



IMD

Partner in democracy



REPORT ON THE EVALUATION
OF THE

IMD PROGRAMME IN
BOLIVIA

2000 - 2003

C.G. Koonings

H.C. Felipe Mansilla

25 September, 2004

Contents

Executive summary	1
1. Introduction: context, terms of reference, research questions and methodology	4
2. Democracy, Political Parties and the fBDM	6
3. The nIMD-fBDM programme: vision, objectives, strategy, impact	13
4. Appreciation of the implementation modalities	25
5. Conclusions and recommendations	31
Annexes:	
A. List of consulted mission documents	35
B. Full Terms of Reference	37
C. Mission Schedule	43

Executive summary

This report contains the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the external evaluation of the Bolivia programme of the Institute for Multiparty Democracy (IMD). The evaluation was carried out on terms of reference that focused on various aspects or 'levels' of the programme:

- Its effect on the realization of the core objectives of the IMD Bolivia programme
- Its effectiveness in terms of programme structure and implementation
- Its relevance in terms of the added value of the fBDM and its programme of activities

On the basis of these terms of reference, the evaluators formulated the following operational research questions:

1. How and to what extent has the programme contributed to the objectives of IMD and fBDM, that is, the strengthening of multiparty democracy through institutionalisation, internal democracy, and the thematic and programmatic capacities of the parties and the party system?
2. Are the activities within the programme relevant, effective and consequential (having an impact) for these objectives?
3. Is the programme structure and implementation modality adequate and appropriate?

The core findings of this evaluation can be summarized in two sentences.

First: the Bolivia programme operated by IMD through its partnership with the fBDM since the end of 2002 has had, as its main achievement, the consolidation of a national multi-party organisation that represents all relevant political parties and is widely seen as a unique opportunity to strengthen democratic political parties and multi-party democracy as a key condition for democratic consolidation in the country.

Second: at the same time, however, it is necessary to give much more substance to this potential than has been achieved up till now, by developing a more ambitious and effective profile and programme for the fBDM in tune with its strategic objectives and priorities.

There is no doubt that, after two decades of relatively stable representative democracy, Bolivian politics have entered a rough stretch. The so-called 'pacted democracy' has collapsed under the combined weight of the social tensions created by a faithful application of the Washington Consensus, increasing social fragmentation, and the diminishing capacity of the conventional political parties (particularly MNR, MIR and ADN) to represent this growing diversity of societal groups and interests. One of the results has been the increase of social tensions and conflicts, another has been the widespread loss of legitimacy of the parties and the party system (a phenomenon that can be observed in many Latin American and other developing countries). Internal deficiencies within the parties (clientelism, corruption, neo-patrimonialism, lack of democracy, lack of programmatic capabilities, etcetera) have strongly contributed to this state of affairs, to the extent that it can be concluded that Bolivia's political parties and the party system are in *crisis*. Yet, a renovated and re-invigorated party system is seen as essential for the development of democracy in Bolivia: only such type of political parties is able to fulfil the crucial role of mediator between societal groups and interests on the one hand, and the state and public policy on the other hand. Therefore, the current crisis of political parties is at the same time seen as a *challenge*: an opportunity now imbued with more urgency than ever before, for party-political renewal. But such renewal can not be expected to succeed overnight: a medium- to long-term perspective is necessary. The upcoming three years are of key importance for the long-term future of Bolivia's democracy: 2005 will face the impact of the upcoming municipal elections and

quite likely see the election of a Constitutional Assembly; the impact of the new constitution will dominate politics from 2006 onward, especially the general election scheduled for 2007.

Over the past two years, the Bolivian Foundation for Multiparty Democracy (fBDM) has, with strong and direct support of IMD, been able to consolidate itself as an institution that is widely seen as unique in its kind and (potentially) well positioned to serve as a platform and initiator for the renewal and re-invigoration of democratic political parties in Bolivia. These priorities are formulated at the core of the vision and strategic objectives of the fBDM that is fully compatible with the vision and objectives of the IMD. The fBDM has gradually managed to expand the membership of old and new political parties, it enjoys good acceptance among prominent party officials, a key entity such as the CNE and representatives of civil society and academics. The fBDM is not associated with the old vices of the party system (its chairman is widely respected) and offers room to innovative forces within the political parties. The fact that the fBDM is supported by external, that is to say Dutch, funding is not seen as problematic but rather as valid and needed. The fBDM cherishes (for obvious reasons) its partnership with IMD from which it derives a certain degree of trustworthiness. The fBDM would prefer to maintain its status as (quasi-)exclusive partner of IMD in Bolivia, although it professes to be open-minded with respect to participation in other programmes with IMD (co-)financing.

The role of the fBDM in renewing and strengthening democratic political parties is two-fold. In the first place, the fBDM functions as a 'space' or a platform for dialogue, consensus and trust-building among political parties, especially regarding themes that bear on the democratic quality of the political parties and cross-cutting issues of the party system; here it is important that political parties have at their disposal a shared institutional space that allows them to address pertinent issues frankly without the looming presence of power calculations and short-term party interests. In the second place, the fBDM functions as a pro-active catalyst or generator of specific activities to enhance the democratic quality of the political parties and the party system. However, over the past two years, this role has not been sufficiently ambitious and visible; greater priority has in practise been given to the institutional consolidation of the fBDM, an endeavour that faced particularly turbulent social, political and institutional conditions since February 2003. At the present moment, however, priority should be shifted towards the formulation and implementation of a more ambitious and comprehensive strategy for the fBDM in order to fulfil its potential and to adequately respond to the important politico-institutional developments in the coming years.

IMD and fBDM each have a responsibility in the implementation and management of their partnership programme. IMD is characterised by the direct involvement of the Dutch political parties in the management of country programmes. In the case of the Bolivia programme, this is normally done on the basis of consensus despite occasional political and practical differences between the Christian Democrat and Groen Links parties' programme officers. IMD staff has a supportive and enabling role that is adequate. The management of information and monitoring can be improved, however. On this score, IMD has up till now been fairly permissive towards the fBDM but has also itself only recently started to improve its information management routines. Relationships between the two partners can be characterised as respectful and based upon mutual affinity and trust. Frequent visits by IMD delegations and mutual communication (by email) contribute to this and compensate in part for the less-than-optimal flow of information on programme activities and progress. fBDM has suffered considerable difficulties with its internal management and this has negatively affected its capacity to formulate and report on specific annual programmes. There is a clear need to separate the functions of chairperson and manager. At the same time, IMD has so far no standard format available for the monitoring of outcome and impact of programme activities. Although a manual for developing democratic political

parties has been published in 2004, its Bolivian partner feels that more could be done in the field of the exchange of expertise and lessons learned from IMD's experience with other programmes and partners. With respect to funding and the allocation of financial resources by the fBDM, it is quite clear that the latter depends substantially on the financial contributions of IMD. Although it may not be easy to change this state of affairs radically, possibilities for greater self-financing and diversification of financial contributions to the fBDM could and should be more actively explored. With respect to the allocation of resources by the fBDM, there has been a clear proportional imbalance in spending on personnel and institutional costs on the one hand, and programme activities on the other hand (the latter being at best around one-third of total expenditures).

1. Introduction: context, terms of reference, research questions and methodology

This report contains the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the external evaluation of the Bolivia programme of the Institute for Multiparty Democracy (IMD). This evaluation has been carried out by Kees Koonings (Utrecht University, The Netherlands) and H.C. Felipe Mansilla (independent consultant and publicist, La Paz, Bolivia) during the months of July, August and September 2004. The Bolivia programme of IMD started in 2002; after an initial brief period of direct support to Bolivian political parties prior to the elections of 2002; the programme has been carried out almost in its entirety through a partnership with the Bolivian Foundation for Multiparty Democracy (Fundación Boliviana para la Democracia Multipartidaria – fBDM). This Foundation was formally created in November 2002 and has been operating a programme in 2003 and 2004. This evaluation report addresses primarily the co-operation between IMD and fBDM and the programme of the latter.

IMD is still a relatively young organisation that was founded by the Dutch political parties in 2001 and started its programme activities in 2002. Currently, IMD works under the terms of a Thematic Co-Financing Grant (TMF) for the 2003-2007 period provided by the official budget for International Co-operation of the government of The Netherlands. This programme has as its point of departure that political parties are crucial for the functioning and deepening of democratic governance, not only in the field of electoral competition but also with respect to the accommodation of societal interests and the reconciliation of antagonism and conflict. In this view, democratic party politics also presupposes a democratic party system in which political parties develop and acknowledge a shared interest in democratic practises and the consolidation of democracy as a pluralistic and inclusive system.¹ IMD's *Framework for Democratic Party-Building*, published in 2004, provides an operational tool box for the design and implementation of this programme. This Framework focuses on the institutional development of political parties, the democratic quality of the party system (including pertinent institutional and legal arrangements), and the interface between parties and civil society. From this, three key objectives are derived: institutional strengthening of political parties and the party system; the stimulation of debate, discussion and reflection within and among the political parties; the strengthening of internal democracy within the political parties.

Since 2002, IMD has been managing programmes in 11 countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America that are considered 'young democracies'.² IMD's total budget for 2004 is € 7,653,500; € 5,084,000 (or 66 percent) is destined for the 11 country programmes, of which € 300,000 (or 6 percent of the country programme and 4 percent of the total budget) was allocated to the Bolivia programme.³

The evaluators were provided with terms of reference that focused on various aspects or 'levels' of the programme:⁴

- Its effect on the realization of the core objectives of the IMD Bolivia programme
- Its effectiveness in terms of programme structure and implementation
- Its relevance in terms of the added value of the fBDM and its programme of activities

¹ See IMD's (2002) funding proposal for 2003-2007 ('Without Democracy Nobody Fares Well'); also IMD *Annual Report 2003*, p. 5.

² These countries are: Bolivia, Ghana, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Suriname, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

³ Expenditures for the Bolivia programme in 2002 and 2003 have been € 290,003 and €201,291, respectively. See IMD *Annual Report 2003*, p. 68.

⁴ See Annex B for the full text of the Terms of Reference.

On the basis of these terms of reference, the evaluators formulated the following operational research questions:

1. How and to what extent has the programme contributed to the objectives of IMD and fBDM, that is, the strengthening of multiparty democracy through institutionalisation, internal democracy, and the thematic and programmatic capacities of the parties and the party system?
2. Are the activities within the programme relevant, effective and consequential (having an impact) for these objectives?
3. Is the programme structure and implementation modality adequate and appropriate?

To address these questions, the evaluators conducted research in The Netherlands (The Hague) and Bolivia (La Paz). The principal activity consisted of a field study in La Paz carried out jointly by Koonings and Mansilla between 18 and 28 August 2004. During this field study, ca. 40 persons were interviewed, individually or in small groups. The duration of the interviews varied between 45 minutes and 2 hours each. The informants came from the fBDM directorate, political parties, government and other public agencies, academic and research institutions, the news media, and the donor community. In addition, programme documents were studied in La Paz and The Hague, and IMD functionaries were interviewed by Koonings in July and early September 2004.⁵ The evaluators were in a position to appreciate the fBDM and the programme against the background of recent and current social and political developments in Bolivia: during the field mission a serious crisis broke out between the President and Congress, and frequent social protests affected daily life in La Paz. At the end of the field study (on Friday 27 August 2004) the evaluators gave a debriefing on their work and preliminary findings to the fBDM directorate.

The abundant information gathered has been analysed in three main clusters: (1) the (recent) development of democracy and the party system in Bolivia and the place and relevance of the fBDM in this context; (2) the objectives of the fBDM and its programme, its nature and content, and its outcome and impact; (3) the organisation (or structure) and management of the programme, including the relationship between IMD and fBDM and its relevance in comparison to other modalities of supporting democratic politics in Bolivia.

These three themes are analysed in detail in the following chapters 2, 3 and 4, respectively. Chapter 5 contains the conclusions of the evaluation and the recommendations that are based on the analysis and conclusions.

Finally, we would like to express our gratitude towards the people of IMD and fBDM for the trust they have bestowed upon the two evaluators and the freedom they allowed us to carry out the evaluation research. This has been an experience based on mutual respect and a shared conviction that democracy is a difficult business that deserves to be fought for. Also we would like to thank the many interlocutors in Bolivia and The Netherlands for the constructive and candid way in which they responded to our questions during the research. We are particularly grateful to the bureau staff of fBDM for the logistical support without which it would not have been possible to manage the hectic schedule of meetings and other activities in La Paz. Needless to say that any flaw or error in this report is the sole responsibility of the authors.

⁵ See Annex C for the complete working schedule of the evaluation mission and Annex A for the list of consulted mission documents.

2. Democracy, Political Parties and the fBDM

2.1 Democratisation and political crisis since the 1980s

There is of course a wide range of opinions about the political and institutional evolution of Bolivia, but some central arguments turned out to be prevailing. Dissident voices have been also considered, when it seemed to be pertinent.

