

**STRENGTHENING OF DEMOCRACY AND  
POLICY DEVELOPMENT CAPACITY  
OF POLITICAL PARTIES**

**EVALUATION OF THE  
NIMD PROGRAMME IN SURINAME  
2003-2008**

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English version



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## **SUMMARY**

*In Suriname, the NIMD supports the Strengthening of Democracy and Policy Development Capacity of Political Parties project, for which purpose it concluded an agreement with the Government of Suriname and the Anton de Kom University of Suriname around the turn of the year 2005. The project is implemented by the Democracy Unit which operates within the university. Its object is the institutional strengthening of democratic structures in Suriname, capacity strengthening of political parties in order to enable them to effectively formulate and monitor national development policies in a participatory and transparent way, and enhancing participatory democracy.*

*After describing the political framework in Suriname, this evaluation report looks at the state of affairs as far as the project is concerned. To this end, we have talked to the Democracy Unit itself as well as to ministers, executive committees of political parties and representatives of civil society.*

*In general, although there is some diversity of opinion, this project is appreciated by the political parties. This was also evident in the contacts with the project's Klankbordgroep (Sounding Board), which is made up of representatives of the political parties or combinations of political parties and, as such, is a useful platform for discussion. The representatives of civil society thought the programme was meaningful, even though the programme was not generally known.*

*The implementation of the programme suffered delays owing to various circumstances, which are indicated in this report. Every effort will have to be made to carry out the project as effectively as possible in the next few months. What is considered essential in particular is the train-the-trainers project, which intends to train or give further training to the executives of the political parties with regard to democracy. The successful model of organising seminars will be continued with new topics. Other issues that have been brought up are promoting contacts with other players; awareness-raising programmes on the radio; establishing links with the decentralisation process; setting up relevant research; involving the research departments of political parties; establishing relevant contacts with related organisations in the Caribbean. What is crucial is the question how programmes can foster and strengthen a 'democratic disposition' in Suriname.*

*The conclusion we have drawn is that many greatly appreciate what has been organised and presented so far. If the NIMD and/or the Anton de Kom University of Suriname were to decide to terminate the programme at the conclusion of this project, we are inclined to think it would be regarded as a loss in Suriname, possibly even by those that now have objections.*

## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

### Political parties

A 1	- Alternatief 1
ABOP	- Algemene Bevrijdings en Ontwikkelings Partij
BEP	- Vereniging Broederschap en Eenheid in de Politiek
BVD	- Basispartij voor Vernieuwing en Democratie
DA-91	- Democratisch Alternatief 1991
DNP-2000	- Democratisch National Platform 2000
KTPI	- Kaum Tani Persatuan Indonesia
NDP	- Nationale Democratische Partij
NPS	- Nationale Partij Suriname
SPA	- Surinaamse Partij van de Arbeid
VHP	- Vooruitstrevende Hervormings Partij (1973)

### Other abbreviations

ACP	- African Caribbean and Pacific (Group of States)
CARICOM	- Caribbean Community
CLO	- Centrale van Landsdienaren Organisatie (federation of public servants' trade unions)
COL	- Confederatie voor Organisatie van Landsdienaren (federation of public servants' trade unions)
DU	- Democracy Union
EC	- European Commission
FTAA	- Free Trade Area of the Americas
IPP	- Instituut voor Publiek and Politiek (Institute for Public and Politics)
IDB	- Inter-American Development Bank
IGSR	- Institute for Graduate Studies and Research
MDG	- Millennium Development Goal
NGO	- Nongovernmental Organisation
NIMD	- Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy
NOS	- Nederlandse Omroepstichting (Netherlands Broadcasting Authority)
NOVA	- NOS-VARA (current affairs programme on television)
UNDP	- United Nations Development Programme
UvS	- University of Suriname
VSB	- Vereniging Surinaams Bedrijfsleven (Suriname Business Association)
WTO	- World Trade Organisation

## I INTRODUCTION

Science cannot lay down what democracy should be. On the basis of basic principles like those in the Declaration of Human Rights and other United Nations declarations, science can, however, indicate in what ways democracy can be given shape and how this is done in the world and in various countries, whether effectively or not. There is a lot to be learnt, if one is willing to learn and implement.

The crucial question is how programmes can foster and strengthen a ‘democratic disposition’ in Suriname. Programmes may be and will have to be drawn up to instruct people in issues that are relevant to democracy and their implementation. But whether this will succeed depends on the points of view such programmes invite. The analysis of what democracy should be is fairly clearly put forward by everybody in all sorts of discussions, but by no means always implemented transparently as soon as one has gained power; on the contrary. What can be done to connect the two?

A awareness-raising programme relevant to Suriname, with its population of about half a million<sup>1</sup>, should deal with those issues that give a better idea of what democracy can be, that is, a transparent organisation of the government and also of other associations in society, in which decisions are taken that guarantee the freedoms of the entire population within the context of the relevant UN treaties, and optimise prosperity and well-being within society as far as possible. Democracy requires a policy that is supported by a majority and at the same time considers the rights and opportunities of minorities in a positive way.

In this connection, practising democracy requires a middle class that is conscious of democracy and alert, a civil society that has something to say – in the double sense: both as to content and organisation, that has room and is not threatened by military force or loses its job as ‘punishment’. At the moment, the level of development of the middle class in Suriname is poor.

A people has a short memory. The revolution was welcomed by many in 1980. After Fort Zeelandia in 1982 and Moiwana in 1986 and all that was bound up with it, things changed and in 1987 it seemed the tide had turned. But this is only true to a certain extent: the military administration, it is true, has been a matter of the past since then, but there does not seem to be a stable democracy. In 1999, the Government was sent home, as it were, by demonstrations and the parties then in power now do very well in opinion polls - the alternative does not appear to be very convincing right now.

The Democracy Unit (DU) of the Anton d Kom University of Suriname has been engaged for a number of years in activities aimed at raising democratic awareness in political parties. By means of research and programmes aimed at the institutional strengthening of political parties, social scientists have tried to make democratic

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<sup>1</sup> At the 2004 census, Suriname had 492,829 inhabitants at the time.

principles the basis of political thought and action in general. The DU has been supported in this by the *NIMD Strengthening of Democracy and Policy Development Capacity of Political Parties* programme. From 2003 to 2005, this programme went through a preliminary stage, which resulted in a project at the beginning of 2006. The 2003-2008 period is the subject of this evaluation, which especially focuses attention on what the programme has undertaken.

After a short description of the objectives and strategy of the NIMD programme and the methodology, the context is given in which the DU operates by means of background information on the political situation in the country. This is followed by an evaluation of the programme including a report on interviews with political parties and a number of civil society organisations that are important for the advancement and perception of democracy in speech and action. The DU itself, as an organisation, has also been analysed. Next, the cooperation with the UNDP is dealt with and the final section of the report includes conclusions and recommendations.



## **II OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY OF THE NIMD PROGRAMME**

As indicated in the Terms of Reference (see Appendix) the NIMD programme is aimed primarily at three intervention areas, namely, the multiparty political system, political parties and the relations between politics and civil society (social partners and NGOs). The NIMD programme in Suriname supports reform activities that have been identified by the participating political parties in mutual consultations. The general objectives of these activities are:

- Reducing polarisation and enhancing social and political cohesion;
- Reducing fragmentation, and increasing stability and predictability in the political system;
- Institutional strengthening of political parties, finding peaceful solutions to conflicts and policymaking within the multiparty political system;
- Paying special attention to groups that are underrepresented in political life, like women, young people and the indigenous peoples.

The programme focuses on three approaches in achieving these objectives:

1. The institutional strengthening of democratic structures in Suriname by means of developing a set of nationally adopted democratic principles to serve as a frame of reference. To that end, the Democracy Unit of the University of Suriname needs to have established itself as a nationally and internationally recognised institute for research and the development of democracy in Suriname.
2. Strengthened capacity of political parties to develop an effective, national development policy in a participatory manner. Political parties must be provided with knowledge and tools to effectively draw up their respective party programmes, including the principles of the party and the approach to national questions like democratic governance, poverty alleviation, realisation of the Millennium Development Goals, and Suriname's position in regional and international trade agreements (CARICOM, FTAA, EU/ACP Cotonou agreements, WTO). Political parties should be equipped with the necessary knowledge and skills to participate in discussions about issues of national importance for the development of the country. Broad discussions will have to be held about a number of development issues that are of national importance and that should be dealt with in a concerted and coordinated way in support of a nationally defined Vision 2020.
3. Strengthening of participatory democracy in Suriname. Political parties are aware of the way in which people in general think of democracy and take measures to effectively strengthen the public's faith in political parties as democratic institutions.

To this end, party programmes and election programmes should be discussed and explained in a participatory way. Political parties have a strategic plan for the participatory involvement of their voters during election time and outside it.

Since the next elections are to be held in 2010, the programme objectives, according to the 2008 annual plan, will focus on strengthening the capacity of political parties with regard to revising and developing party policies, so that the parties will be able to formulate their programmes properly for the next elections. This period will also have to be used to consider issues that may raise the awareness of party members, journalists and the electorate in general. Attention will be paid in particular to the alleviation of poverty and the exchange of knowledge and experience with experts from the region.

Within the framework of strategic partnership, the programme will be carried out nationally by the Democracy Unit of the Anton de Kom University of Suriname, and a collaborative relationship was entered into with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which was, however, terminated in 2008.

The evaluation of the NIMD *Strengthening of Democracy and Policy Development Capacity of Political Parties* programme has been made against the background of the above-mentioned objectives and strategy.

### III METHODOLOGY

The evaluation was made in April and May 2008. First of all, the Dutch evaluator studied documents in The Hague and documents received through e-mail. He then talked to some persons involved in this project. The Surinamese evaluator has received documents through e-mail and studied them. Next, from 17 April to 3 May they had 33 interviews in Suriname and wrote the report. They completed the report together after the Dutch evaluator's return to the Netherlands.

