Mid Term Review

NIMD PROGRAMME IN UGANDA 2009-2013

February 5, 2014
Executive Summary

IPOD was established by NIMD in 2010 to create an informal interparty dialogue process, as a way of reducing animosity between the ruling party, the National Resistance Movement, on the one hand, and opposition parliamentary political parties on the other, particularly in the run-up to what was promising to be yet another tension-filled 2011 general election. The forum was set up with deliberately modest ambitions, and progress has been broadly in line with those programmatic objectives. IPOD is a valuable forum, and despite grumblings, none of the political parties involved seem likely to withdraw entirely from the process. In general, the parties have recognised the benefit of much of IPOD’s work, for their own capacity and organisation, and clearly want it to continue. But the bulk of the interviews with the opposition parties focused on the failure of NIMD to realise their expectations through IPOD.

However, much of this criticism has revolved around the opposition’s frustrations at the broader political environment, and IPOD not helping them to change it. All stakeholders in IPOD – political parties, parliamentary parties, donor community, media and public – seem to believe that IPOD should have made much more progress on the political reform agenda. And, although wide-ranging constitutional reform is unlikely in the short-term, it is becoming the benchmark against which IPOD is increasingly judged.

The key challenge for IPOD in the coming years will be to manage those expectations, emphasising the diversity of its activities, providing evidence of progress, and notably by improving the coherence, organisation and performance of the opposition parties. While inter-party dialogue is valuable for its own sake, IPOD may benefit by being clearer about the intended outcomes of that dialogue.

This review is structured in four parts. The first chapter looks at the logic of NIMD’s approach to Uganda. As with NIMD projects elsewhere it was thoroughly researched with an astute understanding of the political context. The key insight was that in the first phase it needed to ensure the continued involvement of all the political parties in parliament. The principal purpose of the dialogue was simply to provide a forum for discussion amongst the parties, and aside from the vaguely worded ‘minimalistic reform agenda’ there was little reference to the substantive outcomes.

The central principle that informed subsequent dialogue was that IPOD would proceed only by consensus. This sought to take the heat of adversarial contestation out of inter-party relations and introduce a new dynamic based on collaboration and consensus building. This is the forum’s greatest strength. It is also its biggest weakness. It meant that the NRM were willing to participate, as they could not be bound by the decisions of other parties. But it also meant that each party effectively had a veto over any decisions of the forum.

The second chapter looks at the programmatic objectives and the implementation of IPOD’s various activities. It starts with an assessment of the regional visits, which kicked off the dialogue process, and then examines the process of dialogue, party capacity building and work with CSOs. The fifth section looks at the organisational and administrative structure of IPOD.

Although NIMD has been resourceful in how it has used experiences from other multi-party dialogue platforms in Africa to inform IPOD planning and programming, the visits also appear to have contributed to the inflation of expectations amongst the political parties. They undoubtedly provided inspiration and comparable regional experience. But the process of constitutional change in Ghana, in particular, is cited by all the opposition parties as the key comparator for IPOD.

The sense of frustration has been heightened by the slow progress of dialogue itself. The opposition parties complained that too much of IPOD’s content was insubstantial, with few tangible outputs or outcomes. In addition they contrasted IPOD’s internal discussions with political developments outside. Many of the interviewees pointed to the Public Order Management Act (POMA), which had been passed by parliament,
as evidence of the gap between the NRM’s words in IPOD, and their deeds outside. And, although relationships between the delegates who serve on IPOD are strong, the relationship between the opposition parties and the NRM is still characterised by mistrust.

The parties welcomed the support provided by the capacity building strand of the programme, including the support in manifesto development, provision of policy analysts, broadband internet connection and training for party staff. But they all questioned how far such initiatives were changing the political environment. In the final area, that of civil society engagement, very little on-going activity has occurred, for reasons that are not entirely attributable to IPOD.

We conclude that, given the difficult and fractious political environment in which it was born, IPOD had made some crucial first steps in opening and facilitating dialogue amongst parties. But there were notable omissions. The failure to hold the Leaders’ Summit is becoming a totemic issue for the opposition parties who seem to believe that the meeting will entirely change the dynamic of the IPOD forum. We have not seen any compelling evidence to indicate that this is the case, but as long as it remains an unfulfilled IPOD objective, it will shape political perspectives of the dialogue process. We understand that politics is unpredictable, and that activities will be subject to delays from time to time, but IPOD/NIMD will be judged, partly, by what they say they are going to do, and whether they actually do it. This applies to the Leaders’ Summit, work with civil society and the district dialogues.

