpin citizenship itself. Violence is becoming more lethal, which is evidence that social causes that are not stopped by threats are then attacked with violence to silence voices.

And these are not just any voices. These are the voices that represent the effort of citizens to remedy the gaps left by the State itself. These are voices that seek to transform their surroundings, they are the voices of peasant activism, women movements, indigenous communities and communities of African descent, they are victims of human rights abuses, and the LGBTIQ community, they are activists for land, the environment, and those who seek a more equal country. Violent acts committed against them not only put a stop to the important work of leaders, but it has the additional effect of stunting those who work for the same causes; those who, although they will continue their work, will now do so with fear.



Picture by: latina.com.ar

Year after year, the figures of leaders who are attacked, threatened, kidnapped, disappeared, are victims of assassination attempts, and those who are indeed murdered are revealed. In many ways this violence has been normalized by society. To a large extent it has been explained as a consequence of the “conflict”. Nevertheless, when this violence is understood solely in light of the conflict, the victims are set aside and turned into statistical data. But we must recognize that they are not numbers. They are persons, leaders whose work must be praised, for the violence they suffer disrupts the communities and the country's political life. These aggressions have serious repercussions in the security of all those who work to make Colombia a different country.

The figures in this report show that violence not only persists, but that it has reached new territories and intensified in those where the conflict has a historical presence. This is particularly true in regions prioritized by the State where,

1. Acronyms in the document refer to the initials in Spanish.



despite the implementation of Development Plans with Territorial Scope (PDETS), the State's persistent absence has meant that prevention and protection measures are clearly insufficient.

Likewise, the document reveals how political leaders were the target of attacks, during the first semester of 2020. Particularly, at regional and local levels, violence against elected officials has increased. Just after six months in office, mayors and councilmen mainly, have experienced continuous aggressions. This is proof of the intention of those exercising violence to control not only social activity, but the State itself, by subjugating its leaders through fear. If the levels of lethality of these actions increase, the situation could result in atypical elections, such as those that occurred in the municipality of Sutatausa, Cundinamarca.

Communal leaders have also been affected by violence during this semester, prominently JAC's presidents. In this regard, MOE Colombia has identified that the more localized leaders are exposed not only to greater amounts of violence, but also to more deadly forms. This is the case of communal as well as of many social leaders who are exposed to different risks as a consequence of acting in rural areas where armed groups and illegal economies are present.

The report presents detailed data and analyses of the security situation of different leaders. Given this situation, it is not feasible to separate the study of Illegal Armed Groups from their behavior and presence in a territory. Although they are not solely responsible for the aggressions, there is a clear correlation between the counties with the highest number of violent events against leaders and the presence of armed actors.

Due to this setting, and based on the evidence of protection policies that, despite their progress have been clearly insufficient, this report includes a chapter with a concrete strategy to enhance public policies to prevent and protect social and communal leaders and those working

in the defense of human rights. This section proposes integral mechanisms that are adaptable to each specific context and that can be easily applied by authorities. These mechanisms entail a minimum impact on current budgets and the fiscal rule as it is conscious of the sanitary and economic emergency and its demand for resources not previously assigned.

Finally, this document will briefly expose concrete recommendations that can be applied by authorities at all levels, in order to guarantee the protection of the different types of leadership.

In order to advance towards peace, one of the greatest challenges that the country faces is ensuring that violence is not normalized. Voices must be raised, indignation must arise in the face of attacks against leaders, and demands must be made not only to the Government, but to the State as a whole for the establishment of effective mechanisms to prevent and protect the life and integrity of the different people that work through their leadership for citizens, for their rights, and in order to make Colombia a better country.