Bolivia won its independence from Spain in 1825, after a long and ruinous war which lasted sixteen years. A large part of Bolivia's 19th century history was beset by political turmoil and economic decay. The commercial ties with the world market were disrupted. Only about 1880 began a modest economic and institutional recovery.⁶ But this long period of isolation and decline produced an important and until now enduring consequence: the strengthening of an authoritarian, centralist and bureaucratic culture, which was in many forms the continuation of the Spanish institutional traditions.⁷ The rather slow modernization process took place only after the so-called "National Revolution" in April 1952.⁸ This revolution induced a radical land reform (in favour of the indigenous peasants in Bolivia's western half⁹), the nationalization of the large private tin mines, and the definite displacement of the old landed aristocracy. This revolutionary period, led by the still most important political party, the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR: Nationalist Revolutionary Movement), came to an end in 1964, replaced by a series of military dictatorships. The reformist and populist experiment of MNR did not alter, however, the prevailing political culture of authoritarianism and centralism, although it coincided with the political emerging of the middle classes. As afore-mentioned, this phenomenon has still an outstanding meaning in Bolivia.¹⁰

Until 1982 Bolivia had probably the world record of political instability caused by chaotic governments and continuous military *coups d'état*. Like many Latin American countries, after a long military dictatorship the rule of law and representative democracy were re-established in October 1982. A weak and luckless left-wing government (1982-1985) induced a very high inflation process (the second highest rate in world history) and was paradoxically confronted with the fierce opposition of both trade unions and private entrepreneurs. This period has been called a "drifting

⁶ Cf. some important collections of essays about the social and economic history of Bolivia: Herbert S. Klein, *Bolivia: The Evolution of a Multi-Ethnic Society*, New York / Oxford: Oxford U. P. 1982; Fernando Campero Prudencio (ed.), *Bolivia en el siglo XX. La formación de la Bolivia contemporánea*, La Paz: Harvard Club de Bolivia 2000; Dora Cajías et al. (eds.), *Visiones de fin de siglo. Bolivia y América Latina en el siglo XX*, La Paz: IFEA 2001.

⁷ Some interesting insights in: Claudio Véliz, *The Centralist Tradition of Latin America*, Princeton: Princeton U. P. 1980. On the specific Bolivian case cf. Marta Irurozqui, *La armonía de las desigualdades*, Cuzco: CSIC / Centro Bartolomé de Las Casas 1994.

⁸ The most important studies about the "National Revolution" are: James M. Malloy, *Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution*, Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh U. P. 1970; Herbert S. Klein, *Orígenes de la Revolución Nacional boliviana*, La Paz: Juventud 1987; III Tercer Congreso Nacional de Sociología (ed.), *Medio siglo de la Revolución Nacional de 1952*, La Paz: Colegio de Sociólogos de Bolivia / UMSA 2003.

⁹ Danilo Paz Ballivián, *Medio siglo de la reforma agraria boliviana*, in: OPINIONES Y ANALISIS (La Paz), Nr. 65, November 2003, pp. 11-56

¹⁰ Franco Gamboa Rocabado, *La revolución del '52 bajo la luz del presente*, in: T'INKAZOS (La Paz), vol. 2, Nr. 3, April 1999, pp. 42-71

democracy".¹¹ By fair and free elections liberal-conservative government coalitions came into power in 1985 and lasted until 2003. They suppressed inflation by reducing social expenses and by closing state-owned enterprises.

During those eighteen years (1985-2003) Bolivia represented a faithful example of the so-called Washington Consensus. It combined pluralistic, representative democracy, free elections and the relative rule of law with a liberal economic system, free trade and the privatisation of state enterprises. This period has been seen by politicians and social scientists as a promising model, but now it demonstrates its own limitations.¹² At the political level, Bolivia experienced a surprisingly long time of governmental and monetary stability. But this model proved to be partially based on clay feet, especially in the social area. But first we must insist on the positive and promising assets of this liberal period. Almost all interviewed persons agreed on following issues.

(a) By traditional Bolivian standards there was (and is) a small number of political parties in parliament (7 to 10). Three main parties (MNR: Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario; ADN: Alianza Democrática Nacionalista; and MIR: Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria) built the core of all political alliances and government coalitions in that period 1985-2003. In spite of their names these parties are (or better: have become) rather conservative organizations. Since 1985 and up to approximately 2003 they exhibited stable internal structures, strong regional leaderships, and the capability of building relatively solid parliamentary coalitions. They were also able to supply experts and functionaries for many posts in the public administration, whose quality and performance have rested very doubtful.¹³ The party system was (or seemed to be) moderate, non-polarized, interest-led (non-ideologized) and co-operative.

(b) This system of alliances and coalitions (*la democracia pactada*) rendered possible a long period of relative social peace.¹⁴ The great reforms in the years after 1985 were due to this coalition system: the establishment of a liberal market economy, the reduction of the economic role of the state, the privatisation of almost all state-owned enterprises, the reform of the pension system, the decentralisation of the main state structures and some valuable efforts to change cultural and educational patterns.

(c) In the same time the trade unions, the leftist parties, the indigenous associations and the so-called social movements were weakened and exempt of a nation-wide impact. But since April 2000, the regeneration of all them began. Two main aspects of Bolivian social life were neglected in this period: the demands of the indigenous population and the rise of the so-called new social movements (the informal, the unemployed, the landless peasants, the urban and community-based movements, the regionalist currents, etc.).¹⁵

¹¹ René Antonio Mayorga (ed.), *Democracia a la deriva. Dilemas de la participación y concertación social*, La Paz: CLACSO / CERES 1987; Robert Laserna (ed.), *Crisis, democracia y conflicto social*, Cochabamba: CERES 1985.

¹² Cf. the writings of the most skilful advocate of this liberal-democratic model: René Antonio Mayorga, *La democracia en Bolivia: presidencialismo parlamentarizado y gobiernos de coalición*, en: Jorge Lanzaro / R. A. Mayorga (eds.), *Presidencialismo y gobiernos de coalición en América Latina*, Buenos Aires: CLACSO / EUDEBA 2001; René Antonio Mayorga, *Desmontaje de la democracia. Crítica de las propuestas de reforma política del Diálogo Nacional 2000 y las tendencias antisistémicas*, La Paz: CEBEM 2001

¹³ OPINIONES Y ANALISIS, Nr. 47, October 1999; OPINIONES Y ANALISIS, Nr. 50, August 2000

¹⁴ Interview with Mr. Salvador Romero Ballivián, CNE, 19 August 2004.

¹⁵ Arturo D. Villanueva, *Pueblos indígenas y conflictos de tierras*, La Paz: Fundación Tierra 2004

But the coalition system is perceived now in a completely different way. As Mr. Jorge Cortés (who has been a former Minister of Sustainable Development) pointed out, there is today a general crisis of the whole party and even the state system.¹⁶ The popular uprisings during 2003, the resignation of President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada and, since October 2003, the introduction of different economic and institutional policies by the new president, Carlos D. Mesa Gisbert, have put a temporary end to both the coalition system (especially the close co-operation between government and parliament) and the predominant policy which was so clearly favourable to foreign private investments.

The liberal period (1985-2003) was not able (and was not willing, according to many voices) to modify the second largest income inequality in the world (according to a report of the World Bank).¹⁷ Unemployment rates are still very high; that is: the main source of political unrest is given. The police riots in February 2003 and the popular uprising in October 2003, which led to the overthrow of the legally elected president Sánchez de Lozada, exhibited the narrow popular support of the liberal regime. Most of these factors are still at work and build today a durable constellation of high social exclusion, administrative corruption, unresolved ethnic issues and new political radicalism - with an uncertain result.

Most of the interviewed persons agreed on following central issues of critique against the Bolivian model of liberal democracy, issues which have become definitely evident with the afore-mentioned events since February 2003:¹⁸

- the loss of public confidence in all political parties
- the separation between politics and ethics
- the distance between the legal frame and everyday's political practice
- the very poor political leadership¹⁹ (which lacks intellectual gifts and technical skills)
- the transformation of the coalition system into a "fraternal" distribution of funds, power positions and other privileges among the ruling parties
- the lack of internal democracy within the parties
- the continual practice of *caudillismo* and the still strong position of family groups in the leadership level of political parties
- the persistence of the traditional political culture of authoritarianism in the whole of social life²⁰

¹⁶ Interview with Mr. Jorge Cortés, Minister and Presidential Delegate for Institutional Reform, 27 August 2004. This view was anticipated by other social scientists: Marcelo Varnoux Garay, *El Estado que necesitamos, el Estado que queremos: una evaluación del papel del Estado en el marco de las reformas de segunda generación*, in: Carlos F. Toranzo Roca (ed.), *Bolivia: visiones de futuro*, La Paz: ILDIS 2002, pp. 69-109; Gonzalo Rojas Ortuste, *La crisis de la democracia y sus salidas institucionales y políticas*, in: OPINIONES Y ANALISIS (La Paz), Nr. 54, July 2001, pp. 11-31; cf. also the special number of OPINIONES Y ANALISIS, Nr. 66, December 2003

¹⁷ Reported by Miguel Urioste, *Hasta las últimas consecuencias*, in: LA PRENSA (La Paz), September 5, 2004, p. 15a

¹⁸ Cf. also: Fernando Mayorga, *Sistema de partidos en Bolivia: crisis y recomposición?*, in: *Crisis de los partidos políticos en la región andina: lecciones de la historia*, La Paz: FUNDEMOS 2001, pp. 149-187; Jorge Lazarte, *La globalización en la crisis de los partidos*, in: *ibid.*, pp. 189-226

¹⁹ René Antonio Mayorga, *Democracia y liderazgo político en Bolivia*, in: Wilhelm Hofmeister (ed.), *Liderazgo político en América Latina*, Rio de Janeiro: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung 2002, pp. 167-212

Almost all interviewed persons asserted that the political parties have been unsuccessful in trying to articulate and canalise the demands of large social groups, especially of the indigenous population, the impoverished middle classes, the young, the jobless and the informal. One of the most discussed issues in Bolivian political science has been the lack of representative-ness of the political parties.²¹ This point was particularly stressed by journalists and people from the mass media.²² Parties belong now to the most discredited institutions in Bolivian social life. This is due to their multiple incapability of producing new programmes, strengthening the institutional sphere and representing large social sectors.²³ They are not the voice of the emerging population groups, like young people and regionalist movements. Instead of that the Bolivian political parties have continuously indulged in all forms of corruption, favouritism and patrimonialism.

The largest parties failed also in granting the due significance to following themes:

(a) Most Bolivian Indians do not identify themselves fully with the actual Bolivian state and society.²⁴ They presuppose (or better: they feel) the enduring existence of cultural and economic structures led apparently against themselves and favourable to the 'minorities' of white and *mestizos* (problem of a persistent 'internal colonialism'²⁵).

(b) Parties did not consider adequately the regional differences and the regionalist currents, which have become increasingly important and strong in the last years.

There is an almost general agreement on these points:

- a growing separation between political parties and civil society²⁶
- a continuing fragmentation of the largest parties (with the possible exception of MAS [Movimiento al Socialismo] and MIP [Movimiento Indígena Pachakuti])
- the strong probability of a considerable failure of the traditional parties (others than MIP and MAS) at the municipal elections of December, 2004²⁷

²⁰ Jorge Lazarte, *Entre dos mundos: la cultura democrática en Bolivia*, in: Carlos F. Toranzo Roca (ed.), *Democracia y cultura política en Bolivia*, La Paz: PRONAGOB / CNE 2001, pp. 27-153; Mitchell A. Seligson, *La cultura política de la democracia en Bolivia*, La Paz: Universidad Católica Boliviana / USAid 2003

²¹ Cf. among other publications: Gonzalo Rojas Ortuste / Moira Zuazo, *Los problemas de representatividad del sistema democrático boliviano. Bajo el signo de la reforma del Estado*, La Paz: ILDIS 1996

²² Interviews with Mr. Claudio Rossell Arce, *La Prensa*, 26 August 2004; and Mr. Fernando Molina, *Pulso*, 27 August 2004).

²³ Interview with Mr. Saúl Lara, Minister of the Interior, 23 August 2004.

²⁴ Interviews with Mr. Tomás Quispe, MIP, 26 August 2004; and Mr. Luis Alberto Aguilar, member of Parliament, MAS, 24 August 2004.

²⁵ Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, *La raíz: colonizadores y colonizados*, in: Xavier Albó / Raúl Barrios (eds.), *Violencias encubiertas en Bolivia*, vol. I: *Cultura y política*, La Paz: CIPCA 2003; José M. Gordillo, *Campesinos revolucionarios en Bolivia*, Cochabamba: Promec / Plural 2000.

²⁶ Fernando Mayorga, *Avatares. Ensayos sobre política y sociedad en Bolivia*, Cochabamba CESU/UMSS 2003, pp. 69-117

²⁷ Interviews with Mr. Mario Napoleón Pacheco, MILENIO, 25 August 2004; and Mrs. Yvonne Fernández Weisser, FUNDEMOS, 25 August 2004.

- the possibility of a broad rearrangement of the whole Bolivian party system after December, 2004
- the probability of a strong thriving of neopopulist currents²⁸

2.2 Political party renovation and the fBDM

Only two well-informed interviewees spoke in favour to the collapse and elimination of the party system as a "historical necessity" in order to clean radically the political scene.²⁹ Almost all other interviewed persons declared that the party crisis is also a productive challenge,³⁰ a perhaps last opportunity of renewal or rebirth of these institutions. They do not perceive any serious alternative to the political parties as nationwide institutions for ascertaining the political will of the population, for articulating the corresponding demands and to canalise the appropriate decisions through the state apparatus. Mr. Mario Cossío (chairman of the Chamber of Deputies [MNR]) and other parliamentarians said that the probable alternative to the party system would be social disorder, chaos and even civil war.³¹ This opinion is very widespread, also among social scientists.³² Parties are seen as the lesser evil in comparison with other organizations. Almost all voices pointed out that the newly allowed citizens' associations and other similar non-parties institutions (*agrupaciones ciudadanas y pueblos indígenas*) - which can now take part in national and municipal elections under the same conditions which are valid for political parties - will most probably unfold the same behaviour patterns (*caudillismo*, undemocratic structures, greed of funds and power parcels) like conventional political parties, but lacking the nationwide organization, the experience and the practical skills of the latter. They can be also be affected by corruption practices and other evils of every party system.³³

The feebleness of the whole party scene, the post-October agenda, the results of the referendum (July, 18, 2004)³⁴ - which consolidated the legitimacy of President Mesa Gisbert) - and the appearance of non-party political institutions (with a weaker strength than generally accepted) confronts the fBDM with new tasks and challenges. Almost all of the interviewed persons stated clearly that:

(1) For the Bolivian future it is indispensable to preserve (and to rescue, if necessary) the party system.