However, we also conclude that the opposition parties should take greater responsibility for their own deficiencies. The opposition parties are disorganised, and fragmented, but rather than recognising these weaknesses, they too often use the dominance of the NRM as an excuse for their failure to make headway. As one party president commented, “It’s not us, it’s the environment”. In short, they spend too much time complaining about the weather, and resort too much to gesture politics, than making change happen.

The third chapter examines how and why stakeholder expectations have grown, focusing particularly on the perspectives of the political parties and how the wider political environment is likely to shape the development of IPOD in the next few years. We suggest that the biggest challenge for IPOD is the divergent expectations of what it will achieve, and the need to manage stakeholder expectations more effectively.

We make five proposals to that end. First, we suggest that IPOD only operates at one speed and needs to increase the number of gears it uses, by creating alternative forums for discussion. For instance, some meetings would be used to take decisions, some would be used to reach common positions on policy issues and some would be simply to air proposals. Second, IPOD should build stronger links with the parties in parliament and have more direct links to parliamentary business. Third, because IPOD is currently being judged on outcomes that are probably some way off, as part of its management of expectations, the forum should consider producing outputs, such as publications, for public consumption.

Fourth, although effecting changes to the political culture of a country may depend partly on political and constitutional reform, it also depends on changing the way political actors engage with each other. IPOD needs to emphasise its role in improving the performance of the opposition parties as a means to strengthening electoral competition. Finally, we highlight the importance of the secretariat in making these changes happen, and the need to identify quantitative and qualitative measures of progress.

The final brief chapter seeks to summarise the main strategic challenges for IPOD in managing stakeholder expectations, ensuring that the political parties take greater responsibility for their own development, and in being able to demonstrate evidence of progress. We believe that IPOD is a valuable and important forum for the development of multi-party politics in Uganda. Although IPOD has met almost all of the programmatic objectives that it set for itself, the reality of politics is that IPOD is increasingly being judged by most stakeholders on whether constitutional reform is enacted.
It seems unlikely that any of the political parties will leave the forum, and thus bring an end to multi-party dialogue, but there does appear to be a danger that it could lose momentum unless it can find ways of showing progress. All the stakeholders will need a greater sense of tangibility in its discussions, outputs and outcomes.
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Introduction

Global Partners Governance (GPG), in collaboration with Dr. Golooba-Mutebi, has been asked to conduct a Mid-Term Review (MTR) of NIMD Uganda’s Inter Party Organisation for Dialogue (IPOD) to assess progress, examine results and organisational capacity, and identify lessons learnt since IPOD’s establishment in 2010. This review covers the IPOD programme from September 2009 to September 2013 and examines the bilateral and multi-party activities and support funded by DGF/DDP and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs during this period.

The Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD) was created in 2000 by seven Dutch political parties to support multi-party systems in new and developing democracies. Its programmatic approach has been to foster better relationships between parties and improve party credentials through direct support as a dual strategy to sustain and strengthen nascent democratic systems. NIMD began working in Uganda in 2009 in the run-up to the country’s second multi-party elections in 20 years and launched the IPOD platform in the highly polarised political climate of the time. Three years on, the IPOD continues to exist and to provide Uganda’s political parties with a forum for discussion.

The NIMD MTR Terms of Reference (Appendix 1) articulate three main objectives for this review. First, to identify and assess the results of the Uganda programme between 2009 and 2013, focusing on both the programmatic results as well as the organisational capacities of NIMD Uganda and the IPOD secretariat. Second, to analyse results and relate any first effects of the programme on the political party system in Uganda and the political culture emerging. And third, on the basis of the lessons learned so far, to provide recommendations for the next phase of the Uganda programme in 2014-2016. Specific themes to be considered within these MTR objectives are:

The expectations of the participating parties in the IPOD dialogue process (past and future)
- The ‘Ownership’ and level of participation of the parties in the IPOD dialogue process
- The effectiveness of the IPOD institutions (‘Council of SGs’, committees, ‘Summit of Presidents’) and methods of work (study visits, trainings etc).
- The relevance of IPOD as a dialogue mechanism relative to other key political processes in Uganda (Parliament, National Consultative Forum (NCF), ‘intra-party’ processes, informal mechanisms).
- The main challenges/obstacles to the inter-party dialogue process and key leverage points for progress.

Details of the GPG review methodology and review team can be found in Appendix 2. The report’s findings were drawn from an extensive desk review of NIMD documents (listed in Appendix 3) and direct and remote consultations with a range of internal and external stakeholders to NIMD’s work (listed in Appendix 4). Direct consultations were conducted in a visit to NIMD headquarters at The Hague and in a field visit to Kampala, Uganda, where the review team met with NIMD Uganda staff, IPOD political party representatives and wider political and international agency actors in the country. These consultations were held under conditions of anonymity, so the quotations used in this report are not attributed.