The team has been able to work and cooperate well. In general, we have met with a positive reception from the various persons we interviewed and have been able to have the interviews we intended to have. First of all, we talked at the Democracy Unit to Dr J. (Hans) Breeveld, Project Coordinator, and next to members of the Project Council, viz. Dr J. Breeveld, Chairman, and Mr A. Boldewijn, Mr H. Jap A Joe and Mr J. Kasdipowidjojo, Secretary.

Next, we were received by two Surinamese ministers, Dr R. van Ravenswaay, Minister of Planning and Development Cooperation, who co-signed the project contract, and Mr M. Hassankhan, Minister of the Interior, who is *the* Surinamese initiator of the project, as well as Ms Tanya van Gool, the Netherlands Ambassador to Suriname.

Unfortunately, the President of the Republic of Suriname has not been able to make time to see us. When at the unveiling of the statue of H.A.E. Arron, Prime Minister at the time of Suriname's accession to independence, the Dutch evaluator had the opportunity to talk briefly to the President, the latter said that he had 'some objections' to the project. In his keynote address on the occasion of the 30<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Independent Electoral Bureau in November 2007, he quite explicitly spoke of a 'rather silent process of infiltration'.

In the next few days, we talked to representatives of various organisations that, one way or another/somehow, are involved in the project or to whom the project is relevant. (The exact schedule is given in the Appendix.)

They are:

- The Board of Governors of the University, that is, Mr A. Li Fo Sjoe, Chairman. The Board is formally responsible for the project. We also talked to the Board of the Faculty of Social Sciences and representatives of the University's Financial Unit.
- The Country Director of the UNDP, Mr T. Gittens, and a member of the staff about the relations between the UNDP and the NIMD and the University.
- The project's so-called Sounding Board. It is made up of nine representatives of political parties, viz. four from the parties forming the coalition, three from the

opposition parties and two from parties that have no seats in the National Assembly. Six parties were represented in our interviews. Subsequently, we talked to another member and an acting member of this group during our visits to political parties.

- Party executive committees or representatives of political parties. We talked to representatives of nine of the twelve parties in the National Assembly, viz. the ABOP, BVD, DA-91, DNP-2000, KTPI, NDP, Pertjaja Luhur, SPA and VHP. Unfortunately, we have not talked to the party executive of the NPS, because it did not feel the need for a talk.<sup>2</sup> There have been no talks with BEP due to illness of the Chairman, while the interview with A1 did not take place owing to a misunderstanding.
- The District Administrator, Mr Nalim, and five members of the District Council of Paramaribo, because in our opinion political democracy is also relevant at regional and local levels. For that reason we have also had talks with
- Mr B. Ahmadali, Managing Director of the Decentralisation and Local Government Strengthening Programme (DLGP) financed by the IDB.
- Representatives of the social partners, including the Executive Committee of the Suriname Business Association, representatives of Ravaksur, the trade union consultative body, and the Executive Committees of the CLO and COL trade union federations.
- Representatives of the civil society, viz. IRIS (the Interreligious Council in Suriname), the NGO Forum Bureau and the NGO Platform for Women and Development.

We have talked to the social partners and civil society, because contacts between political parties and these organisations are in the interest of political democratisation.

The documents and interviews have provided a sound basis for this report.

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<sup>2</sup> It should be noted that talks, without the project coordinator, have shown us that both the first and the second echelons of the NPS appreciate the existence and activities of the DU and the programme.

#### **IV POLITICAL FRAMEWORK**

This is not the place to make a comprehensive analysis of the political developments that have taken place in Suriname since independence in 1975.

Anyone feeling in some degree involved with Suriname knows about the military take-over of 25 February 1980, about the December killings of 8 December 1982, about the growing conflict within the country leading to, among other things, Moiwana 1986, about the formal withdrawal of the military in 1987, and about the subsequent elections that were won comfortably by the parties removed in 1980.

The trial for the December killings of 8 December 1982 has hardly been brought up in our interviews. The trial has started but progresses slowly and it is not clear, not to an outsider at any rate, when the actual interrogations and examinations will begin, sentences will be passed, if any, whether it will be before the 2010 elections and what exactly the implications will be for Surinamese politics. They may be profound but it is difficult to assess right now what they are going to be. It is a crucial matter that looms large in the background, but it hardly surfaces.<sup>3</sup>

##### *Formal democracy*

Historically, the political organisation of Suriname is closely linked to the ethnic groups that were brought to and entered the country during the plantation era. As a rule, the ‘traditional’ parties have a distinctly ethnic basis and, in the more recent, larger parties of a more multiethnic nature, the various ethnic groups still play a recognisable role in the internal distribution of power.

Since 1987, except for the brief period during and after the so-called Christmas coup in 1990, Suriname has officially had democratic rule once again with the political parties playing a dominant role in society. A new balance of power has arisen in politics in the past two decades. A dichotomy has arisen when it comes down to getting to the centre of political power. The oldest, traditional parties (VHP, NPS, KTPI and PSV) lose votes in every election. Parties like the VHP and NPS are therefore forced to cooperate with an increasing number of other parties, which results in coalitions fitting the occasion. The country is now governed by President Runaldo Ronald Venetiaan (Chairman of the NPS) at the head of a government made up of eight parties, viz. the VHP, NPS, Pertjaja Luhur, SPA, DA '91 and the A Combination (ABOP, BEP and SEEKA). Mr R. Sardjoe (Chairman of the VHP) is Vice-President. What strikes one most is that there is no unequivocal coordination within the Government to harmonise the views – and the interests – of the parties and translate them into effective policies.

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<sup>3</sup> During a conversation in the context of the mission, a nonpolitical person expressed the fear that ‘a murderer might come to office’ after 2010.

A major problem of this kind of coalition – in addition to the slowness of the decision process – is the fact that consensus has to be reached on the usual allocation of resources in the broadest sense: who gets the various positions, licences, who is granted land and where etc. This does not seem conducive to the development of the country.

Besides, Suriname uses the US system of appointing senior officials – each political change leads to a change in senior officials at senior posts, which breaks the continuity of the implementation of policies put into operation previously.

If a minister includes persons from outside his party in his circle of advisers to find a solution to a concrete problem, it is thought odd and raises many questions within his own party – and sometimes at higher levels.

A specific characteristic of Surinamese politics and of the administration is at least as essential, namely, the lack of substantive, policy-oriented cooperation. Ministries do not cooperate on cross-ministry problems, even if it might be the obvious thing to do. It certainly does not happen if the ministers belong to different political parties, but even if they do, cooperation is not a matter of course. Within ministries, cooperation between departments is not general practice either. Self-interest and fear may account for it, but whatever the reason it harms the functioning of politics. Representatives of international organisations, in particular, are struck by the fact that Suriname is anything but a communication democracy. In this context, several speakers have said that Surinamese education (not counting individual exceptions) is too hierarchic, does not encourage initiative and creates a type of citizen – and official – that does not speak up and does not ask questions.

Something similar seems to be the case in the political parties, which are all strictly managed from the top. The power of decision largely rests with the chairman, often surrounded by a small circle. It is therefore common practice that those who determine government policy are also in control in the parties. If that is not the case, it may lead to clashes as it did in the NDP in 2000, which resulted in the party splitting up into NDP and DNP-2000.

It should be added that patronage – arranging specific favours for one's own supporters – is still quite a familiar phenomenon in Suriname. Patronage was rejected flatly in two of our interviews (both with the coalition and the opposition), but the policies pursued that were then explained with animation can only be called politics of patronage. Democracy in speech and democracy in practice are not the same thing.

One of the consequences is that the faith that many people have in the functioning of political parties is anything but strong. Even though the whole population appears to be mobilised during election campaigns, there is little actual involvement in the functioning of political parties in the periods between elections.

*'Politics is more than political parties'*

The political parties function in a society in which other organisations also make their voices heard. In this connection, one of the larger parties mentioned the 'churches', that

is, the religious organisations, as the most authoritative institutions. The so-called social partners in particular are important, i.e. trade and industry and the trade unions.

In addition, the NGOs are essential. Their sphere of activity extends to various social areas, like poverty alleviation, health care, women and development, human rights and training and education. Their relations with the government are far from perfect. According to the NGOs, the government does not cooperate with them closely and does not properly recognise the role of civil society. They do want positive contacts with the government especially to develop long-term views. 'Politics is more than political parties.' One of the larger, 'traditional' political parties emphasised that the relations with NGOs should be improved.

### *Discontent*

If the issue of security and crime was the main problem in 2005, today it scores lower for safety has somewhat increased in relation to some years ago because crime has been combated much more effectively. Discontent in this respect has decreased. The fight against crime is now seen as 'normal'. Other causes of discontent are now mentioned, especially the increases in prices and the housing shortage.

From a macroeconomic point of view Suriname's position is fairly stable. In 2007, as a percentage of the GDP, the internal debt and the external debt were well below the ceiling laid down in the National Debt Act, whereas they exceeded the limit substantially in 2000. However, the debts have increased considerably in absolute terms in the last few years owing to, among other things, a Chinese loan for the Afobaka road.

On the one hand thanks to the policy of the Governor of the Central Bank and on the other hand because of additional income from the exploitation and export of natural resources and growing numbers of tourists, especially but not exclusively from the Netherlands, the exchange rates have been kept more or less stable under this government, at least in relation to the US dollar. Apart from positive effects (transfers), the increase in the value of the Euro has also negative effects for Suriname. While the export is calculated in US\$, many goods are imported from Europe, consumer goods as well, which the government is now warning against.

Even though the macroeconomic situation has improved, a flow from macro level to micro level has hardly been noticeable. Statistics of the General Bureau of Statistics show that, as a result of the distribution of the growth of the national product, income disparities have increased in the last few years. There is hardly any balanced economic growth requiring relatively skilled labour. Certain production sectors, like agriculture, seem to have been neglected.

The recent developments on the world market clearly have negative effects on ordinary people. The prices of rice – a staple food – have more than doubled in the last few months. And even if the banks are now asked for loans for investments in the rice industry, it will not benefit the consumers. Likewise, the rising fuel costs figure largely in a country that uses a lot of petrol. The Government has not yet been able to find effective answers to how to tackle the declining purchasing power, even though the salaries of government workers, old-age benefits etc. were raised by ten per cent in May 2008 with

retroactive effect to 1 January. And there is anxiety about inflation, which could neutralise the present drop in interest rates – important for, among other things, the construction of houses. This fear has not come true so far. In 2005 average inflation was 9.5%, it was 11.3% in 2006 but dropped to 6.4% in 2007 and was even lower in the first few months of 2008.