²⁸ Cf. the standard work on Bolivian neopopulism: Fernando Mayorga, *Neopopulismo y democracia*, Cochabamba: CESU / UMSS 2002

²⁹ Interview with Mr. Jorge Lazarte and Mr. René Blattmann, 18 August 2004. Very critical were also Mr. Javier Campero Paz (acting chairman of the MNR), Mr. Franz Barrios (senator, MBL) and Mr. Godofredo Sandoval (executive director, PIEB). See Annex C for interview dates.

³⁰ Fernando Mayorga et al., *Retos para la democracia en la coyuntura*, La Paz: fBDM 2003

³¹ Interviews with Mr. Erick Reyes Villa (NFR), Mrs. Ericka Brockmann (MIR), Mr. Hugo Carvajal (MIR). See Annex C for interview dates.

³² Interviews with Mrs. Gloria Ardaya, Mr. Franco Gamboa Rocabado, Mr. Fernando Mayorga, Mr. Fernando Molina, Mr. Salvador Romero Ballivián, Mr. Gonzalo Rojas Ortuste, and Mr. Godofredo Sandoval. See Annex C for interview dates. Interview with Mayorga conducted by Felipe Mansilla in March 2004.

³³ Interview with Mr. Claudio Rossell Arce, La Prensa, 26 August 2004.

³⁴ María Teresa Zegada et al., *El referéndum 2004 en Bolivia*, La Paz: Corte Nacional Electoral 2004; special number of OPINIONES Y ANALISIS (La Paz), Nr. 70, August 2004.

- (2) The way to this desideratum is the renovation of the political structures, especially the innovation of the political parties, both in organizational and programmatic levels.
- (3) The fBDM can and should play a decisively important role, giving sustainable technical and intellectual support to broad modernization efforts concerning all political parties.
- (4) The fBDM is unanimously perceived as the only institution of this kind: accepted by all parties (including the indigenous parties and organizations), respected by the intellectuals and social scientists and well seen by the mass media.
- (5) The fBDM is generally appreciated as a pluralistic forum and as an ideologically neutral meeting space for all parties, which, besides that, exhibits a considerable degree of discretion and familiarity to discuss political issues without the pressure of the mass media and public opinion. This atmosphere creates a climate of confidence (among politicians) and trust (between politicians and other personalities of social life).

In a long interview, Mr. Fernando Mayorga referred to his own experience with young members of all parties during a workshop (seminar) held at the National Electoral Court (CNE: Corte Nacional Electoral) in March 2004. He detected the following deficiencies, which could be overcome by fBDM activities: poor managerial (organizational) skills with regard to party activities; deficient intellectual faculties and lack of knowledge about Bolivian sociology and history; and scarce knowledge of foreign countries and even actual world problems.

The fBDM shows also some elements of feebleness, which can be easily compensated:

- concerning the foundation's activities: lack of presence of women, Indians and young people
- deficient links to the mass media, the universities and the intellectual scene
- very few activities outside the city of La Paz
- a bad distribution of its publications
- unilateral dependency on one or two financial sources

There was no voice at all against the existence of the fBDM, against the Dutch cooperation and against the chairman of the fBDM, whose conciliatory and integrative capabilities were generally praised.

2.3 Representativeness and relevance of the fBDM within the party system

In order for the fBDM to be able to fulfil its role as platform for multi-party democracy and as generator of specific activities to strengthen this (to be addressed in the next chapter), it is important that the Foundation is seen as legitimate by its member parties and that the representatives of these parties carry sufficient weight within their respective political organisations.

There is no clear way to verify this point unambiguously. Initially, the group that took the initiative came out of the 'sounding group' that accompanied the 2002 activities of IMD in Bolivia (see the next chapter). During the politically turbulent year of 2003, this group maintained its cohesion and commitment to the objectives and activities of the Foundation. In 2004, representatives of more political parties (namely MSM, MBL and FRI) joined the Foundation.³⁵ In fact, all political parties with a representation in Congress or regularised through the CNE are participating in the fBDM. At present the nature of the representation of political parties is being reconsidered, in the sense that

³⁵ Also the current independent mayor of El Alto, who has been working to set up his own party for the December 2004 elections, has stated his intention to join the fBDM after the formalisation of his party organisation. Interview with Mr. José Luis Paredes, 25 August 2004.

party delegates in the fBDM should be mandated officially by their party. In this way, the status of the fBDM vis-à-vis the member parties could be further enhanced. During our interviews, opinions as to the political weight of party representatives in the fBDM varied: according to some it was good, according to others this could be improved. We have noted a certain prevalence of potential party ‘innovators’ among the fBDM activists, especially from MNR and ADN.

All parties, through high-ranking interlocutors we interviewed, stated that they considered the fBDM to be a representative and important organisation. A partial exception could be made in the case of the MIP. Although this party is formally present in the fBDM, their officials seem to nurture a certain degree of scepticism vis-à-vis the Foundation. They are still not totally convinced that the fBDM give due consideration to the position and interests of the indigenous population. To a certain degree this is the consequence of the somewhat intransigent or radical posture adopted by MIP officials themselves. However, the importance of making efforts to incorporate the indigenous sectors is clearly recognised within the fBDM directorate.

A final point to consider is the question how the fBDM should face the emergence of so-called new political actors. In fact, new parties, especially MAS and recently formed parties representing urban interests (like MSM) have been incorporated. The fBDM has an open attitude to this issue. However, with respect to the *agrupaciones ciudadanos* and *pueblos indígenas* now being formed under the law ACPI that enables direct electoral participation of such groups, most interlocutors are of the opinion that at the present moment the fBDM should not take steps to incorporate them as members of the Foundation. The principal argument for this is that it is necessary to, first, await the results of the December 2004 municipal elections, and second, the subsequent evolution of these new entities. It is possible, for instance that many of them turn out to be unstable or of dubious representative-ness. Others may well transform into regular parties or be absorbed by existing ones. It is therefore advisable to consider the development of these new actors before deciding on a strategy to address them. It is conceivable that other entities, such as the Federation of Municipal Mayors (FAM: Federación de Alcaldes Municipales), are more appropriate platforms for new local political groups.

3. The IMD-fBDM programme: vision, objectives, strategy, impact

3.1 Antecedents: programme identification and direct support to political parties and political debate, 2001-2002

Preparations for IMD's programme in Bolivia started with a desk study in 2001, followed by an exploratory mission in November 2001 headed by Mr. Jos van Gennip. IMD's intention was to move quickly towards the definition and actual start of its activities aimed at supporting Bolivia's political parties. This mission was to identify the possibilities for starting a programme in line with the general IMD objectives (see Introduction), considering the following objectives: strengthening the institutional and organisational structure of political parties, strengthening their decentralisation at the department, municipality, and community levels, and strengthening their analytical and programmatic capacity. In addition, the November 2001 mission was asked to discuss and reflect upon the operational modalities of such a programme.

The mission recommended positively with respect to the possibilities and desirability of setting up a Bolivia programme to support the political parties. This programme could entail projects designed by individual parties as well as multiparty activities. The mission suggested that a 'mechanism for shared responsibility' between the Bolivian parties and IMD be set up to design and implement the programme.

Shortly after the conclusion of this exploratory mission, a more specific identification mission to Bolivia was undertaken in February 2002, led by Mr. Cor van Beuningen. This mission identified two lines of action for the incipient Bolivia programme: to support the elaboration and diffusion of political programmes of parties during the 2002 electoral campaign; the support the public political debate in the country. To that end, six parties submitted proposals (totalling US\$ 230,000), and public debate was to be deepened by a broadcasted electoral debate organised by CEPB, a written debate in *Pulso* magazine, and a series of 12 regional debates (totalling US\$ 50,000).

An additional objective of this 2002 programme was to position IMD 'on the ground' in Bolivia; this was expected to lead to a learning process on the part of IMD and to strengthen relationships between IMD and key Bolivian protagonists and stakeholders. To this end, the 2002 programme was accompanied by a 'sounding group' committee chaired by Mr. Carlos Toranzo Roca. The latter was also hired to evaluate the 2002 programme and to formulate suggestions for subsequent IMD-supported activities.

The assessment of the 2002 programme (Toranzo, 2002) was mildly positive. The single most important problem that the programme encountered was the ruling by the National Electoral Court (CNE: Corte Nacional Electoral) that individual political parties were not allowed to receive direct financial support from foreign donors for their electoral campaign activities.³⁶ Additional problems signalled by Toranzo were the late start of the programme (in relation to the election date in June 2002), the late disbursement of funds, and the limited capacity of some parties to administrate project activities of this nature. Nevertheless, MNR, MIR, ADN, NFR and MAS used the IMD funding to hire experts to elaborate (parts of their) electoral programme or to communicate their programmes through printed material. In addition the debate between presidential and vice-presidential candidates under the auspices of the Bolivian Confederation of Private Entrepreneurs (CEPB: Confederación de Empresarios privados de Bolivia) was

³⁶ This ruling came as a surprise to most involved due to the late moment of the decision and previous indications that the programme did not violate legislation.

broadcasted by national television and thematic debates moderated by party-linked foundations were published in *Pulso*. In a more general sense, the evaluation concluded that support to the party system is relevant (but often neglected, contrary to support for civil society organisations) within the overall context of democratic consolidation. The evaluation came up with a number of suggestions for the future, the most important of which was to found an inter-party foundation that could be the basis for future co-operation between the Bolivian political parties and the IMD. This programme should be aimed at institutional and organisational strengthening of the political parties, at enhancing their programmatic capabilities, at training party cadres and militants, at decentralising party activities, and at involving key protagonists from the political parties and also civil society in mutual encounters.³⁷

3.2 Foundation, vision and objectives of fBDM

Following the conclusion of the 2002 programme, steps were taken to effectively create such an inter-party foundation. The 2002 programme was directly instrumental since it brought together protagonists from political parties, academia and civil society. In fact, the CNE itself recommended the creation of an inter-party foundation to channel future co-operation between the Bolivian political party system and IMD.³⁸ Prime mover of the creation of this foundation was Mr. Guido Riveros Franck, MIR politician and former Bolivian ambassador to Colombia, who had also acted as counterpart for the November 2001 pre-identification mission of IMD. Other protagonists were involved in the ‘sounding group’ committee of the 2002 programme; this group was expanded and transformed into a group of ‘founding members’ of the Bolivian Foundation for Multiparty Democracy (Fundación Boliviana para la Democracia Multipartidaria, fBDM³⁹). An active role was also played by IMD, particularly through the involvement of CDA party co-ordinator Mrs. Dionne Dinkhuijzen and IMD consultant Mr. Cor van Beuningen who took part in the foundational deliberations during the second half of 2002. fBDM was legally established in November 2002 and had established itself physically (with office premises and small staff) by early 2003.

The conceptual starting point of fBDM was the assertion that Bolivian political parties and the party system as a whole suffered from a profound crisis of legitimacy due to internal flaws and the erosion of credibility vis-à-vis civil society and public opinion (see chapter 2 for an analysis). fBDM sought to overcome this state of affairs by adopting as its general objective “to develop and consolidate democratic forms of thinking and acting among and within Bolivian political parties, and to contribute to the strengthening of adequate relationships between parties, civil society and the State.” (fBDM Mission Statement, s.d.). A number of specific objectives were formulated, to be incorporated in a tri-annual strategy and annual operational plans from 2003 onwards. The specific objectives entail:

- To promote political training, organisational strengthening and capacity building to enhance democratic conduct;
- To support the creation of inter- and intra-party spaces for debate and reflection;
- To contribute to norms and conduct for internal party democracy.

These general and specific objectives are consistent with IMD’s objectives (see Introduction).

³⁷ Alongside the obvious recommendation to triple-check the legal feasibility of any future programme.

³⁸ Statement by Mrs. Roxana Ibarregaray, CNE Councillor, interviewed 19 August 2004.

³⁹ fBDM is the acronym currently used by the Foundation. We will use either this acronym or ‘the Foundation’ throughout this report. Initially the Foundation was shorthanded as Fubodem.

In practice, these objectives were developed further into a two-pronged overall strategy in which fBDM was at the same time ‘means and end’ for strengthening multiparty democracy in Bolivia. The role of fBDM as an *instrument* for the implementation of the Bolivia programme means that the Foundation designs and carries out specific activities or ‘projects’; the role of fBDM as an *end in itself* means that the Foundation forms an institutional space for political encounters and the development and spread of an alternative, more democratic political culture. The conceptual and strategic inputs from IMD, particularly from its Bolivia consultant, were important in defining this strategic vision.⁴⁰ From the latter’s perspective, the role of fBDM as an end in itself appears as the most important aspect. In early 2003, the IMD representatives emphasised the need to ‘consolidate’ the ‘as yet fragile’ existence of fBDM so that it could evolve not only as an institution but also as a space for dialogue and trust within political and civil society in Bolivia.