**PAMELA SAN MARTÍN RÍOS Y VALLES**  
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# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

**81 ASSASSINATIONS  
HAVE BEEN  
COMMITTED SO FAR  
IN 2020.**

In the course of the first semester of 2020 (January 1st to June 30th), 248 events of violence against political, social, and communal leaders were registered by MOE. A 2% decline occurred when compared with the same period of 2019, when 253 violent acts were reported. Nevertheless, these figures are worrying as they show that violence has not ceased, nor has it been substantially reduced. The above data is even more serious when considering that there was an important reduction in violent acts during the month and a half that strict confinement measures were decreed by the national government (equal to 25% of the semester). The reduction in violence during the strictest lockdown, did not offset the overall incidence of violence for the entire period.

On average, 1.6 events of violence were registered per day during the periods without strict confinement. Conversely, in periods of severe restrictions, these acts were reduced by 50% to an average of 0.8 each day.


Regarding lethal violence, 81 assassinations have been committed so far in 2020, June being the most violent month with 20 events. This figure represents an 82 percent increase when compared to May 2020. If the overall lethality is compared with the same period in 2019, when 61 murders were reported, the increase is of 32.7%.

During this first semester of 2020, violence perpetrated against social, political, and communal leaders has spread steadily throughout the national territory. Keeping the same

trend of the previous 4 years, the departments of Cauca, Arauca, Norte de Santander, Antioquia, and Córdoba account for nearly half of the acts of violence that took place in the country during the first half of the present year.


52 of the 81 killings of leaders committed in Colombia during these six months happened in PDET territories - regions where the Plans of Development with a Territorial Focus were carried out. This means that 64.2% of the murders occurred in zones that were prioritized by the State to prevent hotspots of violence. This represents a 39% increase over 2019, when 39 assassinations were reported.

Regarding each particular type of leadership, social leaders have suffered the greatest amount of violations, concentrating 50% of the



**ARAUCA, NORTE DE SANTANDER,  
ANTIOQUIA, AND CÓRDOBA ACCOUNT  
FOR NEARLY HALF OF THE ACTS OF  
VIOLENCE THAT TOOK PLACE IN THE  
COUNTRY.**





**SOCIAL LEADERS HAVE SUFFERED THE GREATEST AMOUNT OF VIOLATIONS, CONCENTRATING 50% OF THE ATTACKS. IN OTHER WORDS, FOR EVERY TWO LEADERS ATTACKED IN COLOMBIA ONE IS A SOCIAL LEADER.**

attacks. In other words, in the six months covered by this report, for every two leaders attacked in Colombia one is a social leader. Though acts of violence against social leaders have been increasing year after year, the first semester of 2020 stands out for the lethality of the aggressions, even in the period of strict confinement. The number of killings increased by 85% (going from 28 murders in 2019 to 52 in 2020), while threats decreased 24%.

When the ethnic component of the effects on this type of leadership is reviewed, it turns out that 58% of violent events against afro Colombian leaders were lethal (of the 12 acts of violence recorded, 5 were killings and 2 were assassination attempts). In the case of indigenous leaders, the lethality reached 70% of the 20 events reported (13 killings and 1 assassination attempt).

The departments of Cauca, Chocó, and Valle de Cauca concentrate 54.8% of the total aggressions against afro and indigenous leaders in Colombia. The department of Cauca merits special attention since 7 of the 9 indigenous leaders that suffered attacks were murdered.

Regarding the geographical location of lethal violence against social leaders, there is an alarming situation in the departments of Cauca, that had a 250% increase in the number of killings reported (6 in 2019, against 21 in 2020); Córdoba with a 400% increase (1 killing in 2019, against 5 in 2020); Bolívar with an increase of 150% (2 killings in 2019, against 5 in 2020); Putumayo with a percentage variation of 200%

(1 killing in 2019, against 3 in 2020); North Santander which has maintained a relatively constant number of killings in both periods, with a 33% increase (3 killings in 2019, against 4 in 2020).

70 of the 124 acts of violence against social leaders (56% of them) occurred in 13 of the 16 PDET territories (81% of the zones). In these regions the assassination of social leaders has increased by 74% (going from 19 killings in 2019 to 33 in 2020).