*The Worldwide Governance Indicators Report of the World Bank*

The state of affairs with regard to good governance and democracy is also indicated in the report recently issued by the World Bank entitled *Governance Matters VII*, the Worldwide Governance Indicators Report, which judges more than 200 countries on the extent of their good governance in 2007<sup>4</sup>. To this end, six indicators are used:

1. Voice and accountability;
2. Political stability and absence of violence;
3. Government effectiveness;
4. Regulatory quality;
5. Rule of law;
6. Control of corruption.

Suriname scores anything but high but not really low either in the governance score, which runs from +2.5 to -2.5. The average score in all indicators is -0.06; only indicators 1 and 2 are moderately positive (0.36 and 0.23). Generally speaking, there has been a slight improvement compared with 1996. Political stability, however, scores lower than some years ago and control for corruption is also seen as weakened, which also applies to other Caribbean countries for that matter. Of the other countries within CARICOM, Barbados may serve as *the* example with an average score of 1.40. But Suriname is not really focused on Barbados. Suriname is slightly lagging behind Trinidad and Jamaica but is ahead of Guyana.

*Suriname – the Netherlands*

In the past, the Netherlands played a significant part in the political development of Suriname. In short, the relations between Suriname and the Netherlands are a little like a love-hate relationship, especially for those that were born before independence in 1975. Much as the cooperation between the governments decreases now that the so-called treaty funds are about to come to an end, the Netherlands is still visibly present, in the form of people (a substantial part of senior officials has Dutch nationality), goods, ideas and communication. Some newspapers offer pages with Dutch news and NOS news and NOVA (Dutch current affairs programme) are prominent on television.

The relations with the Netherlands appear to be without any pressing problems currently. The speech of the Minister for Foreign Affairs at the reception on the occasion of the Queen's Birthday was positive, with the exception of a paragraph – short this time –

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<sup>4</sup> Kaufmann, Daniel, Kraay, Aart and Mastruzzi, Massimo, *Governance Matters VII: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators, 1996-2007* (June 24, 2008). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4654.



about the so-called 100% checks at Schiphol Airport. She explicitly thanked the Netherlands for its support after the air crash a few weeks before. The visit by the Dutch Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs on 13 -14 May was welcomed. The visit seems to have been a success. 'The Netherlands sets great store by a committed relationship with Suriname. Without ever forgetting the past, we wish, together with you, to work towards a better future,' the Dutch Prime Minister Balkenende said.<sup>5</sup>

Still, the relations are sensitive, which has also affected, and affects, the NIMD programme in Suriname.

### *With a view to 2010*

It is still totally unclear what the 2010 elections will bring. It is related to the specific coalitions that will be formed. Will the parties making up the present Government enter the elections together? This depends on, among other things, the outcome of the fight waged for the nomination of the candidate for the Presidency. Speculation is rife and certain candidates, like the Chairman of Pertjaja Luhur, put themselves forward, which leads to reactions. The split between the present Government and the opposition has recently widened now that a mammoth coalition has been launched, in which the NDP and DPN 2000 join forces with smaller parties like the KTPI, BVD and Palu with a view to the 2010 elections. Some action is being taken in reaction to this split. A number of other smaller parties in Suriname, i.e. A1, Pendawalima, DOE, PSV, UPS and NS, are combining forces for the next elections to offer an 'alternative bloc' and to counterbalance the other blocs.

So the answer to the question who, that is to say, which person and which parties will lead the Government in 2010 is pure conjecture right now. Anyhow, there is a strong possibility that there will be a change.

In addition, it is not clear either what the effects of the electoral system are going to be this time. As became clear in the interviews we had, the present electoral system laid down in the 1987 Constitution is the subject of many discussions. The seats in the National Assembly are elected through the districts. Within the districts, proportional representation is used with the system of residual seats greatly benefiting the large parties, which encourages parties to join forces and form coalitions. The distribution of seats among districts, however, is not proportional. A vote in the district of Coronie, for example, is worth five times as much as a vote in Paramaribo. The distribution of seats particularly favours the interior and, because of it, the parties having their basis there. Modification of the system seems anything but likely, at least in the short run.

What was stressed in our interviews was that the distribution of seats on the district councils and area councils will be of vital importance in the next presidential election, because these councils make up the Joint People's Assembly (891 members), which will decide the election of the new President, if there is no two-thirds majority in the National Assembly. What is important is that the election of candidates in these regional and local elections will be influenced by the efforts and policies of candidates with regard to the

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<sup>5</sup> Cf. reports in *De Ware Tijd* and other Surinamese dailies and the press releases from the Ministry for General Affairs, The Hague.

implementation of the opportunities that financial decentralisation has offered lately in a number of districts.

## **V EVALUATION OF THE NIMD PROGRAMME IN SURINAME**

### **V.1 Programme activities**

Within the framework of strategic partnership, the programme is implemented nationally by the Democracy Unit of the Anton de Kom University of Suriname, while a formal cooperative arrangement was made with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP).

Not without reason, the NIMD programme has been introduced into Suriname through the University of Suriname. In April 2001, the Democracy and Governance study group – later called the Democracy Unit – was formed there from a small group of academics who were, and are, especially interested in questions related to political democracy and democratisation. In January 2002, Suriname was visited by a first NIMD mission, which gave the advice that a possible NIMD programme should not focus so much on financing separate political parties but ‘should focus on facilitating exchange between Surinamese political parties in Latin America and the Netherlands to strengthen skills and knowledge of the political parties’. In view of the political situation in Suriname, this should be done together with the UNDP as an international organisation. The Democracy Unit in 2002 organised a round-table meeting with experts and persons concerned, at which meeting fundamental questions in Surinamese politics were discussed, also with representatives of political parties. Next, a preliminary project was set up with the NIMD in partnership with the UNDP (see Chapter VII). The seminar of March 2003 on the topic of Policy Development in Political Parties may be regarded as the start of this preliminary project, which was formally signed in December 2003 by the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the University and the person responsible at the UNDP. In June 2003, three Surinamese lecturers participated in The Hague in the NIMD workshop on ‘operationalising institutional development criteria for political parties’. At the end of September 2003, an NIMD mission visited Suriname for further consultations. In November and December, seminars were held on topics like Media and Politics and Political Development and Political Systems in Suriname and the Region. Joint and separate consultations with the political parties resulted in a broad, joint consultation at Theater Unique on 29 June 2004. During this consultation, all parties supported a project aimed at the strengthening of political parties in the area of policy development and capacity to identify, formulate and monitor national policies. The Democracy Unit should become an independent institute, with a clear view on the process of strengthening democracy in Suriname. A number of topics that were considered important were formulated, like perceptions of democracy, criteria for political parties, electoral systems, recalling of members of parliament, internal party democracy, financing of political parties, and systems of patronage. At a seminar held shortly afterwards, a number of key topics were formulated as points of action for enhancing democracy, like the development of an ethical code for politicians, the development of a system to strengthen political transparency and accountability, the strengthening of the Trias Politica,

promoting the dialogue among political parties geared to a long-term perspective for the country (Vision 2020). In short, they were highly commendable points of action in order to enhance democracy and national development.

All the same, the leaders of the country developed a fear that all this would lead to specific political action. There were negative reactions to interpretations on the part of the Democracy Unit of results of opinion polls. This caused tensions between the Board of the University and the Democracy Unit – something that endangered the substantive independence of the Democracy Unit. As a result, one DU member, who also happens to be chairman of a small political party and fully supports the principles of the DU, gave up his activities within the DU.

Nevertheless, the drawing up of the project continued without interruptions, led on the Surinamese side by the historian, Mr M. Hassankhan. This resulted in the adoption of a plan supported by the NIMD running from 1 January 2006 to 30 November 2008, aimed at **Strengthening of Democracy and Policy Development of Political Parties**. It was signed on 30 December 2005 by Dr Ricardo van Ravenswaay, Minister of Planning and Development Cooperation, for the government, and for the partners by Mr Allan Li Fo Sjoe, acting Chairman of the Board of Governors of the University, Mr Jim Kasdipowidjojo, Democracy Unit, and Dr Ingeborg Ebong-Harstrup, UNDP Resident Representative. The document states that the project is financed by the NIMD. The objections that exist to this programme among the leaders of the parties in office – and might have existed among leaders of a Government composed in a different way – have induced the DU, quite rightly in our opinion, to be cautious.

For the implementation of the programme, the Democracy Unit has set up an office that has been domiciled in a small, efficient building since the beginning of this year. There is a project coordinator, Dr Hans Breeveld, a project officer, Ms S. Sewradj, and a secretary, who operate in conjunction with a project council made up of five people, academics from university circles. Since six months the project has had a formal so-called Sounding Board, which meets four times a year and is made up of nine members of the various political parties (four from the coalition parties, three from the opposition and two from parties that have no seats in the National Assembly). There is also a platform (also called the plenary meeting), which consists of all parties participating in the project and meets twice a year.

It cannot be denied that the programme is ambitious. For good reasons, its intended results are numerous. However, the programme will not be completed within the planned period of close on years. There are several reasons for this, which will partly be explained in the next chapter.

The following overview of income and expenditure in the period of October 2006-December 2007 shows that the initial programme has not been completed.

Expenditure between October 2006 and December 2007	expenditure	estimated cost
1. Institutional strengthening of democratic structure of Suriname	7,063	75,000
2. Strengthened capacity of political parties	12,074	70,000
3. Strengthened participatory democracy in Suriname	29,030	123,000
4. Effective technical coordination programme components	91,000	144,000
5. Effective financial and administrative support	88,200	123,000
6. Total	227,368 <sup>6</sup>	535,000

The lower expenditure is to a limited extent due to lower actual expenses, on the one hand because of cheaper accommodation etc. for the seminars (which is positive), on the other hand because of the more limited participation of foreign guest speakers. This cannot be considered a good thing, for it illustrates that the intention to make meaningful contacts with the Caribbean countries in particular has not yet been realised. This may partly be put down to the difficult access to Suriname as a result of limited air connections and the limited time foreign experts had at their disposal. It may have deeper causes and be related to the isolation of Suriname in its region.