The general vision of fBDM is operationalised into 13 ‘working areas’ (*líneas de trabajo*) that can be grouped under a few thematic headers: to create spaces for debate, trust and understanding among the political parties and between the party system and societal actors; to enhance the programmatic capabilities of the parties; to strengthen the institutional solidity and internal democracy of the parties; to stimulate democratic culture and ethics in political and public policy conduct; to further pro-democratic legal reforms; to learn from comparative experiences with democratisation (fBDM Mission Statement, s.d.). These working areas are by and large consistent with the overall contours of IMD’s (2004) *Framework for Democratic Party Building*. It must be noted, however, that this is an *ex post* appreciation; this framework had not yet been drafted at the time fBDM formulated its objectives and strategy.

3.3 The programme of fBDM: strategy, activities, impact

The proof of the pudding is, of course, in eating it. In principle, the vision and objectives of fBDM, and hence of IMD’s Bolivia programme from 2003 onward, are operationalised in a tri-annual programme and in annual ‘operational plans’ (Plan Operacional Anual, POA). In the POA, specific and budgeted activities should be related to the general and specific objectives and to the ‘working areas’ derived from these objectives. Ideally (at least in the ‘logical framework approach’ fashionable in programme- and project-based planning and control cycles), the planned activities are motivated in terms of aim, content, target group and intended or expected outcome and impact.

Operational strategy

This evaluation mission has not encountered a specific tri-annual programme *document* for the co-operation between fBDM and IDM during the 2003-2005 period. By the end of January 2003, fBDM presented a project proposal to IMD that consisted of a very general outline of proposed activities (see box 4.1). These activities envisioned intra- and inter-party workshops and debates, meetings of members of Congress, training activities for party leaders and cadres, study and analysis, and internal debates among Foundation members. For 2004, a more systematic POA was elaborated and presented to IMD (see box 3.1).

⁴⁰ Policy Memorandum Dinkhuijsen & Van Beuningen, March 2003; statement by Mr. Cor van Beuningen, interviewed on 13 July 2004.

Box 3.1 Planned activities fBDM, 2003, 2004

2003 (Fubodem, Naturaleza y propositos del proyecto, 28 January 2003)

- Research activity to analyse the political and party system
- Training of party leaders and activists on democratic values and conduct
- Meetings, seminars, workshops and debates on pluralism, political tolerance, internal democracy and democratic institutions, in the form of intra-party workshops, inter-party panels and public conferences
- Co-operation and exchange among political parties
- Meetings of parliamentarians to promote legislative modernisation and other actions to enhance the dissemination of a democratic and pluralistic political culture
- Internal debates among members of the fBDM

2004 (final Plan Operativo Annual 2004, April 2004)

External activities

- 3 seminars with (former Peruvian president) Valentin Paniagua (April)
- Publication of texts on parties in the crisis (April)
- Round table on the referendum with government, Congress and CNE (May)
- Discussion panels on the Diagnostical Study of the Political Parties (May, June, July)
- Seminars on party legislation and electoral processes (July, August, September)
- First issue of a proposed fBDM 'Review' (September)
- Discussion panels on national cultural and economic issues (May-December)

Internal activities

- Renewal of party affiliation to fBDM (April)
- Inauguration of website fBDM (May/June)
- Evaluation of the Fddpc training programme (June)
- Support for CEEILA international seminar in Santa Cruz (June/July)
- Elaboration of selection criteria for IIG study grants (September)
- Launching event fBDM: 22 years of Bolivian democracy (November)
- Preparation for participation in FIAPP, Brasília (November)

Activities

If we consider the actual activities carried out by fBDM we observe that discussion panels, workshops and conferences have been the predominant activities of the Foundation between April 2003 and August 2004 (see box 4.2 for a complete overview). These activities brought together party politicians, leading academics, and representatives of civil society organisations; presentations and proceedings have been published subsequently in an fBDM booklet series that

is also available through the website of the foundation.⁴¹ A planned international conference celebrating 21 years of democracy in Bolivia in October 2003 had to be cancelled due to the social and political upheavals that took place during that month. Other activities undertaken included the training of party activists (contracted out to Fddpc), the sponsoring of a number of grants allowing party activists to follow a certificate programme (*diplomado superior*) in electoral law and management (initiated through a covenant with the CNE), and the sponsoring of a base line study on the situation of the political parties in Bolivia (Costa Benevides et al. 2003).

A notable qualitative development has been the organisation of the first General Assembly of the fBDM in La Paz on 17 August 2004. This plenary meeting was attended by 60 people upon previous invitation, while an additional 23 invitees (most of them members of Congress) confirmed their interest but were unable to attend for diverse reasons. The group of attendees and invitees comprised politicians (including fBDM directors and members of Congress), representatives of civil society organisations and the private sector, journalists, academics, representatives from donor agencies. During the assembly, those present stated their views on the prospects for multiparty democracy in Bolivia and the role that the fBDM and its Assembly could play.

⁴¹ See list of consulted documents and www.democraciapartidos.org.bo

Box 3.2 Activities realised by fBDM 2003, 2004 (January-August)

2003

seminars, conferences and debates

- 3 April: Discussion panel ‘Retos para la democracia en la conyuntura’
- 6 May: Discussion panel ‘El rol del parlamento en la concertación política’ (in collaboration with the Foro Político Nacional de Mujeres and the Unión de Mujeres Parlamentarias de Bolivia)
- 13 May: Internal debate on ‘El pacto social’
- s.d.: Internal debate on the first year of the Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada administration
- 9 July: Discussion panel ‘Ética y partidos políticos en el parlamento’ (in collaboration with the Comisión de Ética de la Honorable Cámara de Diputados)
- 10 September: Discussion panel : ‘Estado, sociedad y partidos políticos’ (broadcasted on television and radio)
- 7 October: Lecture by Daniel Zovatto (IDEA) on Electoral reform in Latin America (in cooperation with the CNE), followed by a book presentation and an internal debate on the latest polling results of Latinobarometro.
- 23-25 November: panel in the Annual Conference of the OAS Interamerican Forum of Political Parties (in Cartagena, Colombia)

publications

- fBDM brochure
- Insert in *La Epoca* magazine
- 3 books: Retos para la democracia en la conyuntura; Ética y partidos políticos en el parlamento ; Parlamento y partidos políticos en la concertación
- Covenant with *Pulso* magazine for the publication of articles of social and political interest (in cooperation with FES-ILDIS, COSUDE, FUNDEMOS, KAS)

training

- training of party leadership and militants
- 6 grants (3 full, 3 partial) for the Diplomado Superior en Gestión y Derecho Electoral (in cooperation with the CNE and the Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar)

miscellaneous

- Research project Diagnóstica sobre partidos políticos en Bolivia (carried out by CIBEC)
- Elaboration of a Communication Plan (by Lic. Arturo Cárdenas)

2004

seminars, conferences and debates

- 16 January: Discussion panel ‘Formas de democracia directa’ (in cooperation with the

CNE)

- 30 January: International discussion panel ‘Sistema de partidos en sociedades plurales’ (in cooperation with the CNE)
- 11 February: Round table ‘Finalmente, Tiene Bolivia un plan económico?’
- 5 March: Discussion panel ‘Asamblea Constituyente como instrumento de cambio en los países y los partidos’
- 10 March: Round table with members of Congress and government ministers on the relationship between parliament and government, with an introduction by Dr. H.C.F. Mansilla
- 12 and 13 April: Regional seminars with Mr. Valentín Paniagua (former President of Peru) in El Alto, Cochabamba, Santa Cruz (in cooperation with the CNE, the NDI and the IRI)
- 28 April: Round table on the referendum with the chairmen of the respective committees of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, cabinet ministers and councillors of the CNE
- 17 August: first meeting of the General Assembly of the fBDM

publications

- 3 books: Crisis de la democracia y de la representación Bolivia 2003 ; Finalmente, Tiene Bolivia un plan económico?; Los partidos políticos ante la crisis

training: no activities reported

miscellaneous: no activities reported

Source: fBDM internal reports (Informe complementario de actividades gestión 2003, s.d.; primer informe de la fBDM 2004, 6 May 2004 by Gonzalo Rojas Ortuste, manager fBDM)

Impact assessment

If we try to arrive at an overall assessment of the *relevance and impact* activities of fBDM a certain measure of caution is called for. With one exception⁴², no (detailed) reports of seminar events and training activities are available, either in printed form or on the fBDM website. A number of seminars and conferences have subsequently resulted in fBDM publications. Our assessment is therefore based on the thematic content of the events and publication, their dissemination, and the appreciation of our informants with respect to fBDM events and the role and relevance of fBDM and its activities more generally.

With respect to the relationship between strategy and activities, it must be observed that this connection has been rather loose during 2003 and the first half of 2004. Especially in 2003, the (rather un-specific) plan of activities appeared to be far wider than activities actually realised. For 2004, a first effort was made to link planned activities to an operational strategy, but for various reasons that have to do with the managerial performance within the fBDM, this has not been followed through during the current year (for reasons we return to this in the next chapter where we discuss the managerial or ‘governance’ aspects of the IMD-fBDM co-operation).

⁴² The exception is a detailed and in part also reflexive report on the first event organised by fBDM: the seminar on ‘Challenges to democracy in the present conjuncture’, 7 April 2003.

Most of the energy has been put into a series of seminars, conferences and debates that in themselves address relevant themes, but are considered to be of a predominantly intellectual/academic significance. These events are seen by many as a proof of the good ‘convocatory’ potential of the fBDM, uniting national top-level academics and political analysts. The contributions are, as a rule, of solid quality and the publication series is technically and editorially well done. All publications and other occasional papers sponsored by fBDM are available through the website (www.democraciapartidos.org.bo).

It is, however, not clear what the real influence of these activities and publications is on thinking and conduct within the political parties and the political class. Few of the informants from political society (including Congress) and the government we spoke confirmed to receive or consult the fMDB publications on a regular basis. Particularly the dissemination of fBDM publications and other material was seen as inadequate.⁴³ Many interlocutors shared the view that fBDM should not focus on an academic agenda (since this would merely duplicate the work of other more appropriate entities in this domain), but rather be more pro-active in organising events with a direct (party) political relevance and impact.

The covenant with *Pulso* magazine was ended after the publication of 1 insert. fBDM felt that the nature of the article did not reflect the interest and purpose of the Foundation. The other partners in this covenant have continued sponsoring the publication of inserts by *Pulso* during 2004.

The communication plan elaborated during the final months of 2003 had the fBDM website as the only tangible result. The website is well designed but could be more frequently maintained. Especially the absence of a more complete reporting on upcoming and past events and a periodic newsletter is notable.

Another line of activities that occupies an important place in the strategic vision of the fBDM, that is: training and capacity building of party cadres and militants, is hard to assess for lack of specific information. In October 2003 three full grants and three half grants for party activists (from NFR [2x], MAS [2x], MIR and MNR) have been awarded for the certificate programme organised in collaboration with the CNE. The programme is implemented through the Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar. An interlocutor from the MIP complained about the lack of access of MIP party members to these grants and stated that MIP students in this certificate programme were sponsored with (scarce) MIP funds directly.⁴⁴

It is not totally clear what the scope and impact has been of the funds made available for the ‘strengthening, training and capacity building of the political parties’. A public call for tenders for this programme was made in August 2003. The tender was won by the Fundación Desarrollo Democrático y Participación Ciudadana (Fddpc) and the programme was to be implemented between October 2003 and March 2004 at a total cost of US\$ 20,000. An interesting feature appears to have been that the activities organised by Fddpc took place also in rural areas and the urban peripheries of the four principal cities (La Paz, El Alto, Cochabamba, Santa Cruz) and that a variety of topic were addressed in inter- and intra-party sessions (such as party and electoral legislation, political doctrines, democratic theory, Bolivia’s international relations, ethnicity and cultural identity, party statutes, political communication and electoral campaigns, participative

⁴³ For instance, the voluminous study *Investigación diagnóstica sobre los partidos políticos con representación parlamentaria en Bolivia* (2003), commissioned by the fBDM, has not yet been published. It is available as a document on the website of the Foundation.

⁴⁴ Interview with Mr. Tomás Quispe, MIP, 26 August 2004.

elaboration of public policy planning). We have no information, however, on the precise number and content of these sessions, nor on the number and background of participants.

Clearly, the line of activities related to capacity building of political parties can be improved and be more clearly embedded in a cohesive vision and strategy. This observation is important because it relates to a point made by a number of our interlocutors from political parties who felt that the fBDM should do more in terms of direct financial or technical contributions to individual political parties. Some have cast this clearly in proposals to make a fixed proportion of fBDM resources (e.g. 40 percent) directly available to activities of individual parties.⁴⁵ We have found, however, that there is no clear consensus and even opposition, particularly within the Directorate of the fBDM, for such a formula, although it is acknowledged that a more visible support or ‘service’ role of the fBDM towards the member parties is desirable. Hesitation to embrace a “60/40” formula for the allocation of financial resources is based on the alleged lack of transparency in the use of such funding by individual parties.

The General Assembly held on 17 August 2004 was generally seen as a success, although the relative under-representation of women, indigenous people and especially youth was noted. The fBDM directorate was aware of the need to follow up on the Assembly meeting in order to preserve the momentum provided by this promising event. It was subsequently decided to organise a follow up to the Assembly meeting by means of an interactive website. This initiative was labelled the ‘Virtual Assembly’.⁴⁶ The basic idea (still being elaborated during the field visit of the evaluation team) was to set up a number of thematic panels (moderated by fBDM members) to allow virtual discussion among participants in the Virtual Assembly and to serve as catalysts for deepening the debate among and between political parties and other sectors of society. By the end of 2004, the results of these debates are to be synthesised and made public by the fBDM.