The worsening of lethal violence against social leaders in the PDET regions stands out in Nariño-Cauca and south Córdoba. In 2019, Nariño-Cauca registered 6 murders, while 14 have been perpetrated in 2020 (representing a 133% increase). In south Córdoba, killings went from 2 in 2019 to 7 in 2020 (a 250% increase).

Political leaders are the second most affected type of leadership, with 89 violent acts during the first 6 months

of 2020 (39.5% of the acts of violence in the country). Of the total number of aggressions, 73 where threats, which amounts to 82% of the cases. In relation to the lethality of the violent acts against political leaders, 2020 has experienced a 45% decrease in comparison to 2019, which was an electoral year.

Throughout the period analyzed, the acts of violence directed at elected officials is noteworthy. They account for 60.7% of the aggressions against political leaders and represent a 35% increase compared to the previous year. While in 2019, 40 elected officials were affected, 54 were so in the first six months of 2020.

This year, 60% of the killings of political leaders are concentrated in the departments of Antioquia (2), Valle del Cauca (2), and Córdoba (2). The events in the department of Vichada draw attention because it had not registered any violent act against leaders in the previous 4 years. However, Olga Lucia Hernández, a former candidate for the Liberal Party to the municipal council of Cumaribo for the Liberal Party, was murdered in May 2020. Likewise, the situation in the department of Sucre raises particular concern. While in 2019 there were no records of assassination attempts or homicides, one of each type of these acts has been registered so far in 2020.

With respect to communal leaders, 35 acts of violence have been perpetrated against them in 2020, representing a 13% increase in relation to the 31 events registered in the same



period of 2019. It's important to underscore that 60% of the attacks were lethal (killings or assassination attempts), placing these leaders in a particular situation of risk, especially the Presidents of Communal Action Boards (JAC). While 18 of them were victims of some act of violence, 9 of them (50%) were killed.

Antioquia is the department that raises the most concern, since 6 communal leaders have been killed, 4 of them in the region of Bajo Cauca. This represents a 300% increase in murders compared to the previous year (1 killing in 2019 versus 4 in 2020). The situation in the department of Putumayo also stands out, particularly in the municipality of Puerto Guzmán, where 3 former members and members of JAC were killed.

Of the 35 acts of violence against communal leaders, 24 (68.6%) were perpetrated in PDET territories. Of these, 62.5% (15 events) were killings. Compared to the previous year, the region of Bajo Cauca stands out, as it maintains the pattern of lethal violence against this class of leaders (4 assassinations). Likewise, despite not registering violent acts against communal leaders

during the first six months of 2019, Catatumbo and Putumayo experienced 3 killings in 2020.

In the case of both communal and social leaders, 46% of the events occurred in the rural sectors of the municipalities, where they are more exposed to the diverse risks posed by the presence of armed groups and illegal economies.

With regard to the acts of violence against women who are political, social and communal leaders, during the first six months of each year, from 2016 to 2020 a constant growth in the number of aggressions against them is noticed. They went from 17 women leaders attacked in 2016, to 20 in 2017, 29 in 2018, and 57 in 2020. These figures are worrisome because despite the overall reduction of violence during the first six months of 2020, aggressions against women leaders increased by 18.8% compared to the same period in 2019.

Threats are the most recurrent act of violence against women in a position of leadership. Nevertheless, it's important to acknowledge that in the case of women these aggressions have a particular characteristic. By exerting this mechanism

**IN THE CASE OF BOTH COMMUNAL AND SOCIAL LEADERS, 46% OF THE EVENTS OCCURRED IN THE RURAL SECTORS OF THE MUNICIPALITIES.**



of pressure on them, the perpetrators also resort to stereotypes and symbolisms that extend the impact to their families and close ones, thus affecting the psychological integrity of those around them.