The limited expenditure is largely due to the fact that the DU has failed to carry out a major task which it wishes to undertake and has undertaken, namely conducting research, and having it conducted, in preparation for seminars and more generally for achieving political democratisation in Suriname. Apparently, the Project Coordinator, together with the Project Council, has not yet been able to write the intended relevant research proposals relating to political democratisation, or have them written, and have them carried out. The last chapter will go into this matter in more detail.

What is important is that since October 2006 at least eight seminars have been held and a Sounding Board has been established. Topics that were discussed at the seminars include: political parties and popular sovereignty, MDGs (illusory or attainable), the interaction between political parties and political institutions, questions as to the recalling of members of the National Assembly, decentralisation and people's participation, the financing of political parties, as well as in February last the possibility of introducing a *Stemwijzer* (voting guide), a topic that was presented by Ms Van Dijk of IPP. In general,

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<sup>6</sup> Rounding-off difference

these seminars were found to be useful (see V.2). The publications relating to the seminars - an attractive outcome of the activities of the DU in the first few years – have not appeared lately. This matter is now said to take priority.

In 2007 the old programme was abandoned and a new annual plan has been made for 2008. This plan includes a course for trainers and the *Stemwijzer* (voting guide), and the research component has been reduced. Unfortunately, the train-the-trainers programme has not yet started, a variety of courses offered for the instruction, training and education of political executives in Suriname. The object of this, in our opinion, important programme is to give the executives of the political parties a better insight into key concepts in democratic thought and practice (rules, institutions, policy objectives) and the transfer of practical skills (holding meetings, debating, writing). The participants will then be able to use the knowledge they have acquired to receive follow-up training within their own parties. According to the documents, this training should have started by the middle of 2007. It is now expected to start in September 2008 at the latest. To begin with, a draft of this training was drawn up by the DU. One of the members of the Sounding Board, whose discipline includes training, has produced another, attractive draft *Investing in Democracy*, which is now under discussion.

With regard to the *Stemwijzer* it may be stated that various discussions with political parties have shown that they think it is an interesting project but not directly relevant to Suriname.

There was some fear that the results of the *Stemwijzer* would become public, because the selection of participants would be one-sided – among whom many persons of Surinamese origin having Dutch nationality. The representatives of the political parties have been told again and again that to begin with an ‘inverted *Stemwijzer*’ is aimed at, i.e. bringing up important issues and their relation to programmes.

It will be a challenge to the DU to adjust the programme in such a way that it is relevant to Surinamese politicians and the objectives of the DU may be achieved with regard to the formulation of policy programmes by political parties.

## **V.2 Perceptions and insights**

Generally speaking, it may be said that the programme is seen as positive in Suriname. During our interviews hardly anybody doubted the usefulness of the programme. It was said that reflecting on democracy and training in practising democracy were important. During the interview with the executive committee of a large coalition party it was stated that ‘the Democracy Unit may play an important role in the democratisation of society. It is a neutral place that may make a significant qualitative contribution.’ And this programme is *the* activity carried out by the Democracy Unit right now. In addition, the Democracy Unit aims to conduct scientific research. In the future, it wishes to pay more attention to it than it has done in the last few years.

### *a. Members of the Government*

The programme as such has been received well by the Ministers Van Ravenswaay and Hassankhan. Dr R. van Ravenswaay, who co-signed the programme, thinks it useful that the Democracy Unit is operational. There should, however, be a clear link with civil society. As Minister of Planning he inquired after the indicators that have been developed to measure programme's effects. That is important, it is true, but concrete testing of indicators can only be done after some time and, besides, the programme is too small to be able to measure independent, separate effects exactly. With regard to the electoral system, he remarked that representation should be evenly balanced.

The interview with Mr M. Hassankhan, Minister of the Interior, in fact had a twofold purpose, because he had been the Surinamese godfather of this programme before he became a minister. In his present position, he also considers the programme very useful. He thinks it highly important that the DU should turn to long-term planning. Explicit political statements may work against it. In his opinion, training is an essential pillar of the programme.

*b. Ambassador of the Kingdom of the Netherlands*

Ambassador Ms Tanya van Gool, who also had dealings with an NIMD programme in Kenya, warmly welcomes the fact that such a programme is in progress in Suriname, even though in a different form; in her opinion, gender and young people are important components. She has is not concerned in any way with the content of the programme as such. She is going to have a meeting, for the first time, with the Project Council in the DU building in the near future.

*c. Political parties*

Consultations with the political parties have been held along two lines.

First of all, we talked to the Sounding Board, in which members of the coalition parties, the opposition parties and parties that have no seats in the National Assembly discuss the implementation of the programme. This group was established in August 2007 and has met three times since. We found that, within the present political practice, this Sounding Board is the only place where political parties exchange ideas, which was seen as meaningful by all participants. 'You get more respect for the views of others.' It turned out that there was some hesitation on several sides – coalition and opposition – about organising a *Stemwijzer* in Suriname. 'Interesting, but not relevant.'

The seminars and workshops were found to be very important. They provide necessary information and greater depth. It is seen as positive that the press is not present, so that the issues can be discussed openly. The Democracy Unit is recognised as being above parties.

During the meeting with the Sounding Board, the importance of training courses was stressed. In fact, an 'Administration college for politics and society' should be set up with its own funding, one of the members of the group said. Much as direct, internal

influencing of political parties was rejected, some members of the group did argue in favour of direct stimuli to the parties. ‘The DU should be able to act as a consultant to individual parties.’

The Sounding Board also made out a case for awareness-raising programmes that extend beyond just the political parties. In consultation with the Sounding Board, the DU should produce radio programmes relating to political democracy. Moreover, particularly the people that do not vote or vote incorrectly should be approached.

The Sounding Board declared with one voice that the programme as it is implemented is a wholly Surinamese programme.

Next, we talked to nine political parties, sometimes at party headquarters, sometimes at a ministry and sometimes at the DU office. The delegation was often made up of key political figures; sometimes there were young people who made specific and enthusiastic contributions that were worth careful consideration.

During these meetings, issues have been brought up that are similar to those discussed in the Sounding Board. Two issues in particular have been raised. The first issue concerned the question whether, in their opinion, they considered it important to benefit from contributions from civil society or the social partners, the NGOs and the religious communities in the implementation of the programme. After all, it is one of the programme’s objectives that have not been achieved so far. The parties said that, in their opinion, contacts with civil society during seminars and workshops would have a positive effect. What was worth noting in this connection was that various parties asked for the introduction of awareness-raising programmes that could be used to reach the population directly, especially through the mass media. Apparently, they were of the opinion that they could not do it themselves.

Next, since it is a sensitive issue in Suriname, the question was expressly brought up in how far there was any ‘foreign interference’ in the programme. We know that the leaders of the NPS and, to a lesser degree, those of the VHP have some serious doubts about the programme. As far as we can see, they are related, on the one hand, to the question in how far ‘the Netherlands is trying to come and teach us democracy’<sup>7</sup>, and on the other hand to the fear that this programme wishes to influence the internal functioning of the parties directly. NPS members of the Sounding Board said that the latter was absolutely out of the question. The leaders of other large parties may have the same idea, but they have not raised the issue at all.

So in our talks with the political parties we always asked the question in how far they felt there was ‘foreign interference’ in the drawing up and implementation of the programme. Although, on the 30<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Independent Electoral Bureau in November 2007, the President spoke some harsh words in this respect – also about the renovation of a building for the Democracy Unit at the university complex – it was not brought up in the various meetings. (By the way, the DU office was officially opened by one of his ministers two months later.) We have been told again and again that the programme is

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<sup>7</sup> At the beginning of the various meetings, the Dutch evaluator sometimes said that the support from the Netherlands to this programme does not mean that the Dutch democracy is quite in order. People in Suriname also watch the Dutch news and the Dutch NOVA current affairs programme.

primarily regarded as a Surinamese programme, whose concrete, final form is a Surinamese matter. This also applied to the discussions about the *Stemwijzer* programme, which was brought up at the request of the project management in Suriname (see below). Representatives of the NDP did say that the Netherlands had ‘interests’ in supporting this project and they should be brought to the fore more openly, but they did not have a negative opinion of the importance of the project.

The discussions with the executive committees of the political parties showed that most of them were aware of the NIMD support for the project. But this was not always the case. The information was new to two former ministers. In a discussion outside the political parties, it was seen as an IDB project. The IDB is a major donor and is also active in the field of decentralisation.

Anyway, the foreign contribution to seminars and workshops has been limited. In the last few years, more than 50 people have spoken at seminars and workshops, three-quarters of whom were Surinamese nationals. Fifty per cent of the other speakers were Dutch (including some with Surinamese roots) and most of the others came from the Caribbean. The foreign contribution was generally felt to be useful. In fact, it is a pity that relevant expertise from abroad, particularly the Caribbean, is not or cannot be used to a greater extent.

To round off this section, it may be stated that the functioning of the programme is now generally felt to be positive. Parties vary slightly in their appreciation of the existence of the programme. Although all political parties declared that they agreed to the programme in 2004, the coalition parties, and particularly senior leaders, are more reserved. Yet, as a matter of fact, representatives of all parties participate actively in the programme. The discussions with the political parties focused on the DU and the programme. The internal democracy of the political parties was not really brought up and discussed.

*d. Perception and points of view of the ‘outside world’*

Interviews have also been held with organisations from civil society. What we noticed first of all is that the DU and the programme are not generally known. We have understood that, certainly at first, the DU did not have the intention to push the programme, given the reservations in some political leaders. ‘I have heard about it, has it already started?’ [businessman]. This also applied, albeit to a lesser extent, to the organisations we talked to.

So the DU as such and its activities were often little known to the social partners or not at all, which did not mean that enhancing democracy was not considered useful. But, as the Suriname Business Association stated, how can you achieve democracy if the players do not think democratically. What is needed first of all is a democratic disposition. Democracy should therefore be included in the curriculum so that young people can be taught. Participants in the interviews came up with a number of issues that could be considered in the context of the programme.