In sum, the general appreciation we gathered from our informants and other sources available is that the fBDM is not only an important, even unique entity for fostering a multiparty and conciliatory approach to democracy (as we concluded in the previous chapter), but also has good potential for the further development of a series of specific activities to that effect. However, the link between strategy and programme has so far been somewhat weak and arbitrary. The activities themselves are promising but should be more ambitious and comprehensive. Therefore, we can endorse the assertion made by one (non partisan) member of the fBDM Directorate, who observed: “We need to show more!” We will present some additional reflections and suggestions on how to boost the relevance and impact of the activities of the fBDM in the next and final section of this chapter.

3.4 Current challenges and future directions for the fBDM programme

In this section we aim to strike an overall balance of challenges facing the fBDM programme, and to arrive at some suggestions with respect to the strengthening of this programme in the immediate future. These suggestions draw in part upon points made by our interlocutors both from within and outside the party system. We find it useful thereby to make a conceptual and operational distinction between the role of the fBDM as a ‘space’ for the strengthening of democratic dialogue, thought and practise among the political parties, and its role as a generator of specific multi- or inter-party (‘transversal’) activities.

⁴⁵ In addition, during interview sessions, interlocutors from two political parties presented proposals for (IMD funded) activities related to activist training and the strengthening of ethnic political representativity.

⁴⁶ Discussed during lunch meeting with fBDM directorate, 19 August 2004; interview with Mr. Guido Riveros Franck (fBDM chairman), 16 August 2004.

Challenges

We find that the profile and level of ambition of the fBDM programme and activities needs strengthening in the following areas:

- Ideological profile and programmatic capacity of parties concerning key issues

Instead of the predominantly academic orientation of activities so far, inter-party meetings and seminars involving participants from civil society, the media and the academic world should focus more on the way political parties reflect upon key current and future issues and how this can be translated into clear programmes and proposals for the political and public debate and, eventually, upcoming electoral and political processes such as the Constituent Assembly (2005) and the general elections (2007 and beyond). Key themes of long-term importance could be: the Constituent Assembly, social and ethnic exclusion/inclusion, economic and social policy, and regional autonomy

- Practical-political aspects of party renewal and modernisation

Although the current crisis of the political parties has been contributing to a sense of urgency with respect to party renewal and is opening up spaces for innovative forces within the parties (forces that appear to be drawn into the ambit of the fBDM), there has been little systematic attention for the political, institutional and practical aspects of party renewal. This would include issues such as the renovation of party leadership, internal functioning and internal democracy, the representation and empowerment of specific categories such as women, youngsters, indigenous groups, and the strengthening of democratic political culture, dedication to the ‘public good’, political ethics, and so on.

- Training and capacity building

A very important line of activities for fBDM is training and capacity building, especially for new, innovation-oriented activists and functionaries within the political parties. Activities in this area have so far been meagre and poorly visible.

- Decentralisation

In spite of a few activities that took place outside of La Paz, the fBDM and its activities are very much concentrated in the *paceña* (La Paz metropolitan area) conurbation that is the political and administrative centre of the country. Not only is it important that a more visible part of activities are decentralised, but also that the very presence of the fBDM be enhanced in the interior, particularly in the cities of Santa Cruz and Cochabamba and the other departmental capitals.

- PR, communication and public profile

During the mission we observed a clear lack of exposure of the fBDM, its ideas and its activities in the news media, especially newspapers and periodicals. Especially journalists/newspaper editors we consulted referred to the notable absence of a strategy or a systematic practise of communication on the part of the fBDM. This has some relation with the bad image of political parties in public opinion and in the way party politics is often reflected in the news media. Without wanting to enter into the complex discussion as to the causes of this “bad press”, we think that the fBDM should see it as its responsibility to develop a public communication strategy for the dissemination of its ideals, ideas and actions.

Future directions

The elements discussed above could be incorporated into a re-vamped strategy for the medium and long term in which the original two-pronged nature of the fBDM (as ‘end’ and as ‘means’) could be made more explicit and mutually re-enforcing. The suggestions made here are to a substantial degree in tune with suggestions we gathered from many of our informants during the field mission. In box 4.3 we present an inventory of these suggestions for purely illustrative purposes.⁴⁷

Box 3.3 *Suggestions for fBDM activities gathered during the mission (in arbitrary order)*

- Ensuring the continuity of the General Assembly of the fBDM
- Creating a political memory facility
- Preparatory activities for the Constituent Assembly
- Preparatory activities for key policy decisions
- More frequent inter-party activities
- Elaboration of a practical dictionary of democracy
- Preparation of inputs for the practical work of politicians and party activists
- Technical and logistical facilities for political parties
- Elaboration of draft texts for new constitution by inter-party task force
- Facilitate encounters between political parties and new political actors
- Incorporation of Agrupaciones Ciudadanos
- No incorporation (for the time being) of Agrupaciones Ciudadanos
- Political training of party activists
- Institutional strengthening of parties
- Publication of more widely accessible folders and brochures
- Strengthening of programmatic capabilities of parties
- Decentralisation of activities
- Direct financial support to parties
- Be more receptive towards ideas and propositions of indigenous peoples
- Constituting a think tank capacity

Our suggestions for a future fBDM strategy have bearing on both the role of the Foundation as platform for multiparty dialogue and articulation and also as a generator of activities and programmes. It is important to stress that these suggestions are illustrative, meant as inputs to support strategic and operational thinking within the fBDM and its partnership with IMD and should not be taken as an imposition.

- The fBDM as a ‘space’ for multiparty democracy

The key priority here is twofold: (1) to further strengthen the commitment of the political parties to be part of the fBDM and to work through the Foundation to enhance democratic politics and more legitimate and effective political parties; (2) to strengthen the role of the fBDM as the prime mover and source of expertise on multiparty democracy vis-à-vis society in general and specific sectors.

⁴⁷ Also for this reason we abstain from linking these suggestions to the party or organisational affiliation of specific informants who made them.

Specific activities can be:

- To involve specific actors and groups from all political parties in periodic general and topical round tables: national and regional leaders, activists, youngsters, women, Congress members, including encounters and dialogues among these categories.
 - To organise or sponsor thematic events of social and political relevance (essentially along the lines already existent) among (party) politicians, civil society representatives, journalists and academics.
 - To strengthen the role of the fBDM as the ‘expert source’ of information on multiparty democracy through forming a national (or international – explicit mobilisation of IMD experience and network is highly advisable) network of analysts and practitioners and (on line or carefully distributed) publications.
 - To facilitate the deepening and continuity of the General Assembly in 2005 and beyond, not only by way of the ‘Virtual Assembly’ but also by repeating actual meetings, for instance of thematic subgroups and an annual plenary meeting.
- The fBDM as a generator of activities

The key priority here is to design and implement a more ambitious and comprehensive suit of activities that are clearly embedded in a medium- and long-term strategy.

Specific activities can be:

- To elaborate a more ambitious and comprehensive programme for training and capacity building (human resource development) within the political parties, with a focus on, for instance: party organisation, party democracy, party ideology and programme, inter-party co-operation, democratic political culture and practice.
- To organise a ‘service function’ or ‘desk’ for affiliated political parties, comprising, among others: access to physical infrastructure and logistics for intra- and inter-party events, advising on project proposals and independent funding applications by individual parties, facilitating access by party representatives to knowledge and expertise.
- To design and implement a broader and more effective strategy for communication and publication, including, towards the *news media*: systematic liaisons with the news media, frequent press briefs, encounters between politicians/party activists and journalists, seminars for journalists on (multiparty) political issues; towards the *general public*: the publication of a newsletter (printed and on the website), compact folders and brochures on relevant or current (multiparty) political issues, written in accessible language (possibly also in indigenous languages), better targeting and promoting of fBDM book publications, a broad and frequently maintained website.
- The organisation of ‘decentralised’ events in the departments and regions.

4 Appreciation of the implementation modalities

4.1 Governance and management of the Bolivia programme by IMD

IMD is a non-governmental organisation with a distinct governance structure in the sense that representatives of the Dutch political parties have an active role in the design and implementation of the various country programmes. The executive director of IMD is responsible for the management of the Institute and its overall programme. He supervises ‘country teams’ that implement the country programmes. So-called ‘party co-ordinators’ (full- or half-time employees stationed within IMD by their parties, formally ‘programme officers’) and professionals from the IMD bureau staff are designated to each country team. The party co-ordinator of one party acts as ‘leading’ and the one from another party as ‘supporting’ (or ‘second lead’). Country teams report to the Director who is responsible for the liaison with the IMD Board. The latter consists of prominent figures from Dutch political and public life.

For the IMD programme as a whole, broad political support in the Dutch parliament and the availability of funding under the Thematic Co-Finance (TMF) programme for the 2003-2007 period has provided the conditions for the design and implementation of an ambitious programme of support for democratic parties and party systems in so-called young democracies. This is a specific and innovative niche in the general domain of international co-operation support for democratic politics, civil society and good governance.

For Bolivia, the CDA (Christian Democratic Party) provides the leading programme officer, seconded by the Groen Links party (Progressive Environmentalist Party). The management of the Bolivia programme within the IMD is generally based on consensus between the two party co-ordinators and the IMD Bureau staff. Certain differences in viewpoints exist: CDA tends to favour the exclusivity of the IMD-fBDM partnership, while Groen Links favours broadening the scope of IMD activities in Bolivia. CDA has dedicated the attention of a team of functionaries to the Bolivia programme since its inception in late 2002.⁴⁸ From 2003 onward, the input of the Groen Links policy officer has become more visible, but the legacy of the CDA imprint may at times make the Groen Links officer a little apprehensive.⁴⁹

Be this as it may, the ‘internal politics’ (and we repeat that this does not affect the overall basis of consensus for the management of the programme within IMD) do not in any sense appear as negative or confusing when it comes to the relationship between the IMD and the fBDM and the image of the former with its Bolivian counterpart. IMD representatives are seen as operating consistently.⁵⁰

IMD is in the process of installing a computerised system for integrated process management to absorb the growing portfolio of all its activities. Over the past two-and-a-half years, however, the Bolivia programme has been managed mainly on the basis of frequent visits and the exchange of email messages and documents. The documentation of the Bolivia programme at the IMD office is contained in a number of files covering the years 2002, 2003 and 2004. This documentation is

⁴⁸ Consisting of the party co-ordinator, the international secretary of the party, a CDA senator who also sits on the IMD Board and chairs a consultancy NGO that also supplied the principal back stopper to the Bolivia programme in the 2002-2004 period.

⁴⁹ Interviews with Mr. Karim Beroud (Groen Links), 16 August 2004, and Mr. Martin van Vliet (CDA), 1 September 2004.

⁵⁰ Interviews with Mr. Gonzalo Rojas Ortuste, 20 August 2004, and with Mr. Guido Riveros Franck, 26 August 2004.

fragmentary as it appears in its 'hardcopy' shape. Despite the intentional structure of the files, proposals, reports and correspondence appears in a rather arbitrary order. This archive does not give an impression of completeness.⁵¹ Some documents are included more than once, sometimes in several slightly different versions. IMD as a (young) organisation is still in the process of consolidating its administrative (or 'planning and control') routines, working among other on a 'procedures manual'. At present, this filing system has been substituted by a computerized data management system that appears to be working satisfactorily.

In theory, IMD funds are transferred on the basis of a yearly programme designed and submitted by the counterpart fBDM that contains specific activities and expenditures related to a multi-annual strategy. Upon approval by the IMD board (supported by a memo from the IMD director), funding is generally transferred in several instalments during the year. However, the planning and progress documents submitted by fBDM are sketchy. This is a consequence of poor practice by fBDM during 2003 and 2004 (in part for reasons that are perfectly understandable, see below), but there is as yet no clear format for substantial reporting, let alone progress monitoring, either designed by fBDM or made available by IMD.

This is in part compensated by frequent visits of IMD party co-ordinators, staff and the permanent consultant. This practice has contributed to a by and large adequate understanding within IMD of what goes on in the programme, as well as to a solid basis of mutual understanding and trust. It possibly leads to higher overhead costs for programme monitoring than would be the case if consolidated reporting procedures are available and used in practice. However, close face-to-face contact between IMD and fBDM has been an important aspect of the take off and consolidation of the Foundation during its first and turbulent 18 months (January 2003-June 2004). fBDM sees the relationship and the interaction as one of respect, with sufficient ownership of the programme deposited in fBDM. Earlier impressions we had of a too close hands-on involvement of IMD in the set-up and strategic orientation of fBDM were not confirmed by the field study. Some pressure was felt in periods of problems, particularly at the time of the dismissal of the first executive director, in October 2003, and with respect to the directorship issue in general: "In a subtle way, they [i.e. IMD] interfere in details and exert a little pressure."⁵²

In sum, the partnership between IMD and fBDM up till now is a typical example of institutional support. IMD has stated the intention to work towards 'programme funding' in its relationship with fBDM. It is doubtful that an even more standardised form of funding (based on the project cycle) is feasible given the nature of fBDM and its activities.