That said, of the 109 municipalities where violence against political, social, and communal leaders has been reported in the course of 2020, 67% of them (73 municipalities) have the presence of at least one illegal armed group. Additionally, 75.2% of lethal acts against leaders were perpetrated in municipalities where the presence of such groups is registered. However, it cannot be inferred that all violent acts against leaders that occur in these territories can be attributed to armed groups. In fact, a relevant number of violent and lethal acts have been registered in territories with no presence of Illegal Armed Groups.

In this regard, the progress in investigations on cases of violence against social, political, and communal leaders reinforces the hypothesis that the various interests at the local level behind the violence against leaders are not always related to armed groups.

For this reason, MOE has insisted on the need to identify the legal and illegal actors behind the planning and execution of these acts, and to establish effective mechanisms to prevent and protect the life and integrity of those who exercise leadership in the country.

In relation to the belligerent actions of Illegal Armed Groups -GAI-, during the first semester

of 2020, a 6% decline in the number of violent acts was experienced, compared with the same period of 2020. In 2019, 260 violent actions occurred, in contrast to 245 in 2020. Nevertheless, this reduction cannot be understood as a de-escalation of armed actions.

Likewise, during the first semester of this year, the overall intensity of the conflict has remained constant, despite the consequences of the health emergency in some regions with presence of GAI. Thus, according to the data, during the pandemic, illegal armed groups continued to operate, despite the unilateral ceasefire decreed by ELN in April 2020.

Regarding the intimidations committed by GAI, a 13% decrease was experienced during the first semester of 2020, compared to the same period of 2019. 92 intimidations occurred in 2019 compared to 80 recorded in 2020. These were mainly linked to the quarantine and the humanitarian crisis, as the ELN, FARC dissidents, and Organized Armed Groups -GAO- resorted to armed "deterrence" to force the confinement of the population. This was particularly evident in the departments of Nariño, Antioquia, Cauca, and Putumayo.


Since the beginning of the quarantine, the decline in violent actions against leaders in those territories that coincide with the presence of armed groups interested in affecting the different types of leaderships is a phenomenon that merits attention. Nevertheless, during this same period, the GAIs expanded and exercised a more





effective control in a larger number of municipalities. This can be corroborated by the fact that within the more restrictive period of confinement, the number of regions with an IAG presence increased in 31 municipalities.

With respect to the ELN, the group carried out 101 violent actions during the first semester of 2020 which amounts to a 10% increase compared to its 9 actions in 2019. During this period, February was the month with the highest number of violent actions by the ELN, precisely when they decreed an "armed strike" that included actions against civil society and the Public Force in the departments of Norte de Santander (Catatumbo Region), Arauca, Chocó, and Cesar. Likewise, in May, once their unilateral ceasefire ended, there was a significant increase in the number of armed actions, a rise of 250% over April.



MOE calls for peace negotiations to begin again between the government and the ELN. Their presence in at least 20 departments of the country, and their capacity to affect the civilian population, should be reason enough to resume dialogues and seek a bilateral and definitive ceasefire. However, this must be accompanied by a commitment on the part of ELN to stop child forced recruitment, kidnapping, and release all those held captive.

Regarding FARC dissidents, this semester the number of violent actions declined by 11% compared to the same period of 2019. This year they committed 73 actions, in contrast to 82 committed in 2019. These were concentrated mainly in the department of Cauca with 40% of them, followed by Nariño with 12.3%. The most violent month was March when the mandatory preventive confinement was decreed by the government, and dissidents intimidated civilians under the justification of enforced confinement. Of the 22 actions registered that month, 54% of them took place in Cauca, specifically in the



north and center regions of the department.

So far this year, violent actions by the GAO declined 20%, considering that the previous year 75 actions were registered, in contrast to the 60 actions reported in 2020. These actions concentrated in the departments of Antioquia (31), Chocó (14), Norte de Santander (6), Putumayo (3), Córdoba (3), Nariño (2), and La Guajira (1). In the northern part of Colombia towards the end of the first semester, the tensions between Los Caparrapos, Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia -AGC-, and FARC's dissidents became evident. Therefore, it's a region where violence could increase if urgent actions are not taken by authorities.