During meetings with the trade unions, it appeared that in general they thought they were not involved enough by the government in consultations about, for example, developments relating to CARICOM. In this context, they pointed out the importance of



television programmes like *Krutu* and *Domineestraat*, which give young people the opportunity to voice their views, which could clearly have a democratising effect. The DU or the programme could possibly play a role in training policymakers in how to deal with partners. The political parties should also be more aware of the need for democratisation within education and child care.

As far as the NGO Forum Bureau and NGO Platform for Women and Development are concerned, they think the objectives of the DU valuable. Mutual contacts should be made or strengthened. The NGO Forum Bureau stressed the principle of equality – especially of equality in diversity. This should be given shape in politics, and in discouraging the patronage system. They also called attention to Human Rights. Government and civil society should work together much more closely on, for example, the issue of suicide in Nickerie, education in the interior, the squatters' problem in Greater Paramaribo etc. Political parties should encourage this cooperation. Discussions about decentralisation and Public Sector Reform are also important. One of the women's organisations approached the DU to carry out joint activities in the course of this year. It is to be hoped that this will be achieved. It should be added that one of the political parties, during our interview, stated that contacts with NGOs were inadequate, possibly because they often seem to be of a 'leftist' persuasion, but these contacts should now be established.

The discussion with some key persons from IRIS, the Interreligious Council in Suriname – representatives from the Roman Catholic Church, Arya Dewaker and the Suriname Muslim Association, was stimulating. They knew the DU by name but without any further knowledge or involvement. In principle, in their opinion, the University needs knowledge and insight into democracy, which may be passed on to society. They argued in favour of a professorship relating to philosophy, which could pay attention to enhancing democracy. They drew attention to UN programmes running in Suriname with regard to capacity building relevant to the government, companies and civil society. These programmes might offer an excellent opportunity for cooperation. This DU programme could also play a part in the formulation of VISION 2020, the prospects for the future the drawing up of which Suriname has committed itself to. They expressed the hope that the DU and the programme would not be confronted with political infiltration by the University, which probably referred to the discussions about the appointment of a new Chairman of the Board of Governors.

*e. Regional and local government*

Another opening was offered by discussions with, on the one hand, Mr. B. Ahmadali, the Director of the financial decentralisation project financed by the IDB, and, on the other hand, with the District Administrator and members of the District Council of Paramaribo. Suriname has always been a country with a highly centralist administration, where regional and local democracy has hardly crystallised. As part of the 'modern' ideas about governance, decentralisation is now encouraged in Suriname too – however difficult it may be from a technical point of view in a physically fairly large but sparsely populated country. Modest decentralisation programmes are now ongoing that give the politically elected district councils and area councils some control and, consequently, the need for insight and knowledge of how to act. The discussions we had showed that there are some

excellent points of departure here for a DU political democratisation programme, also because it will strengthen the regional political branches of political parties (the senior party members).

In explanation: The 1989 Regional Organs Act (WRO), which lays down the politico-administrative structure of the districts and the organisation and powers of the regional organs, including planning at regional and area levels, has not been implemented as such. In 1998, however, the Decentralisation and Local Government Strengthening Programme (DLGP) project financed by the IDB was started. This project resulted in, among other things, the adoption in 2003 of the Financial Decentralisation Interim Regulation. This regulation gives the districts limited powers to generate their own income and set up and manage a District Fund. A number of powers resting with the central government are delegated to district bodies established to this end, like the maintenance of and improvements to secondary and third-class roads, drainage, refuse collection and disposal, and the distribution of drinking water. It primarily concerns responsibilities of the Ministry for Regional Development as a first step in the decentralisation project. The pilot districts for these major reforms are Nickerie, Wanica, Commewijne, Marowijne, Paramaribo and Sipaliwini. (The last district has been added to the other districts only recently.)

### **V.3 Suggestions for future cooperation**

The programme is a programme that has been formulated in Suriname and receives financial and substantive support from the NIMD but, for political reasons has been signed and implemented under the flag of the UNDP. Apart from the question of how things were handled (see VII), it seems advisable to us to consider in how far the programme may be strengthened in the future by means of international support. First of all, there is a political dimension, for the relations between Suriname and the Netherlands continue to be sensitive. At least as important is the substantive support that seems to be needed. This can only be provided to a limited extent from the Netherlands. It will also have to come from international organisations. Both the UNDP and the UNDAF have programmes in the field of governance and capital building that may provide the necessary insights and experts that are essential for the implementation of the programme supported by the NIMD. The programme also mentions the exchange of knowledge and experience with experts from the region. In this connection more contacts should be established within CARICOM.

All this has been worked out in detail in Chapter VIII: Conclusions and Recommendations.



## **VI THE DEMOCRACY UNIT**

### **VI.1 Structure**

The Democracy Unit which runs the programme is part of the Anton de Kom University of Suriname. The implementation of the programme is *the* activity of the Unit right now. As a matter of fact, there are hardly any other activities at the moment and the NIMD is the DU's only donor. The DU sees the contacts with the NIMD as positive. It is hoped that the NIMD will understand why the programme is not running quite on schedule.

The DU has a direct contact with the Board, especially with the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the University. This Board is formally responsible for the programme and the current state of affairs is regularly discussed with the Chairman. There is no substantive involvement with the DU on the part of this Board, let alone with the programme.

From an organisational point of view, the Unit is part of the Faculty of Social Sciences. We have found, however, that there are hardly any formal contacts between the Board of the Faculty and the Unit, which surprised us somewhat since the Board might be better able to channel the attention definitely present within the Department for the DU and the programme.

As to staff, the Unit is made up of a Project Coordinator, Dr Hans Breeveld, a Project Officer, Ms S. Sewradj, and an Office Administrator/Secretary. It is housed in a small building – five rooms – that has recently been renovated for the DU and the programme with NIMD funds (namely, the rent paid under the terms of this project).

The DU also has a Project Council currently consisting of six members, Dr H. Breeveld, Chairman, Mr. J. Kasdipowidjojo, Secretary, Ms W. Bechan, Mr A Boldewijn, Mr H. Jap A Joe, and Dr J. Menke. The Project Council meets several times a year. There are no fixed dates for meetings.

For the past six months, the project has had a formal Sounding Board, which in principle meets four times a year. It is made up of nine members of the various political parties (four from the coalition parties, three from the opposition and two from parties that no seats in parliament). At the same time, there is a platform (also called the plenary meeting) which consists of all parties participating in the project and meets twice a year.

The responsibility for the financial management of the programme rests with the Financial Management Division of the University. According to the UNDP, this caused problems (see VII), since the management of the funds did not follow international financial rules, so that adjustments had to be made again and again.

## **VI.2 Programme management and decision-making procedure**

The organisational structure and guidelines for the implementation lay down the responsibilities for the project fairly clearly. The role of the Board of the University is crucial and limited. The Board has signed the project document together with the UNDP and has delegated the implementation of the project to the Democracy Unit, which prepared the project. This delegation has not been interfered with at all, as far as we know.

The Project Coordinator manages and coordinates the project. The Project Council supports him in drawing up terms of reference for research projects and seminar and workshops, draws up, together with the PC, the draft annual plans and draft annual budgets, and sees to it that the implementation of the project continues to contribute to advancing the broader views of the Democracy Unit on the strengthening of democracy in Suriname, as laid down in its objectives. In practice, the role of the Project Council seems to be more of an advisory nature. This emphasises the dominant role of the Project Coordinator, who has to show strength and independence and live up to it. His role was appreciated rather than criticised in the interviews we had with the representatives of the political parties we talked to.

By the way, it should be noted that the Project Coordinator, as a citizen and as a member of a political party, is personally concerned with the fortunes of society. Nevertheless, what he states personally, may be too easily interpreted as a point of view of the DU and the programme. It seems therefore advisable that he should refrain to a certain extent from expressing political views in the short term. It is a long-term programme and could be endangered by ill-disposed outsiders. This does not mean, of course, that, in the field of political democracy and human rights, situations may not arise that do demand reactions from the DU.

What is important is that the entire management – both the day-to-day and the general management – works at the actual, effective and prompt realisation of the instrumental project objectives.

The establishment and first performance of the Sounding Board may be regarded as beneficial. It is a major advisory body to discuss the concretisation of the programme with. Both sides see this as clearly positive at present.

As indicated before, the management is faced with a serious backlog in the implementation of the project.

At first, the delay was the result of the change of government. Mr M. Hassankhan, who initiated the project, led the preliminary phase and was supposed to manage the actual project implementation, was appointed Minister of the Interior before the project started. It was not until 1 October 2006 that he was succeeded by Dr Hans Breeveld, who had previously participated actively as a member of the Project Council. No activities were carried out in the intervening period. In addition, it took a long time to find a suitable candidate for the post of Project Officer. Only recently has Ms S. Sewradj has been appointed as a member of staff, who can devote time, attention and expertise to the programme, although financial matters have taken up a great deal of her time so far (see VII).

### **VI.3 Suggestions for improvement**

In our opinion, achieving the objectives of the programme as soon as possible is vital to enhancing political democracy in Suriname. It is regrettable that the programme has suffered delays, even since October 2006. It is probably partly due to the lack of a sufficiently efficient organisation and lack of staff to achieve the object. This applies particularly to the training programme and support research related to the analysis of democracy and democracy potential.

Within the Democracy Unit itself, the work of the Project Coordinator requires support. It is advisable for the Project Officer to focus more on the actual implementation of the programme and to leave the financial aspect of the programme to those responsible for finances in the University, in accordance with internationally prevailing formal rules. Possibly, one or more young staff members could be recruited on a project basis for short, well-defined activities.

It seems important to us that the Project Council should more diligently perform its duties, which according to the guidelines are more than just advisory in nature. In our opinion, this council, whose members do their job free of charge and show commitment, sometimes in considerable measure, should also be expanded. It may be a good idea to consider increasing the number of members by adding other University staff that could make an academic, stimulating contribution or other people from elsewhere who are willing to dedicate themselves to the cause in an academic and socially acceptable manner. It is advisable to focus on young people in particular. It seems necessary that the Project Council should have a chairman of its own as soon as possible, if necessary from somewhere else.