4.2 Governance and management of fBDM programme

fBDM started as a broadly composed group of concerned individuals from (almost) all Bolivian parties and the academic world. They formed a *directorio* (directorate or board) and a *mesa directiva* (chairs committee or bureau). The *directorio* is responsible for the wider policy decisions and for control and approval of the actions of the *mesa directiva*. The latter is responsible for policy implementation and daily business. The work of the fBDM is supported by a small staff composed of an executive director/manager, a secretary/office assistant, a free-lance bookkeeper/comptroller, and office amanuensis.

⁵¹ These were the files made available to the evaluation during the 2 working days available for analysis of the programme files and interviewing of IMD staff. A brief demonstration of the PMS computerized data management system was given but the evaluators were given to understand that the content of this system did not deviate from the documents of the hardcopy files.

⁵² Mr. Guido Riveros Franck, interviewed 26 August 2004.

The *directorio* met on average bi-monthly (but sometimes weekly) in 2003 and January-August 2004. The meetings principally addressed practical and managerial matters; much less attention was given to strategic policy matters.

Since mid-2004, fBDM is in the process of instituting a more systematic representation of the political parties (see chapter 2, section 2.3) and non-party members of the *directorio*. The Foundation has adapted the statutes for this purpose. In the new configuration, the 11 parties that are member of the fBDM each designate one formal representative in the directorio (50 percent minus one). Independent members and representatives of the General Assembly (convened for the first time in August 2004) designate 12 members (50 percent plus one) of the *directorio*. It appears that by this innovation, the presence of both the parties and social sectors has become more solid and transparent.

As we already mentioned in the previous chapter 3, in theory fBDM works on the basis of a tri-annual programme and annual operational plans (POAs). No tri-annual plan is available, however. As we observed above, for 2003 a very general POA was made in January 2003; for 2004 a more systematic POA (based on a 'logical framework' format) was presented in February 2004, distinguishing lines of action, priorities, and specific activities. No precise planning of activities has been made at the start of both years. Relationship of the yearly programme and activities with the general vision and aims of fBDM is rather loose.

Reporting by fBDM on its activities is fragmentary and most of the time succinct. It does not allow for systematic monitoring of the precise outcome and impact of the role played by fBDM and its activities. The main reason for this has been the instability with respect to internal management of the fBDM. So far two executive directors have been dismissed or resigned. The motives for this were various and included, in the case of the first director, different opinions between director and members of the fBDM directorate on style and direction of management, elements of *incompatibilités d'humeurs*, and the feeling that this director at times confounded the work of the fBDM and his own strategic ambitions.⁵³ The second director accepted an academic position after a few months, but agreed to wind up ongoing business.⁵⁴

The lack of continuity of management has negatively affected the strategic capacity of the fBDM. A further factor that has played a role here is the turbulent social and political environment in Bolivia during 2003. This has inevitably absorbed much time and energy of party politicians and has had consequences for the ability of political parties to look beyond the political conjuncture towards more strategic priorities of party renewal (especially after October 2003).

It has become quite clear that fBDM needs a systematic separation of responsibilities: a chairman who takes care of the external political articulation and public positioning; and a manager, whose principal responsibility is the internal operationalisation of the strategy, planning, implementation and reporting of activities of the fBDM. The first function has, in the opinion of all our informants, been adequately fulfilled by Guido Riveros Franck. Recently (during the field trip) a new manager was hired and started his activities. This person has substantial experience in working in support programmes of donors to political society (particularly Congress) and enjoys a good network and respectability. There is, therefore, reason to assume that the strategic and daily management of the fBDM will improve in the near future.

⁵³ It must be stated clearly that we were unable, for practical reasons, to interview the first director.

⁵⁴ This former director maintains cordial and constructive relationships with the fBDM.

4.3 Programme finance: sources and allocation

IMD has, until recently, supplied the totality of fBDM financial resources. Up to April 2004, IMD has transferred the following contributions (in US\$): 15,296 in 2002, 221,000 in 2003, and 29,960 for the first four months of 2004 (the total budget of expenditures for 2004 is US\$ 330,530).

The pattern of expenditure in 2002 (final months), 2003 (entire year), and 2004 (January-April) is shown in table 4.1.

Table 4.1: Expenditure of fBDM financial resources, 2002-2004 (US\$)

Spending category	2002	2003	2004 (Jan-April) ⁵⁵
Personnel	3,250	81,480	25,801
Material overhead	17,047	59,033	7,602
Programme activities	195	76,573	3,877
Total	20,492	217,086	37,280

Source: Informes Economicos y Financieros fBDM (detailed in Annex A)

It is clear that a large, even disproportionate percentage of financial resources is used to cover personnel and apparatus costs (more than two-thirds in 2003, over 80 percent in the first four months of 2004). In part this pattern of expenditure may be justifiable given the role of fBDM as a platform and in view of the institutional build up and consolidation that has been an important part of the development of the programme over the past 18 months. It reflects also, however, the relative underachievement of the Foundation in terms of designing and implementing of specific activities (as we noted in the previous chapter). It is highly advisable to move towards a more balanced ratio of expenditure between programme activities and personnel and apparatus costs. The former should be at least more than half of total expenditures, possibly approaching two-thirds. This would mean an inversion of these proportions in relation to the 2003 pattern. This could be achieved above all by increasing considerably the programmatic activities, but also by examine critically the pattern of fixed expenditures, especially regarding variable personnel expenditures such as fees for directorate members.

The fBDM treasurer himself suggested that eventually an 80/20 ratio for programme activities versus personnel and apparatus costs would be desirable.⁵⁶ At the same time, he suggested that this 20 percent of organisational expenditures should be generated by fBDM itself or by other sponsors, so that the support from IMD could be devoted in its entirety to programme activities. Indeed this would be an optimum situation, but it is uncertain whether this aim is realistic. Dependency from IMD funding appears to be unavoidable for the short and medium term despite recent successes in funding diversification such as the covenant signed with the Andean

⁵⁵ For the remainder of 2004 (up to August) no consolidated figures were available.

⁵⁶ Interview with Mr. René Meier Klopstock (treasurer of fBDM), 24 August 2004. He also stated his intention to take care swiftly of the overdue issue of organising the fBDM's own bank account.

Finance Corporation (CAF) in August 2004. In all, efforts to increase the self-financing capacity of fBDM and the diversification of funding sources should be given more priority.

A final issue we examined with respect to the management of financial resources refers to the matter of direct financial contributions to member parties and the so-called '60/40' formula.⁵⁷ As we already argued in the previous chapter, we do not favour such a fixed arrangement, despite the fact that member parties may have some ground in expecting more direct benefits from the fBDM. The Foundation may consider a line of activities that directly supports the institutional and human capacity strengthening of parties, provided this happens under certain conditions:⁵⁸

- such support should be open to all parties affiliated to fBDM
- such support should be granted exclusively to activities that aim at strengthening party organisation and party democracy
- such support should be granted by the fBDM (or if desirable by an independent commission linked to fBDM) on the basis of clear and transparent criteria
- the use and impact of such support should be monitored and reported.

4.4 The appropriateness and added value of the IMD-fBDM partnership

As we already noted in chapter 2, the formula of external assistance to political parties through a multiparty institution is widely seen as appropriate and relevant, indeed as highly needed precisely to face the current crisis of Bolivian democratic political parties. Our informants were virtually unanimous in ascertaining the opinion that the fBDM has consolidated a unique potential for this role. As we already noted in Chapter 2, it is seen as, potentially, the best opportunity at the present moment to strengthen the party system.

The IMD programme of co-operation with the fBDM is also seen as valuable because no other bilateral donor works in the area of party politics. Many donors favour 'civil society' but forget that a stable, representative and legitimate party system is crucial for democratic governance. Other recent initiatives, such as the *mesas de dialogo* (dialogue platforms) could be seen as 'donor darlings' with the detrimental side effect of eroding the prerogatives and the status of Congress as preferential space for national political dialogue. Support from the Netherlands is valued because of its disinterested reputation.

Most interlocutors, including those from (single party) foundations such as FUNDEMOS and MILENIO, see a clear difference between the aim and activities of these (mostly German-funded) foundation and the (US) foundations IRI and NDI on the one hand, and the role of the fBDM on the other hand. The latter is seen as the only one equipped to address the parties as a collectively or a system. The activities of multilateral agencies such as OAS and IDEA are thematically specific, and at the same time aimed at broader range of actors than just political parties.

If we look at the issue of the 'exclusivity' of the IMD-fBDM relationship, it has become quite clear that the close connection IMD/fBDM is valuable for mutual affinity and trust. The fBDM nurtures this relationship, and tends to see IMD funding for other counterparts as potentially harmful for this trust and also for the image of trustworthiness of fBDM in the Bolivian arena.

⁵⁷ Meaning a ration of 60 percent of fBDM funds being used for Foundation activities and maintenance, and 40 percent being passed on to member parties,

⁵⁸ It must also be noted that at least one interviewee, member of the fBDM Directorate, was firmly opposed to any form of direct financial support from fBDM resources to individual political parties.

At the same time, the Foundation's protagonists consider participation by fBDM in multi-partner programmes with IMD (co-)funding as perfectly acceptable.

For fBDM to consolidate and further deepen the legitimacy, transparency and trustworthiness of its role as multi-party platform it would not be a good signal if identical institutions, in competition, would also have access to major IMD funding.⁵⁹

⁵⁹ A specific case in point is the recently established Bolivian Foundation for Political Reform (FBRP), an initiative by the first executive director of fBDM. Although we did not gather primary information on the FBRP, this organisation seems to aim at a similar field of action as does the fBDM and therefore seems to be an undue duplication of efforts.

5. Conclusions and recommendations

The core findings of this evaluation can be summarized in two sentences.

First: the Bolivia programme operated by IMD through its partnership with the fBDM since the end of 2002 has had, as its main achievement, the consolidation of a national multi-party organisation that represents all relevant political parties and is widely seen as a unique opportunity to strengthen democratic political parties and multi-party democracy as a key condition for democratic consolidation in the country.

Second: at the same time, however, it is necessary to give much more substance to this potential than has been achieved up till now, by developing a more ambitious and effective profile and programme for the fBDM in tune with its strategic objectives and priorities.

In this final chapter we will summarize the principal arguments for this conclusion as set out in the foregoing chapters 2, 3 and 4. Each argument will be connected to one or more specific recommendations.

1. There is no doubt that, after two decades of relatively stable representative democracy, Bolivian politics have entered a rough stretch. The so-called 'pacted democracy' has collapsed under the combined weight of the social tensions created by a faithful application of the Washington Consensus, increasing social fragmentation, and the diminishing capacity of the conventional political parties (particularly MNR, MIR and ADN) to represent this growing diversity of societal groups and interests. One of the results has been the increase of social tensions and conflicts, another has been the widespread loss of legitimacy of the parties and the party system. Internal deficiencies within the parties (clientelism, corruption, neo-patrimonialism, lack of democracy, lack of programmatic capabilities, etcetera) have strongly contributed to this state of affairs, to the extent that it can be concluded that Bolivia's political parties and the party system are in *crisis*. Yet, a renovated and re-invigorated party system is seen as essential for the development of democracy in Bolivia: only such type of political parties are able to fulfil the crucial role of mediator between societal groups and interests on the one hand, and the state and public policy on the other hand. Therefore, the current crisis of political parties is at the same time seen as a *challenge*: an opportunity, now imbued with more urgency than ever before, for party-political renewal. But such renewal can not be expected to succeed overnight: a medium- to long-term perspective is necessary. The upcoming three years are of key importance for the long-term future of Bolivia's democracy: 2005 will face the impact of the upcoming municipal elections and quite likely see the election of a Constitutional Assembly; the impact of the new constitution will dominate politics from 2006 onward, especially the general election scheduled for 2007.

Recommendation 1: It is important to continue the support for democratic political parties and multi-party system as a contribution to the strengthening of a more inclusive and effective democracy in Bolivia.

2. Over the past two years, the Bolivian Foundation for Multiparty Democracy (fBDM) has, with strong and direct support of IMD, been able to consolidate itself as an institution that is widely seen as unique in its kind and (potentially) well positioned to serve as a platform and initiator for the renewal and re-invigoration of democratic political parties in Bolivia. These priorities are formulated at the core of the vision and strategic objectives of the fBDM that is fully compatible with the vision and objectives of the IMD. The

fBDM has gradually managed to expand the membership of old and new political parties, it enjoys good acceptance among prominent party officials, a key entity such as the CNE and representatives of civil society and academics. The fBDM is not associated with the old vices of the party system (its chairman is widely respected) and offers room to innovative forces within the political parties. The fact that the fBDM is supported by external, that is to say Dutch, funding is not seen as problematic but rather as valid and needed. The fBDM cherishes (for obvious reasons) its partnership with IMD from which it derives a certain degree of trustworthiness. The fBDM would prefer to maintain its status as (quasi-)exclusive partner of IMD in Bolivia, although it professes to be open-minded with respect to participation in other programmes with IMD (co-)financing.

Recommendation 2.1: IMD should continue to support fBDM as the mainstay of its Bolivia programme.

Recommendation 2.2: IMD can consider other lines of activity in Bolivia (such as working with multilateral or multi-/bi programmes or supporting single party foundations or research activities) but prior consultation with, and if possible, active involvement of, fBDM is advisable.