During the first semester of 2020, just in Antioquia, Choco, and Córdoba, Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia -AGC- and Los Caparrapos committed 45 violent actions (which represent 75% of the actions committed by these groups). Massacres that subsequently caused the displacement of the civilian population from rural to urban zones stand out among these actions.

So far in 2020, 11 violent actions perpetrated by Los Pelusos have been registered, exactly

the same number of events as the previous year.

This report emphasizes the source of financing of illegal armed groups, which is mainly linked to drug trafficking. As such, it was identified that the GAI pretend to control the areas that concentrate coca and marihuana crops. That is, the pacific region of Nariño and Choco, the center and north of Cauca, the Catatumbo region in Norte de Santander, the lower Cauca in Antioquia, south Córdoba, the zone between the departments of Meta and Guaviare, and the departments of Putumayo and Caquetá.

Due to the pandemic criminal groups have been forced to change some of the ways of doing business, as they find themselves in a context in which supply and transport chains have been altered, their income has been reduced due to lack of available markets, and an increase in violence caused by disputes over the control of the drug business.

Although an analysis of the data shows a general decrease in the overall number of violent acts, a different picture is revealed when the number of confrontations between illegal armed groups is considered. These have increased by 27%.

In light of the political violence and the analysis of GAI activity, MOE identified some departments that merit a detailed analysis in order to understand the specificities of the phenomenon of violence. That is the case of the departments of César, Córdoba, and La Guajira, since they concentrate 45% of the events in the Caribbean region. Likewise, MOE emphasized the departments of Antioquia, Cauca, and Norte de Santander because they are the most affected territories, both by violent events against leaders and by the presence of GAI.

In the case of César, it is important to advice about the increasing lethality in the events in 2020, since the

proportion of threats versus killings has turned upside down in the course of this year, compared to the previous one. If this tendency continues, 2020 could record a similar number of events against leaders as 2019, but more lethal. Violent events have concentrated in the northern part of the department where the ELN makes presence as it is a strategic corridor for drug trafficking.

As for Córdoba, in this region, it is the department with the most violence against leaders with 15 acts (31% of those registered in the Caribbean region) during the first semester of 2020. Their lethality stands out since 7 of them (46.7%) were assassinations. AGC and the Los Caparrapos, who are in confrontation against each other, are present in this department. In the midst of these clashes, the civilian population and leaders remain in extreme danger.





In respect to the department of La Guajira, there is a latent risk to the different leaderships in the region. Though no assassinations were registered during the first 6 months of the year, it's worth noting that last year La Guajira was in third place in terms of the departments with more violence (with 41 events, 7 of them lethal). On the other hand, the analysis of political context is particularly relevant in this department. The political instability in which it has been immersed during the last two constitutional periods, its condition as a border territory with Venezuela, and the confluence of armed groups with drug trafficking structures are variables that compel us to keep a close look on the situation experienced there, and the conditions in which innumerable leaders carry on their activities.

On the other hand, Cauca is Colombia's department with the most acts of violence against political, social, and communal leaders. From January 1 to June 30, 2020, 45 violent events occurred, 18% of those reported in the country. 57.8% of these events have been lethal. Social leaders were victims of 91% of the assassinations committed in this department. Indigenous leaders has been the type of leadership most victimized. 78% of the indigenous leaders attacked in 2020 were murdered. This violence could be mainly related to the presence of the ELN and FARC dissidents, and to a lesser extent to GAO and EPL seeking to gain control of illegal crop


production and trade chains.

As for Antioquia, 16 acts of political, social and communal violence were registered in 11 of its municipalities. It's important to underscore that 75% of these events (12) were lethal. In this regard, 66.7% of the killings were perpetrated against communal leaders. These events occurred mainly in the Uraba and lower Cauca sub-regions, where GAO is present and coexist with legal and illegal economies that struggle for control of the territory, resources, and population.