As far as the members of the Project Council in the employ of the University are concerned, no definite arrangements have been made as to the time they spend on the DU or the programme. It is not clear whether it is part of their regular duties – and in that case what part – or whether it is a spare-time activity. It would be a good idea if they could consider a limited part of their working hours as time for services and a more substantial part as part of their research work as a faculty member, which will of course find expression in publications.

It seems of the greatest importance to us that, with a view to the programme, contact should be made with the research departments of the political parties. Although these bodies are limited in size and vigour, they offer the DU the opportunity to try to weave them into the reflection on enhancing democracy.

It also seems advisable to set up a separate committee within the DU to focus specifically on the dissemination of relevant information obtained at the seminars and training courses.

As to contacts within the University, as we have already said, contacts with the IGSR on the one hand and the Public Administration Department on the other hand, could have positive effects. They will have to lead to concrete forms of cooperation.

One of the strong points of the DU is that it has developed into a documentation centre which collects information, including local information, about all political parties by means of, among other things, an extensive cutting service. This has not been done elsewhere. It is advisable that this information be made available to interested parties.

### *Independence?*

It has been discussed internally in how far it is advisable that the DU should become an independent institute to avoid, for one thing, possible internal interference. At the moment the question does not arise. For the time being it is doubtful whether independence would bring any benefits. In fact, the DU is only a very small institute, which depends on one single foreign donor for its present funding. It will be difficult to achieve a totally independent management and administration.

The project began as a UNDP-University project financed by the NIMD. In the meantime, the role of the UNDP has changed. This matter will be dealt with in detail below.

## VII NIMD/UNDP/UNIVERSITY COOPERATION

At the start of the project, the NIMD, in consultation with the DU, formally entered Suriname by means of the UNDP. Because of the intensive and at the same time delicate relations with the Netherlands, it was assumed that it would be wiser to take such a roundabout route. In the preceding chapters it has been reported that many, although not all, were aware of the fact that it was a project financed and recommended by the Netherlands. Generally speaking, however, the project was seen as a completely Surinamese project as to content and not the result of 'foreign interference'.

The contract has therefore been signed by the UNDP together with the Government of Suriname and the Board of the University. The document states that the NIMD acts as financier. In that sense the roundabout route has been quite transparent.

In the last few years, contact with the UNDP was kept up through Mr M. Ooft, the UNDP official. According to him, he spent a lot of time on the project, chiefly because the financial rules observed by the UNDP were completely unknown to the Financial Management Division of the University and declarations of expenses were not made in a correct way. As a result, the Project Officer of the DU, who had to assist the Financial Management Division, was forced to spend a lot of time on financial reports, time that she actually should have spent on other activities. However, the processing of financial claims by the UNDP itself also took up a lot of time, because it had to be done by various offices (although this was denied by the UNDP representatives) and, consequently, money was not transferred to the University on time, so that the University had to lend the DU the money. As a result of all this, the NIMD informed the UNDP on 20 January last that the money would henceforth be transferred directly to the University of Suriname. We have gathered that the NIMD rules in respect of financial settlement and reporting are more flexible than those of the UNDP. It is to be hoped that the Financial Management Division of the University will be able to deal with matters on its own, so that the financial reporting will be dealt with smoothly and the Project Officer will only be needed to a limited extent.

It should be added that the legal aspect of the termination of the contract is not quite clear. Under clause VI of the contract, a notice period is given of at least two months. Has it been observed?

As far as we can establish, UNDP interference with the project as regards content has been very limited, only some 'informal' advice given by Mr Ooft. Nor have we been able to establish that the UNDP has been explicitly asked for advice on the concrete substance of the programme, with regard to, for example, the link with UNDP programmes on democratic governance or speakers from abroad.

What was of interest in the contacts with the UNDP was that in the first talk we had with the very recently appointed new representative, Mr T. Gittens, he was very enthusiastic about possible substantive cooperation between the UNDP and the DU on, among other things, analyses of Public Sector Reform. With the help of the network of Mr Gittens,



who knows the Caribbean well, it could also promote the, in our opinion, desirable cooperation between the DU and other Caribbean countries. However, during the next meeting in the presence of his officer R. Martoredjo, who had the papers relating to the NIMD, Mr Gittens said that he should first gain a greater insight into the relations with the NIMD before substantive cooperation could be effectuated. We think it is in the interest of the project that this mutual insight will be gained shortly.

## VIII CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

‘The Democracy Unit has arrived. The baby has survived and it is no longer a subject for debate whether it should exist. It has won widespread acceptance,’ said one of the initiators, who only participates from a distance right now because of other duties. This is in fact a point of view that we have generally heard in our interviews, although there are some – significant – exceptions.

This positive approach refers to the positive beginning of the implementation of the *Strengthening of Democracy and Policy Development Capacity of Political Parties* programme, which is supported by the NIMD. Generally speaking, the programme, insofar as it has been carried out, is clearly appreciated.

True enough, the programme, which was to start in January 2006, suffered some delays owing to various circumstances. Starting from the set-up of the programme laid down in the project document, every effort will have to be made to carry out effectively as much of the programme as possible in the near future. This will require an all-out effort and efficient organisation. Some possibilities have been indicated in the preceding sections. ‘The near future’ will have to go beyond the formal termination of the programme in November of this year. It is hoped that the programme may be extended at least until the end of 2009. It is also hoped that a new programme will have been formulated by then.

The Democracy Unit is part of the Anton de Kom University of Suriname. This seems the best option right now to achieve the objectives of the programme. It is impossible to measure whether what has been achieved under the programme so far has resulted in essential changes in the perception and functioning of democracy in Suriname. The programme’s duration is too short and its scope is too limited to do that. Apparently, it is the country’s only platform where representatives of different political parties meet at present. This should be seen as significant, for the present *and* in the future. Such consultations will carry more weight if they are extended to civil society. This feeling was shared by the discussion partners. We strongly recommend – this is more than a platitude – that especially women and young people should be involved. Concrete recommendations are given below.

If, in the context of this programme, the contours of the democracy are clearly marked, considered and discussed – also through training programmes – there is some hope that the ‘democratic disposition’, among young people too, will be strengthened and the gap between ‘democracy in speech’ and ‘democracy in action’ will decrease. Something will have been gained.

### **Recommendations for future programme activities**

Reflection on what has reached us through the interviews makes us mention some points that will be of use to achieving this programme and, it is to be hoped, the next programme. For the record, this does not mean that essential parts of the current programme could be neglected. On the contrary. The project’s primary aim is to

strengthen political democracy in Suriname. The activities therefore primarily focus attention on the political parties. How can the quality of the parties be improved – quality in thought and in practice. This is done through the transfer of knowledge and discussions in the hope that this will lead to reflection and action.

Political parties focus on and function in a society in which other players from civil society, like social partners, NGOs and teaching institutes also play a role. In our opinion, it is important to expressly promote the relations between the political parties and such players, because this may lead to a broadening and deepening of perceptions in political parties. However small Surinamese society may be and however crucial knowledge and relationship networks may be, it is an illusion to assume that those involved in political parties have sufficiently clear ideas about the views and actions developed by or on the part of the other players – views and actions that may be of use to achieving and maintaining political democracy in Suriname, now and after the elections.

It would therefore be a good thing if other players were also involved in some of the activities that are organised in the context of the project. The best way to do this is through seminars and workshops if the topics seem relevant. Specific representatives of certain sections of civil society may be invited, so that they are involved in the transfer of knowledge and discussions and can exchange ideas together. In this context, women's organisations and youth organisations (including the Youth Parliament) could also be involved more closely in the activities of the programme, in accordance with its objectives. This possibility has also been brought up in the interviews we had. Without exception, it was seen as a good idea in the context of the project.

#### *Awareness-raising programmes on the radio*

The question will have to be considered in how far it is possible to make and broadcast weekly or biweekly radio programmes focusing on various aspects of democracy. It should be deemed important to raising the awareness of the population. The idea was supported by all members of the Sounding Board and it was also seen as positive in the interviews with the political parties. Of course, the final assessment will follow after the first programmes. Sound preparations and consultations are required.

#### *Establishing links with the process of decentralization*

It is important to establish a link with the decentralisation process, that is to say, to focus, together with the Decentralisation Office headed by Mr B. Ahmadali, on training members of the District Councils and Area Councils as well. This will help to strengthen local democracy. It is clear from information we have received that Para is a good district to serve as an example. It involves, among other things, teaching skills in local democracy, like drawing up local or regional laws, which has been virtually unknown territory so far. The DU and the programme could score high in this respect, for it is essential that the process pass off smoothly.

#### *Undertaking relevant research*

Developing and conducting relevant research, whose results may be considered and applied in the context of the programme, appears to be hard but should be seen as important. Now that this research has not been initiated from within, it is advisable to seek other ways. This could be done within the University through, for example, the IGSR, the institute that provides Master's courses, or the Department of Public Administration, which is somewhat understaffed. Faculty members or supervisors (including one member of the Project Council), together with students, could initiate the intended research. If this is not practical, it may also be possible to try to recruit researchers from elsewhere to carry out part of the research needed for the seminars. In that case one has to make sure that the research is explicitly linked to the project programme.

#### *Involving research departments of political parties*

It seems a good idea to involve the research departments of the political parties more closely in the programme. It might be worthwhile, for example, to persuade members of the various bodies to take part together in organising a seminar and, for a fee, jointly write a report on the seminar.

#### *Topics for seminars*

The seminars are found to be very constructive and useful. One of the political parties even suggested that seminars should be held at least six times a year. The interviews have yielded a wealth of topics that may be discussed at seminars. Many topics have not come from the political parties but from other sources. Apparently, they are topics that are of interest to people but do not come up for discussion, or not enough, at least not in the context of consultations between representatives of political parties and civil society. This also goes for a number of subjects brought up as important during the consultations between parties in 2004.<sup>8</sup> In fact, they are topics that may be highly relevant, directly or indirectly, to the drawing up of election programmes, and thus mesh with the *Stemwijzer*.