3. The role of the fBDM in renewing and strengthening democratic political parties is two-fold. In the first place, the fBDM functions as a 'space' or a platform for dialogue, consensus and trust-building among political parties, especially regarding themes that bear on the democratic quality of the political parties and cross-cutting issues of the party system; here it is important that political parties have at their disposal a shared institutional space that allows them to address pertinent issues frankly without the looming presence of power calculations and short-term party interests. In the second place, the fBDM functions as a pro-active catalyst or generator of specific activities to enhance the democratic quality of the political parties and the party system. However, over the past two years, this role has not been sufficiently ambitious and visible; greater priority has in practice been given to the institutional consolidation of the fBDM, an endeavour that faced particularly turbulent social, political and institutional conditions since February 2003. At the present moment, however, priority should be shifted towards the formulation and implementation of a more ambitious and comprehensive strategy for the fBDM in order to fulfil its potential and to adequately respond to the important politico-institutional developments in the coming years.

Recommendation 3.1: IMD should encourage and support the fBDM in the formulation and implementation of a new, explicit tri-annual strategy for the period 2005-2007, based on its vision and objectives and the available analysis of the current situation of the political parties and the party system.

Recommendation 3.2: This strategy should give more concrete substance to the role of the fBDM as a *platform* for multi-party dialogue and renewal, particularly by emphasising (as put forward in chapter 3):

- The involvement of specific actors and groups from all political parties in periodic general and topical round tables: national and regional leaders, activists, youngsters, women, Congress members, including encounters and dialogues among these categories.
- The organisation of thematic events of social and political relevance (essentially along the lines already existent) among (party) politicians, civil society representatives, journalists and academics.
- The strengthening of the role of the fBDM as the 'expert source' of information on multiparty democracy through forming a national (or international – explicit mobilisation

of IMD experience and network is highly advisable) network of analysts and practitioners and (on line or carefully distributed) publications.

- The facilitating of the deepening and continuity of the General Assembly in 2005 and beyond, not only by way of the 'Virtual Assembly' but also by repeating actual meetings, for instance of thematic subgroups and an annual plenary meeting.

Recommendation 3.3: This strategy should give more substance to the role of the fBDM as a *generator* of a specific programme of activities, particularly by emphasising (as put forward in chapter 3):

- The elaboration of a more ambitious and comprehensive programme for training and capacity building (human resource development) within the political parties, with a focus on, for instance: party organisation, party democracy, party ideology and programme, inter-party co-operation, democratic political culture and practise. This includes the preparation of educational material (such as booklets and brochures) on these matters.
 - The organisation of a 'service function' or 'desk' for affiliated political parties, comprising, among others: access to physical infrastructure and logistics for intra- and inter-party events, advising on project proposals and independent funding applications by individual parties, facilitating access by party representatives to knowledge and expertise.
 - The design and implementation of a broader and more effective strategy for communication and publication, including, towards the *news media*: systematic liaisons with the news media, frequent press briefs, encounters between politicians/party activists and journalists, seminars for journalists on (multiparty) political issues; towards the *general public*: the publication of a newsletter (printed and on the website), compact folders and brochures on relevant or current (multiparty) political issues, written in accessible language (possibly also in indigenous languages), better targeting and promoting of fBDM book publications, a broad and frequently maintained website.
 - The organisation of 'decentralised' events in the departments and regions.
4. IMD and fBDM each have a responsibility in the implementation and management of their partnership programme. IMD is characterised by the direct involvement of the Dutch political parties in the management of country programmes. In the case of the Bolivia programme, this has normally done on the basis of consensus despite occasional political and practical differences between the Christian Democrat and Groen Links parties' programme officers. IMD staff has a supportive and enabling role that is adequate. The management of information and monitoring can be improved, however. On this score, IMD has up till now been fairly permissive towards the fBDM but has also itself only recently started to improve its information management routines. Relationships between the two partners can be characterised as respectful and based upon mutual affinity and trust. Frequent visits by IMD delegations and mutual communication (by email) contribute to this and compensate in part for the less-than-optimal flow of information on programme activities and progress. fBDM has suffered considerable difficulties with its internal management and this has negatively affected its capacity to formulate and report on specific annual programmes. There is a clear need to separate the functions of chairperson and manager. At the same time, IMD has so far no standard format available for the monitoring of outcome and impact of programme activities. Although a manual for developing democratic political parties has been published in 2004, its Bolivian partner feels that more could be done in the field of the exchange of expertise and lessons learned from IMD's experience with other programmes and partners. With respect to funding and the allocation of financial resources by the fBDM, it is quite clear that the latter depends substantially on the financial contributions of IMD. Although it may not be easy to change this state of affairs radically, possibilities for

greater self-financing and diversification of financial contributions to the fBDM could and should be more actively explored. With respect to the allocation of resources by the fBDM, there has been a clear proportional imbalance in spending on personnel and institutional costs on the one hand, and programme activities on the other hand (the latter being at best around one-third of total expenditures).

Recommendation 4.1: IMD should further improve its procedures for soliciting and organising information on the implementation, outcome and impact of the Bolivia programme.

Recommendation 4.2: fBDM should elaborate and implement more detailed annual operational plans that are consistent with its multi-annual strategy and that allows for more substantial reporting and monitoring

Recommendation 4.3: Efforts should be made to stabilize the strategic management capacity of the fBDM on the basis of the duality of chairperson (mainly for external positioning and political articulation) and manager (mainly for the internal operationalisation of strategy, yearly plans, reporting and monitoring), under the general supervision of the directorate.

Recommendation 4.4: The expenditure profile should be changed towards a greater proportion of programme spending towards at least half to two-thirds of total spending.

Recommendation 4.5: possibilities to increase fBDM self-financing capacity and diversification of donor contributions should be explored and pursued. A (small or symbolic) contribution in the form a membership fee from political parties or co-financing of activities is recommended.

Recommendation 4.6: the direct or indirect *unconditional* transfer of fBDM funds to individual political parties is not recommended.

Annex A - List of consulted documents

Documents IMD

Annual Report 2002 (The Hague, 25 April 2003)

Annual Report 2003 (The Hague, 18 March 2004)

Dinkhuijsen, D. & C. Van Beuningen , Policy Memorandum Bolivia Programme (internal document) (The Hague, March 2003)

IMD Institutional Development Handbook: A Framework for Democratic Party Building (The Hague, 14 June 2004)

IMD Thematic Co-Financing Programme 2003-2007: Without Democracy Nobody Fares Well (The Hague, 2002)

IMD website: www.nimd.org

Documents fBDM

Actas de Directorio

14/11/02

09/01/03-16/12/03

11/03/04-28/7/04

Costa Benevides, J et al. *Investigación diagnóstica sobre los partidos políticos con representación parlamentaria en Bolivia* (La Paz: CIEB/fBDM, December 2003)

fBDM Mission Statement : Objetivos y líneas de trabajo (La Paz, s.d.) (also available on the fBDM website.

Informes economicos y financieros (selected)

- Estado de cuentas 17/12/02
- Resumen de ejecución presupuestaria enero-diciembre de 2003
- Estado de ingresos y egresos enero-diciembre de 2003
- Presupuesto 2004
- BDO International (Berthin Amengual & Asociados): Estado de ingresos y egresos proyecto de lanzamiento Funbodem, enero-junio 2003, Julio-diciembre 2003
- Estado de ingresos y egresos enero-marzo 2004

Informes emitidos por el director ejecutivo de la fBDM, year 2003 and January-April 2004 (various internal documents), among which cited :

- Informe complementario de actividades gestión 2003, s.d.
- primer informe de la fBDM 2004, 6 May 2004 by Gonzalo Rojas Ortuste, manager fBDM

Nomina de asistentes (list of attendants) of the Asamblea General, 17 August 2004

Plan Operativo Anual 2003, Naturaleza y propósitos del proyecto, 28 January 2003

Plan Operativo Anual 2004, Final Version, 8 April 2004

fBDM website: www.democraciapartidos.org.bo

The site contains a number of thematic position papers (not cited) and the commissioned study by Costa Benevides et al. listed above. The site also offers downloadable versions of the following fBDM publications of papers presented at fBDM seminars, also available in hardcopy:

Retos para la democracia en la conyuntura (August 2003)

Ética y partidos políticos en el parlamento (2003)

Parlamento y partidos políticos en la concertación (2003)

Crisis de la democracia y de la representación Bolivia 2003 (November 2003)

Finalmente, Tiene Bolivia un plan económico? (February 2004)

Los partidos políticos ante la crise (2004)

Annex B - Full Terms of Reference

Terms of Reference IMD Country Programme Bolivia, 18 August – 28 August 2004

I Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy

IMD's main objective is to support the process of democratisation in young democracies by strengthening political parties as the pillars of democracy in order to help create a well-functioning, sustainable, pluralistic system of party politics. IMD can also support activities of groups and organisations that, in line with its principles and goals, are of relevance for multiparty democracies, even though they are not part of a formal party structure. Groups can only be considered for support if they are basically comparable with political parties and function in a multiparty democracy.

As IMD was created by the political parties in the Netherlands, it has vast experience in capacity building and the institutional development of political parties. Of course, this experience is embedded in the Dutch/European history and social-cultural context.

As Dutch political parties already have a well-functioning support structure for parties in new or restored democracies in Eastern Europe, IMD decided in 2001 to start exploring the possibilities of such support in Africa, Latin America and Asia.

Depending on the situation in a specific country, political parties, organisations and groups will be supported if they fulfil a number of conditions, for example:

- The political objectives of the party/group/organisation should be based on the fundamental principles of democracy and non-discrimination on the grounds of gender, ethnicity or religion for instance;
- The fundamental values that form the basis of democracy and the rule of law should be strengthened. This excludes the tendencies of racial or ethnic exclusivity, as well as the incitement of racial or ethnic hatred;
- The competition of political ideas through peaceful means and dialogue. This excludes justifying or resorting to violence as a means of waging politics;
- Accepting free and fair elections as the only legitimate means of gaining political power;
- Democratic tolerance. This demands mutual tolerance of and respect for the political beliefs and attitudes of other groups;
- Parties should operate in accordance with the code of conduct drawn up by international organisations.

When implementing its activities, IMD will cooperate internationally as much as possible with other organisations that support democratisation processes. The Dutch political parties will also individually strive to fit in the IMD activities via the different international organisations of sister parties. The activities of IMD complement the support given by other Dutch non-governmental as well as governmental organisations, and are financed by the Dutch ministry for Development Cooperation.

II IMD Programme in Bolivia

In 2001 Bolivia was identified as a possible IMD programme country. In November of that year a mission was undertaken by IMD's board members Jos van Gennip, Sam Pormes and by advisor Cor van Beuningen. The mission recommended giving assistance to the political parties in order to strengthen the intermediary role between citizens and the state and to allow them to regain leadership in the debate about the Bolivia of the future.

A second mission by Cor van Beuningen followed in February 2002. It recommended an IMD-Bolivia programme from March to June 2002 with the following characteristics:

- Financial support for 6 political parties, based on their proposals, with the objective to enhance the content and argumentation of the party programmes and to improve communication with the electorate.
- Broaden the electoral and social debate. In this framework three initiatives were to be supported:
 1. A debate between party leaders focussing on economic issues on television and radio;
 2. A written debate based on questions by the magazine "Pulso" with political institutions;

A small group of people, both party-politicians and representatives from civil society organizations, monitored the programme. This pioneering then gradually developed into the Advisory Board for the IMD programme in Bolivia and the founders of the Fubodem. In the Netherlands, Cor van Beuningen maintained contact with the political parties and with the Bolivian advisory group. The budget for this programme was USD 280.000,-

While this programme was being implemented, the National Electoral Court (CNE) decided that political parties could not receive money from international organisations and that the money received by the parties should be given back. This decision caused serious problems for the implementation of the programme, for the parties and for IMD. This IMD programme from April to June 2002 was evaluated by Carlos Toranzo. He mentioned in his report that, despite the problems caused by the CNE resolution, both the political parties and the other organisations positively evaluated the support received from IMD. The main recommendation of this evaluation was to establish a multiparty foundation.

Elections took place in June 2002 resulting in the Presidency of Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada from the MNR. After the elections, the Multiparty Foundation was established with the support of all political parties with representation in the parliament (MNR, MAS, NFR, MIR, MIP, ADN, UCS and PS). The main objectives of the Foundation are:

- Institutional strengthening of the political parties and the political party system through training and capacity building.
- Enhanced debate, discussion and reflection by the parties.
- Improved internal democracy within the political parties.

In January 2003 Fernando Garcia (Foundation), Sánchez de Lozada junior (MNR), Aguilar (MAS), Morales (PSD) came to the Netherlands to participate in the Visitors Programme in order to observe the Dutch elections and to give IMD an impression of the programme developments in Bolivia.

The third of April 2003 the Foundation initiated its programme with the seminar "Challenges for the Democracy in the present situation". Later that year, debates were organised on "the Role of

Parliament in Political Consensus-Building” and on “Ethics, Political Parties and Parliament”. Publications were made of these events and an Institutional Brochure was published.

In October 2003, the Executive Director of the Foundation was fired by the Board. An IMD mission visited Bolivia to assess if the difficult relationship between the Board of the Foundation and the Executive Director was related to the political crisis in the country and if his dismissal would jeopardize the existence of the Foundation. However, all Board members assured IMD that this situation was the result of the management style of the Director and that it was not related to the political crisis in the country. When the differences between the Board and the Director had become irreconcilable, the Board decided to fire the director.

From October 2003 to March 2004, Álvaro Riveros was acting as Director ad interim. In March 2004 the new Executive Director, Gonzalo Rojas, was appointed. The President of the Board provided him with assistance during the first 6 months of 2004 to ensure a smooth transition period.