Lastly, until June 30, 2020, 16 acts of violence were registered in Norte de Santander. It's noteworthy, that 62.5% of these events were lethal. They were perpetrated against 5 social leaders, 3 communal leaders, and 2 political leaders. This violence is related to the presence of different GAI such as the ELN, Los Pelusos-EPL, and the Rastrojos. The Catatumbo region is strategic for illegal weapon trade, migration, smuggling, drug trafficking, and the transit of illegal actors to Venezuela, which makes it a zone of intense disputes for territorial control.

In view of the extension of the violence in Colombia, and considering the economic context that has derived from the health emergency, it is necessary to rethink the protection mechanisms being enacted, in order to identify viable and more effective alternatives. In this context, it's desirable to move towards a

concept of collective protection in addition to the individual one dominant in current policies. Collective protection mechanisms could allow a more efficient use of resources and actions to encompass and address in a better way the phenomena of violence against leadership that hunts the country.





# RECOMMENDATIONS

**1** In order to address the problem of violence towards leaders, mainly against social and communal leaders, the MOE recommends that the authorities at different territorial levels adopt the necessary measures to protect and recognize not only the actions of individuals but also the work of the community in the defense of rights. The practice of rights protection should not be understood only as a practice of representation and the voice of one person but as an exercise of the community as a whole.

**3** A joint effort between national and local authorities is necessary to put forward humanitarian, health, and justice missions, and to provide public services to remote areas from the municipal capitals of affected territories. This is so State presence is not exclusively understood as synonymous with public force or militarization, but rather that it expands the supply of public services in the territory.

**2** The MOE recommends that officials in the interior sector (Ministry of the Interior and Government Ministries) at different territorial levels promote network building at the local, national, and international level on leadership practices, to serve as a comprehensive platform for training, improvement, and exchange of best practices among local leaders.

**4** The MOE recommends officials in the interior sector (Ministry of the Interior and Government Ministries) at different territorial levels to proceed with training and education plans for human rights defenders and leaders in the affected territories with the aim of nurturing, in these communities and not exclusively for those with spokesperson roles, leadership experience and skills.

**5** Authorities charged with protection and prevention responsibilities should improve infrastructure capacities for effective and safe leadership in communities. Building meeting locations or protection sites according to International Humanitarian Law is a key element to sustain community work in human rights protection.

**6** MOE recommends that municipal authorities, mainly mayors, Government Ministries, and municipal officials, maintain close and permanent contact with leaders, their organizations, and communities. The above, to create a relationship of trust between the emerging leaders and local institutions.






**7** The report highlights the important work of the Justice System to end impunity in cases of violence against leaders and defenders. MOE urges that all entities of the Judicial Branch and the Office of the Attorney General prioritize the investigations and hearings to reach the judicial truth in the cases already opened. This is based on the recognition that not all acts of violence are within the framework of the conflict, but that there are also political and social disputes that enable and promote violence. Likewise, it is necessary to carry out campaigns that encourage the report and a closer approach of the victims to the process to assure that the judicial apparatus has a constant feed of the events that take place in rural areas and far from institutions.

**8** MOE acknowledges the commitment of the National Government in the creation of the Municipal Councils for Peace and Reconciliation. In this respect, it recommends that the creation of this body is supported as a mechanism for the coordination between leaders and communities and local authorities to determine the security conditions of the territories and take the appropriate measures with differential approaches (gender, ethnic and territorial approach).

**9** The MOE recommends that the National Government and local governments adopt the necessary measures to strengthen the participation of communities, social organizations, and their leaders in the creation of a Comprehensive Prevention Plans. This is to raise the level of dialogue between organizations, both of its members and representatives, before the municipal and departmental authorities, and articulate their knowledge around the particularities of the territory.

**10** To combat drug trafficking, one of the factors that generate violence against leaders, MOE considers that it is necessary to advance in the development and implementation of the Comprehensive Rural Reform and to strengthen the economic support of the Comprehensive National Program for Illicit Crops Substitution to guarantee its operation.







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