Topics that have been mentioned:

1. What is good governance?
2. Democracy in education
3. Educational systems and democracy
4. Essentials of democratic principles
5. Equality in diversity
6. Models of leadership
7. Human rights
8. Gender and democracy
9. Organisation of political patronage
10. Transparency in procedures
11. What is corruption?
12. The experiences with the decentralisation process (together with the DLGP)

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<sup>8</sup> It may be useful to deal with certain topics twice, once as a topic in general (with an example from abroad), and the second time in workshops geared to the Surinamese conditions.

13. Democracy in word and democracy in action
14. Young people and democracy
15. The meaning of civil society, seen from politics
16. The meaning of politics, seen from civil society
17. Public sector reform in Trinidad and in Barbados (two sessions)

It seems advisable to develop a programme that follows one definite line or two, i.e. has a recognisable order.

### *Contacts with the Caribbean*

It is not true that the political democracy functioning in the Caribbean may serve as a model for Suriname in all its aspects. But now that Suriname, through Caricom, has linked up with a number of Caribbean countries, it seems important to exchange ideas with one another. It may be possible to recruit someone temporarily to prepare this. It is also important with regard to the implementation of the Public Sector Reform, where there is also a gap between speech and action.

It may also be useful to consider in how far a well-organised seminar of political youths – from, say, Barbados, Suriname and Trinidad – may be held about the functioning of the political democracy in their respective countries.

### **In conclusion**

*The Strengthening of Democracy and Policy Development of Political Parties* programme has experienced considerable delay. Efforts will have to be made in the period to come to avoid further delays and to achieve what the programme aims at as much as possible and, if advisable, make concrete adjustments.

All the same, what has been organised and presented so far is greatly appreciated by many. If the NIMD and/or the Anton de Kom University of Suriname were to decide to terminate the programme after the conclusion of the project, it would, we think, be considered as a loss in Suriname, possibly even by those that now have objections. Certainly after the opening of the office of the Democracy Unit in February last, the DU has won a certain place in Surinamese society. If the NIMD is not prepared to continue the programme, it will probably be perceived, in the Surinamese context, as a breach of confidence by the Netherlands, unless there are highly legitimate reasons for the discontinuation. It is also possible that the Surinamese government does not wish to continue the programme. In our opinion, this should be regarded as highly unlikely at the moment.

## Appendix 1

### Terms of Reference NIMD Country Programme Suriname April-May 2008 [main points]

#### I Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy

The main objective of NIMD is to support the process of democratisation in young democracies by strengthening political parties as pillars of democracy in order to help create a well-functioning, sustainable, pluralistic system of party politics. The NIMD works in a strictly non-partisan and inclusive manner.

The NIMD programme focuses on three intervention areas:

1. Multiparty political system
2. Political parties
3. Relation between political and civil society.

The NIMD Programmes facilitate reform agendas that are the result of either an inter-party or individual party's strategic planning process. These 'home-grown' agendas that reflect the need for full ownership of the process by the political stakeholders – taking into account that democracy cannot be exported – provide the compass for NIMD's assistance to the strategic activities identified by the local political parties. These interventions intend to contribute to the following objectives:

- Reduce polarization and increase social and political cohesion
- Reduce fragmentation and increase stability and predictability in the political system
- Enhance the institutionalization of political parties, peaceful conflict resolution and policy development within the multi-party political system

In addition, NIMD pays special attention to the position of groups currently under represented in politics like women, youth and indigenous peoples.

When implementing its activities, NIMD cooperates and coordinates as much as possible with other national and international organisations that support democratisation processes. The activities of NIMD complement the support given by other Dutch non-governmental as well as governmental organisations, and are financed by the Dutch ministry for Development Cooperation.

#### II NIMD Programme in Suriname

##### **Introduction**

In 2001 Suriname was identified as a possible NIMD programme country for several reasons. At that time, Suriname was considered as a country in transition to democracy after a period of military regime. With the reconsolidation of democracy, the development relationship between the Netherlands and Suriname was resumed again. Moreover, the two countries are

closely connected in cultural and economic sense. The first identification mission (January 2002 by Alvaro Pinto Scholtbach, Roel Kuiper, Ellen van Koppen and Mark Dijk) recommended, instead of financially supporting individual parties, the programme should focus on facilitating exchange between Surinamese political parties and political parties in Latin-America and the Netherlands to strengthen skills and knowledge of the political parties. Therefore, the Suriname programme consists, unlike other NIMD programmes, only of a cross-party project and not of bilateral activities with individual parties.

In November 2002, a preparatory mission by NIMD staff (Ellen van Koppen and Dionne Dinkhuijsen) took place. The University of Suriname was soon identified as a possible partner. Due to the sensitive relationship between the two countries, UNDP Suriname (as an international institute) was invited to cooperate in this programme. In this way, the NIMD was less visible and the risk of being accused of influencing Suriname politics was avoided.

With support of NIMD, the UNDP Suriname and Maurits Hassankhan, member of the Democracy Unit (a multi disciplinary work group of the Anton de Kom University of Suriname), initiated a preparatory assistance project. The programme officially started with a seminar on policy development for political parties in March 2003. After several seminars and discussions with all political parties on the content of the programme, the preparatory phase ended at the end of 2005 by the signing of the multi-annual project document “Strengthening of democracy and policy development capacity of political parties.” This document was signed by the University of Suriname, the minister of Planning and Development Cooperation, The UNDP and the Democracy Unit.

The general objectives of this three-year project, formulated in cooperation with the political parties, are as follows:

- Institutional strengthening of democratic structures in Suriname;
- Strengthening of capacity of political parties to effectively formulate national development policies in a participatory manner
- Strengthening of participatory democracy in Suriname
- Effective technical coordination of programme components
- Effective programme management

Since the three-year plan was not executed as planned (see below), the NIMD and the Democracy Unit have established a new workplan 2008, maintaining the same objectives but with different activities.

## **Programme implementation**

### **Democracy Unit**

The 2005 elections led to a delay in the implementation of the programme, due to changes in the staff of the Ministries and the Anton de Kom University. It also resulted in the appointment of Maurits Hassankhan as minister of Internal Affairs. In September 2006 Hans Breeveld was appointed as the new coordinator of the Democracy Unit. From the beginning of the project an advisory body was established and is still involved in the project. Due to the changes in coordinators and project officers, the implementation of the Democracy programme suffered serious delay in 2006 and 2007. In 2007, the sounding board, consisting of representatives of nine political parties, was installed in order to

guarantee ownership of inter-party dialogue and the development of joint intervention programmes with the aim to strengthen democracy. With this the democracy programme reached an important milestone and backing of the major political parties in Suriname.

### **NIMD -UNDP**

Although UNDP has played a crucial role in the start-up phase of the project, UNDP as a reporting partner, turned out to be an extra delaying factor in the implementation of the project due to their bureaucratic reporting principles. Therefore NIMD decided to change the modalities of cooperation between the Democracy Unit and the UNDP. Since January 2008, the Democracy Unit reports directly to NIMD and will receive the necessary financial funds no longer through UNDP but directly from NIMD. Since NIMD has positive experiences in working with UNDP in Suriname and several other countries, NIMD is still very much interested in coordinating with UNDP's activities on democracy promotion and strengthening of political parties as much as possible. At this moment, all involved parties are exploring the options for a new kind of cooperation.

### **Regional embedding of the programme**

The initial phase of the Suriname programme strongly focused on exchanges between political parties in Suriname and Latin America and several seminars on this subject have been organised. However, it has proven to be difficult to connect to other countries, since Suriname is, not only in language, but also in form of government and history, isolated in its region. Regional initiatives of the OAS and UNDP on this theme in the Caribbean has been decreasing in the last years. In 2007, the NIMD has restructured its headquarters in The Hague which resulted in the creation of the regional team Latin America and the Caribbean, in which Suriname is included. This organisational structure should increase the regional embedding of the Suriname programme in Latin America.

## **• III The Evaluation**

### **Objectives of the evaluation**

- To assess the achieved results of the NIMD Suriname Programme in relation to the three general objectives within the NIMD mandate mentioned in the first section;
- To assess the achieved results of the programme in relation with the objectives as specified in the multi-annual plan and the NIMD's annual year plans 2004-2008.
- To provide an analysis of the current political situation and the political system and make concrete recommendations, if necessary, to adjust the NIMD programme in Suriname in order to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the programme and ensure the best possible use of the available resources
- To examine the impact of NIMD's support regarding the institutional strengthening of the Democracy Unit
- To examine if the Democracy Unit has the most effective organisational structure to match the need of the political parties.
- To examine the impact of the Democracy programme regarding the institutional strengthening of the involved political parties.



- To acquire a better understanding of the relationship between the methodology used and the effectiveness of the programme.
- To clarify which lessons can be learned for the work of NIMD in general.

### **Evaluation Parameters**

The main objective of the NIMD Programme in Suriname is *the strengthening of the multiparty political system in Suriname*.

The external evaluation will cover the period from March 2003 to April 2008 and will take into account the following questions.

#### Central questions:

##### *1. cross-party projects*

- What are the achieved results, both qualitative and quantitative, in relation to the general and specific objectives of the programme activities?
- Is the assumption correct that the three specific objectives lead to the overall objective namely developing and strengthening the multi party system?
- What is the impact of the programme at the level of institutional strengthening of political parties?
- What is the impact of the programme on the development and strengthening of a inclusive multi party system in Suriname?

##### *2. Implementation modalities*

- Does the methodology as applied guarantee ownership of the process by political parties?
- How does the overall programme management function in Suriname and in the Netherlands?
- Are the lessons learned (e.g. from monitoring reports) adequately implemented?
- Is the organizational set-up of the Democracy Unit appropriate for the execution of its various functions and does it match the need of the political parties?
- Has the cooperation between NIMD, DU and UNDP been executed successfully and effectively?
- Has the registration and documentation of the projects been adequately organized?
- What is the added value of the NIMD programme in Suriname, compared to other local and international organizations like EU, UNDP and others working in the same field?
- Is the programme implemented in a coherent and comprehensive way?