During 2003, the Foundation gradually managed to gain the confidence of the political parties and other actors. In its Operational Plan for 2004, the Foundation focuses on facilitating debates on the three main issue of Bolivia today: the referendum, the constituent assembly and the hydrocarbon legislation. The other objectives for 2004 are capacity building and the sustainability of the Foundation. Because all the parties are present in Fubodem, this foundation is unique. Regardless of their differences, Fubodem brings together Bolivian political parties with one common goal: to change the way in which politics is conducted. This process of democratisation can only be sustainable if all relevant actors are implied in and responsible for this process. It is within this context that Fubodem is to play a vital role.

A major challenge during the coming months will be to intensify the discussion on the specific relationship between the identified problems within the working field of Fubodem, the identity and purpose of Fubodem as an institution made up of political parties and the different activities. The further elaboration of a specific approach of Fubodem towards important issues in Bolivian society (Constituent Assembly, National Gas Referendum, etc) is an important step to be made. Currently, Fubodem organizes a number of separate activities aimed at supporting the democratization process, whereas in the Annual Plan 2005 these activities will have to be linked to the specific identity and purpose of Fubodem.

III The Evaluation

In the 2004 annual plan of Fubodem, a direct link has been established between the objectives, activities and target groups. However, no direct links are worked out between the problems within the Bolivian political context and the own approach of Fubodem as an organisation of political parties towards these issues. Nevertheless, the evaluation team is requested to formulate an opinion regarding issues on the following levels.

- A. The first level focuses on the effect of the activities on the realization of the three main objectives of the IMD Bolivia programme:
 - What is the impact of the executed activities on the institutional development of the political parties and the political party system;
 - What is the impact of the executed activities on the stimulation of debate, discussion and reflection by the parties;

- What is the impact of the executed activities on the internal democracy within the political parties;
- B. The **second** level focuses on the effectiveness of the programme structure in relation to the main programme objectives:
- How does the methodology of implementation (multiparty institute) contribute to reaching the objectives of the IMD programme;
 - What is the level of ownership by the political parties of the Multiparty Foundation and its programme;
 - Who/what groups within the parties benefited mostly from the projects;
 - Has the link between the party and the Foundation be ensured through the Board Members;
 - How did IMD and the Foundation respond to the political turmoil in Bolivia;
 - What is the complementarity of the IMD programme in relation to other programmes aiming at political party- and democracy assistance;
 - Is there a development in the quality of the programme;
 - How has the relationship between IMD and Fubodem been elaborated;
- C. The **third** level focuses on the connection between the identity of Fubodem as an organization consisting of political parties and the activities implemented. Many (inter)national institutions are organizing activities in relation to central topics within the Bolivian political context. The discussion on the specific approach towards these topics by Fubodem, started during a working mission in March 2004. The evaluation team is asked to:
- Discuss with members of Fubodem the specific role their organisation- as an institute of political parties- plays within the Bolivian context of democratisation support and the way this is reflected in their approach;
 - Assess the objectives of Fubodem, as an organisation with a specific identity, in supporting the democratisation process in Bolivia;

III. 1 Implementation modalities

- How does the overall programme management, including the relations between the Multiparty Foundation, the parties and the IMD staff in the Netherlands, function;
- Has the registration and documentation of the projects been adequately organized;
- How does Fubodem reflect on its relationship with IMD and vice versa;

III. 2 Recommendations

The evaluation should, amongst others, result in recommendations regarding the following issues:

1. The need for a continuation of the IMD programme in Bolivia and its future direction
2. The budget of the programme in relation to the absorption capacity of the Foundation and of the political parties.
3. The role of the IMD and the Multiparty Foundation and the main functions they should undertake.
4. The quality of the programme, the geographic distribution of the projects and the inclusion of women, youth and indigenous people.
5. The ownership of the programme (principle of demand driven approach).
6. Indicators to measure the impact of programmes, to monitor progress and to make a comparison to other programmes of a similar nature.
7. Recommendations on the specific approach of Fubodem, as an organisation made up of political parties, towards the process of democratisation in Bolivia.

III. 3 Methodology

- Study the relevant documentation regarding the programme (original programme proposal, mission reports, annual plans and programme reports).
- Study the IMD four year programme and specific IMD methodology.
- Study the PMS and select some files, available at both The Hague office and the office of the Multiparty Foundation in La Paz, for case studies regarding the process of project-proposals, decision-making and implementation;
- Interviews with leaders of political parties to discuss the impact the IMD project has (had) on the development of their party;
- Interviews with members of the Board of the Multiparty Foundation;
- Discussion with representatives of international NGOs and/or intergovernmental organizations pursuing similar objectives, some external experts and the Royal Netherlands Embassy on the process of democratisation in Bolivia and the role of IMD in this process;
- Meetings with the director, president, and bookkeeper of the Multiparty Foundation. Meeting with the auditor;
- Meetings with the party coordinators in the Netherlands, with the IMD office staff and with IMD's consultant for the Bolivia programme;
- Formulate the final report and present it to the IMD Director;

IV Time-schedule

The mission is expected to start its work in the second week of August 2004.

Briefing and study of documents in the Netherlands and in Bolivia: 2 days

Travel to Bolivia: 2 days

Workshop, interviews in Bolivia: 5 days

Meetings with NGOs and experts in Bolivia: 4 days

Finalisation of the report: 3 day
Presentation of the report: 1 day
Final editing of the report mission leader: 1 day

Total: 11 (plus 7 for mission leader) working days

V Evaluation team

One independent expert from Bolivia or another Latin-American country
One Specialist on Latin-America and Project Evaluations from the Netherlands.

Both members should be fluent in Spanish and English.

VI Reporting

The report should be in English. It will be presented to the Director of IMD within two weeks after the conclusion of the mission. It will contain an executive summary, conclusions and recommendations and cover the issues that are mentioned in this Terms of Reference.

VII Miscellaneous

The IMD Director may decide, depending on the needs, to extend the period of the assignment for purposes of discussions about the outcome of the evaluation. Specific new terms of reference shall be agreed for such a follow-through exercise.

IMD bureau
18 June 2004

Annex C - Mission Schedule

Tuesday 13 July 2004

Morning:

1000 Interview with Cor van Beuningen (advisor for nIMD Bolivia Programme)

Reviewing of nIMD documents.

1230 Lunch meeting with Heleen Schrooyen (Policy Officer Latin America nIMD)

Afternoon:

Reviewing of nIMD documents.

Interview with Roel von Meijenfeldt (Executive Director nIMD) and Jan Tuit (Senior Policy Officer nIMD).

Tuesday 20 July 2004

Consultation of nIMD documents.

Monday 16 August 2004

Afternoon:

Reviewing of nIMD documents; consultation with Heleen Schrooyen (Policy Officer Latin America nIMD)

Interview with Karim Beroud (Green Left Party Bolivia Programme Officer for nIMD)

Tuesday 17 August 2004

2330 Arrival Koonings in La Paz (departure Amsterdam 1100 local time)

Wednesday 18 August 2004

Start of Bolivia (La Paz) Field Mission

1100 Felipe Mansilla, Guido Riveros Franck (chairman of fBDM): planning of mission schedule

1300 Team work Koonings & Mansilla: review of political development Bolivia and diagnosis of political parties; selection of informants; procedural consultations with Guido Riveros Franck

1800 Interview with Jorge Lazarte (Professor of Sociology at UMSA and former council member [*vocal*] of CNE) and René Blattmann (Judge at the ICC, former Minister of Justice and former presidential candidate for MNR)

Thursday 19 August 2004

0900 Team work Koonings & Mansilla: finalization of list of informants; setting up of mission schedule with Guido Riveros Franck (chairman of fBDM) and Augustina Guttierrez (assistant fBDM office); operationalization of interview topics

1300 Lunch meeting with near-complete directorate of fBDM chaired by Guido Riveros Franck (chairman of fBDM)

1600 Interview with Roxana Ybarnegaray Ponce and Salvador Romero Ballivián Council Members [*vocales*] of CNE)

1730 Group interview with MBL leadership: MBL Senator Franz Barrios Villegas, "Americo" Yucra, Tommy Durán del Carpio (MBL, member of fBDM Directorate; Cabinet Chief of the Senate Committee on Parliamentary Ethics and Inter-parliamentary Issues), Enrique Tejada

Friday 20 August 2004

0800 Interview with Gloria Ardaya Salinas (academic and member of fBDM directorate)

1000 Interview with Mario Blacutt (MNR; member of fBDM directorate)

1100 Interview with Oscar Eid Franco (MIR Secretary General)

1230 Interview with Gonzalo Rojas Ortuste (former manager of fBDM)

1630 Interview with Franco Gamboa Rocabado (academic and superintendent of transportation, Ministry of the Presidency)

1800 Interview with Rolando Morales Anaya (PS Secretary General; first vice-president of fBDM)

Saturday 21 August 2004

Organization and revision of notes and documents. Drafting of report outline

Sunday 22 August 2004

Informal lunch meeting at the weekend residence of Guido Riveros Franck and conversation on party-political issues with a.o. Guido Riveros Franck (chairman of fBDM), Luis Gonzáles Quintanilla (former MIR Deputy and former Bolivian Ambassador in France and Paraguay),

Sergio Medina Celi (MIR, former governor of Potosí, former Deputy and Senador), Hugo Mariscal Reyes (MNR and founding member of fBDM), Gonzalo Rojas Ortuste, Ivan Guzmán de Rojas (academic, member of the Bolivian Academy of Science, former council member and president of the CNE).

1700 Informal interview with Ivan Guzmán de Rojas (academic, member of the Bolivian Academy of Science, former council member and president of the CNE) and Gladys Dávalos Arze (member of the Bolivian Academy of Languages and member of the editorial board of *Pulso* magazine)

Monday 23 August 2004

0900 Trip to El Alto for scheduled interview with Felipe Quispe (MIP national leader) and Tomás Quispe (MIP; member of fBDM directorate) but cancelled upon arrival at MIP office and transferred to Thursday 26 August 2004, 1000.

1130 Short conversation with Rodolfo Santiváñez Beltrán (newly starting fBDM manager) for planning of document consultation and vision on fBDM strategy and upcoming activities.

1200 Team work Koonings & Mansilla: preliminary assessment of findings and discussion of report outline

1600 Interview with Saul Lara (Minister of the Interior), Ximena Prudencio Bilbao (Director-General of Citizen Security and Crime Prevention) and Gregorio Lanza (advisor to the Minister of Government)

1700 Interview with Peter de Haan (First Secretary, Embassy of The Netherlands in La Paz)

Tuesday 24 August 2004

0830 Interview with René Meier Klopstock (entrepreneur and Treasurer of fBDM)

1100 Interview with Erick Reyes Villa (NFR Deputy; member of fBDM directorate)

1430 Interview with Alberto Aguilar Calle (MAS Deputy; member of fBDM directorate)

1530 Interview with Mario Cossio (MNR Deputy; president of the Chamber of Deputies)

1630 Interview with Hugo Carvajal Donoso (MIR Senator)

1730 Interview with Erika Brockmann Quiroga (MIR Deputy)

Wednesday 25 August 2004

0900 Interview with Claudio Rossell Arce (*La Prensa*) transferred to Thursday 26 August 2004 due to general strike and blockades of public transport

0900 Consultation of fBDM documents

- 1000 Interview by telephone with Javier Bejarano (MSM Santa Cruz; member of fBDM Directorate)
- 1100 Interview with Ivonne Fernández Weisser (Executive Director of FUNDEMOS)
- 1300 Lunch meeting with Guido Riveros Franck (MIR, president of fBDM) and Rodolfo Santiváñez Beltran (manager fBDM)
- 1500 Interview with Mario Napoleón Pacheco Torrico (Executive Director of Milenio Foundation)
- 1600 Consultation of fBDM documents
- 2130 Interview with José Luis Paredes (mayor of El Alto)

Thursday 26 August 2004

- 1000 Interview with Tomás Quispe (MIP, member of fBDM directorate) (in El Alto)
- 1200 Consultation by telephone with Roel von Meijenveldt and Heleen Schrooyen (NIMD)
- 1430 Consultation of fBDM documents; preparation Koonings & Mansilla of de-briefing meeting 27 August
- 1530 Interview with Javier Campero Paz (MNR acting national) and Elias Clavijo A. (MNR national secretary of organization)
- 1700 Interview with Claudio Rossell Arce (Political Editor *La Prensa*)
- 1800 Interview with Mauro Bertero Gutiérrez (AND acting president; member of fBDM directorate)
- 2030 Detailed consultation with Guido Riveros Franck (chairman of fBDM)

Friday 27 August 2004

- 0830 Interview with Carlos Toranzo Roca (Academic, 2nd vice-president of fBDM and manager of ILDIS – Friedrich Ebert St.) cancelled by Carlos Toranzo due to agenda constraints. To be conducted by telephone by Mansilla.
- 0900 Preparation of de-briefing and draft report
- 1000 Interview with Fernando Molina (editor of *Pulso*)
- 1300 Lunch meeting for de-briefing with fBDM directorate
- 1530 Interview with Jorge Cortés (Minister and Presidential Delegate for Institutional Reform)
- 1800 Interview with Godofredo Sandoval (Managing Director of PIEB)

Saturday 28 August 2004

0930 Team work Koonings & Mansilla: discussion of report structure and planning of drafting schedule and exchange

End of Bolivia Field Mission

1500 Departure Koonings to Amsterdam (arrival Sunday 29 August 2004 1730 local time)

Wednesday 1 September 2004

1400 Document consultation and report drafting at nIMD (Koonings); consultation with Heleen Schrooyen (Project Officer nIMD)

1500 Interview with Martin van Vliet (CDA Bolivia Programme Officer for nIMD)