- Is the programme sufficiently well prepared to attract other international partners to the programme on a longer term basis (e.g. through strategic partnership agreement with NIMD)
- Are the results of the projects sustainable?

### 3. *Lessons learned*

The evaluation should, amongst others, result in recommendations regarding the following issues:

1. The need for continuation of the programme and its possible future direction;
2. The effectiveness of the allocation of the budget between the different projects;
3. The active role of NIMD and the Democracy Unit and the main functions it should undertake;
4. The impact of the programme as stated in the objectives;
5. The ownership of the programme (principle of demand driven approach).
6. The budget of the programme in relation to the absorption capacity of the Democracy Unit. Expansion of the strategic network; finding external financial funds.
7. Indicators to measure the impact of programmes, to monitor progress and to make a comparison to other programmes of a similar nature.
8. Recommendations on the specific approach of the Democracy Unit towards the process of democratisation in Suriname.

## **IV. Methodology**

- Study the relevant documentation regarding the Suriname programme (original programme proposal, mission reports, annual plans and programme reports).
- Study the NIMD four year programme and specific NIMD methodology.
- Study the PMS and select some files, available at the office in The Hague, for case studies regarding the process of project-proposals, decision-making and implementation;
- Interviews with members of the sounding board to discuss the impact the NIMD programme has (had) on the development of their party;
- Interviews with members of the project team of the Democracy Unit
- Interviews with the board of the University
- Interview with UNDP
- Meetings with the coordinator, the project officer and bookkeeper of the University; Meeting with the auditor;
- Meetings with the (former) programme officers in the Netherlands, with the NIMD office staff
- Meeting with the Netherlands embassy in Suriname
- Meeting/interview with IPP
- Formulate the final report and present it to the NIMD Director;

**V. Evaluation team**

Ad de Bruijne (University of Amsterdam)  
Mireille Brunings (Central Bank of Suriname)

All members should be fluent in English.

**VI. Reporting**

The report should be written in English. The draft report should be handed in at NIMD before 2 May 2008. The report will be presented to the Supervisory Council of NIMD at 13 May 2008. It will contain an executive summary (in English) and cover the issues that are mentioned in this Terms of Reference.

**Miscellaneous**

The NIMD Director may decide, depending on the needs, to extend the period of the assignment for purposes of discussions about the outcome of the evaluation. Specific new terms of reference shall be agreed for such a follow-through exercise.

NIMD bureau  
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March 2008-----

## Appendix 2

### A. Schedule of meetings and interviews organised by the Democracy Unit Office, Anton de Kom University of Suriname

Institution: University of Suriname Evaluation: Strengthening of Democracy and Policy Development Capacity of Political Parties project in the period: 17 – 30 April 2008			
Date	M. Brunings and A. de Bruijne	Time	Place
1. Thursday 17 April 2008	Meeting with Dr J. Breeveld, Director of the Democracy Unit	12.00 – 13.00	DU office
	Meeting with the Project Council	13.00 – 14.30	DU office
2. Friday 18 April 2008	DU (records)	9.00 – 12.00	DU office
	Meeting with the accountant	12.00 – 12.45	DU office
3. Saturday 19 April 2008			
4. Sunday 20 April 2008			
5. Monday 21 April 2008	Interview with Mr T. Giddens, UNDP Country Director ad interim	9.00 – 9.30	UNDP office
	Visit to Ms T. van Gool, Dutch Ambassador to Suriname	10.00 – 10.30	Dutch Embassy
	Interview with the District Council of Paramaribo	11.45 – 12.15	Office of the District Commissioner
	Visit to Mr M. Hassankhan, Minister of the Interior	12.30 – 13.00	Ministry of the Interior
	Interview with Mr A. Li Fo Sjoie, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the University	14.00 – 14.30	Office of the Board
	Visit to the President		Cancelled because his busy schedule did not permit the inclusion of a meeting with the evaluation committee during this period.

	Visit to the Vice-President		Cancelled. The Vice-President said he would combine the meeting with the interview with the VHP
6. Tuesday 22 April 2008	Visit to Dr R. van Ravenswaay, Minister of Planning and Development Cooperation	11.30 – 12.00	Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation
	Interview with the Sounding Board	13.00 – 15.00	IMWO office
	Interview with SPA	17.15 – 18.00	SPA office
7. Wednesday 23 April 2008	Interview with NGO Forum Bureau, (Ms S. Ketwaru)	9.00 – 9.30	H. Arronstraat 126
	Interview with COL	10.00 – 10.45	Planning Bureau S. Redmondstraat
	Interview with VSB	11.00 – 11.45	VSB office Prins Hendrikstraat 18
	Interview with NPS	16.00 – 16.45	Cancelled
8. Thursday 24 April 2008	Interview with IRIS	9.00 – 9.45	H. Arronstraat 14, (next to the Residence of the Bishop)
	Interview with the NGO Platform for Women and Development (Ms Gilliad)	10.00 – 10.45	Projekta W. van Aalstraat
	Interview with KTPI	11.15 – 12.00	Anton Faverystraat 1 Tourtonne III
	Interview with DNP 2000	18.00 – 18.45	DU office
9. Friday 25 April 2008	Interview with Mr B. Ahmadali, Director of DLGP	9.30 – 10.30	Anton Dragtenweg
	Interview with CLO	11.00 – 11.45	Verl. Gemenelandsweg 74
	Interview with NDP	12.15 – 13.00	Ocer, Benjaminsstraat
	Interview with BVD	13.30 – 14.15	BVD office Hogestraat 28-30

	Interview with DA-91	19.00 – 20.00	DA-91 building Gladiolenstraat 17
	Interview with ABOP	20.00 – 21.00	DU office
10. Saturday 26 April 2008			
11. Sunday 27 April 2008			
12. Monday 28 April 2008	Interview with UNDP	9.00 – 10.00	UNDP office
	Interview with Ms L. Beek, Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences	12.30 – 13.00	Building ... University complex
	Interview with Dr M. Schalkwijk Dean of ISGR	14.00 – 15.00	IGSR – University
13. Tuesday 29 April 2008	Interview with VHP	10.00 – 11.30	De Olifant
	Interview with PL	13.00 – 14.00	Ministry of Physical Planning and Land Management
14. Wednesday 30 April 2008	Interview with Ravakur	8.00 – 8.45	DU office
	Meeting with Dr J. Breeveld, Democracy Unit	9.00 – 11.00	DU office
	Interview with Dr J. Menke	11.00 – 12.00	IGSR – University

## **B. List of persons interviewed**

(in the order in which they were interviewed)

### Democracy Unit

1. Breeveld, Dr J.H.
2. Sewradj, Ms S.

### DU Project Council

3. Kasdipowidjojo, Mr J.
4. Jap A Joe, Mr H.
5. Boldewijn, Mr A.
6. Dos Ramos, Ms G.
7. Pawirosonto, Ms R.

### UNDP

8. Gittens, Mr T.W.
9. Martoredjo, Mr R.

### Netherlands Embassy

10. Van Gool, Ms T. (Ambassador)
11. Brouwers, Ms N.

### District Council of Paramaribo

12. Lapar, Ms C.
13. Kalpoe-Sitaram, Mrs C.
14. Setrojojian, Mr E.
15. Hanoeman, Mr S.
16. Amatngalim, Mr D.

### Ministry of the Interior

17. Hassankhan, Mr M. (Minister)

### Board of Governors of the University

18. Li Fo Sjoie, Mr A. (Chairman)

### Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation

19. Van Ravenswaay, Dr R. (Minister)

### DU Sounding Board

20. Rathipal, Mr M.
21. Simons, Ms J.
22. Pika, Mr R.
23. Sumter-Griffith, Mrs K.
24. Bram, Ms S.

25. Grunberg, Mr R.
26. Ori, Mr H.
27. Kasantaroeno, Mr F.
28. Kadirbaks, Mr R.S.

#### SPA

29. Gilds, Mr S.
30. Defares, Ms S.
31. Landvreugd, Mr D.
32. Nok, Ms L.

#### NGO Forum Bureau

33. Ketwaru, Ms S.
34. Awanima, Ms O.
35. Romalho, Mr L.

#### COL

36. Blanker, Mr H.
37. Jamaluddin, Mr

#### VSB

38. Meyer, Mr M.
39. Lo Fo Sang, Mr D.
40. Van Essen, Mr R.
41. Doelwijt, Ms H.

#### IRIS

42. De Bekker, Mgr W.A.J.M. (RC Bishop)
43. Lalmohamed, Mr J.K.
44. Waagmeester, Mr N.
45. Bansradj, Mr R.

#### NGO Platform for Women and Development

46. Ganga, Ms S.
47. Gilliad, Ms I.
48. Bhattacharji, Ms R.
49. Ramdin, Ms N.

#### KTPI

50. Soemita, Mr W.
51. Dragman, Mr R.
52. Wangsabesari, Mr O.



DNP-2000

- 53. Raveles, Ms Y.
- 54. Manohar, Ms M.
- 55. Belliot, Ms A.

ABOP

- 56. Amafo, Ms A.
- 57. Daniel, Mr D.
- 58. Ada, Mr C.
- 59. Jemesi, Mr M.

Decentralisation Project

- 60. Ahmadali, Mr B.

CLO

- 61. Hooghart, Mr R.
- 62. Miskin, Mr M.

NDP

- 63. Geerlings-Simons, Mrs J.
- 64. Menso, Mr D.

BVD

- 65. Mungra, Mr D.
- 66. Gopalrai, Ms A.

DA-91

- 67. Meyer, Mr W.

Faculty of Social Sciences

- 68. Beek, Ms L.
- 69. Lenting, Ms Z.
- 70. Van Sichem, Mr R.

IGSR

- 71. Schalkwijk, Dr M.
- 72. Menke, Dr J.

VHP

- 73. Ajodhia, Mr J.
- 74. Hassankhan, Mr M.
- 75. Rathipal, Mr M.

PL

- 76. Kasantaroeno, Mr F.
- 77. Kadirbaks, Mr R.S.

RAVAKSUR

- 78. Haverkamp, Mr R.
- 79. Shields, Mr S.
- 80. Gorisson, Ms Y.