The Mid Term Review of IPOD is structured in four sections. First, we examine the logic of the NIMD intervention in the Ugandan context, and how it has shaped IPOD programme planning. Second, we examine project implementation and to what extent IPOD programme implementation has met its objectives. Third, we discuss the factors within the wider political environment that IPOD will need to address in the coming years, and make recommendations for changes to IPOD’s working mechanisms. In the final section we very briefly recap the three main strategic challenges for IPOD.
Part 1: Logic of intervention

i. Political context

Since gaining independence in 1962, Ugandan politics has alternated between military rule and one-party dominance and has been characterised by violent transitions from Milton Obote’s one party state and Idi Amin’s military dictatorship, to the incumbent President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni’s National Resistance Movement (NRM). When the NRM came to power in 1986, it did so as a unified organisation driven by a desire to introduce a new kind of politics entailing inclusiveness and emphasising the importance of personal merit rather than membership in a political party for those desirous of playing a role in public life. Through inclusiveness it sought to capture all strands of political thinking in order to guard against the divisive sectarian tendencies, which had fuelled much of Uganda’s historic civil conflict. The NRM came as an alternative to the party system bent on homogenising the Ugandan electorate’s political voice in a “no party democracy” that lasted for 20 years.

In 2005, Ugandans were asked to vote in a referendum to re-introduce competitive multi-party politics in the country. The majority voted in favour of allowing “those who wish to join different (...) parties to do so to compete for political power” and in February 2006, 6 political parties gained representation in Uganda’s 8th Parliament. The NRM retained a majority in Parliament with 212 seats. The largest opposition party, mostly composed of NRM defectors, became the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) with 39 seats. The Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) and the Democratic Party (DP) won 10 and 9 seats respectively. The two smallest parties became the Conservative Party (CP) and the Justice and Peace Forum (JEEMA) with 1 seat each.

The second multi-party general elections took place in March 2011 just a year after the Netherlands Institute for Multi-Party Democracy (NIMD) launched the Inter-Party Organisation for Dialogue (IPOD). Again, the results did not radically alter the distribution of power amongst the parties. Fewer Ugandans went to the polls1 and the opposition parties lost some seats to the independents and to the NRM. The NRM remained dominant with a total of 279 seats, the independents followed with 37 seats, the FDC retained 34 seats, the DP and UPC won 11 and 9 seats respectively. The CP and JEEMA seat allocation was unchanged.

This move towards pluralism was a first step towards a competitive party system in Uganda. Today, a number of challenges remain which are restricting parties’ potential to perform effectively and these can be divided into two broad categories.

First, there are the restrictions imposed by the external, legal and constitutional framework within which the parties have to operate. During our consultations with IPOD stakeholders, this uneven playing field was attributed to three main issues. First, parties complained of the limited funding available to them as a result of the Political Parties Organisations Act (PPOA). The PPOA sets strict limits on foreign party funding, and although it was amended to include public funding to parties in 2010, no funds have been released to date. This has led parties to see the PPOA as an NRM strategy geared to their containment and control not least because, as they claim it has access to state resources. Second, the mistrust towards the Electoral Commission (EC) has discredited the electoral process as a whole in the country. The opposition parties regard the EC as an NRM sponsored bulwark of the status quo and its composition and procedures continue to be highly contentious issues, particularly in the run up to elections. Third, parties complained of the repression opposition activists and party members endure on the streets. Most recently, the Public Order Management Act (POMA 2013) which opposition parties claim sets criteria for security clearance of public meetings of 3 or more people, is a key concern for them because they believe it gives scope for discriminatory application of the law.
Second, there are the internal party deficiencies, which further limit parties’ scope for action within this wider restrictive framework. Political parties are poorly institutionalised and remain disorganised, internally divided and with limited access to resources which prevents them from improving their capacities as credible and representative governing entities. As one MP put it, “in Uganda, there is no party operating like a party”. This is in part due to the two-decade ban on competitive politics, which put opposition parties at a relative disadvantage compared to the NRM in terms of party organisation, policy-making and electoral campaigning. Party prospects have been further compromised by the internal factions and leadership disputes, which characterise much of Ugandan party politics. The NRM, meanwhile, has its own share of problems. It is far from monolithic and suffers from some of the same issues in party organisation and capacity as the opposition parties. The ruling party essentially functions on a part time basis, in the run up to elections when conventional party structures need to be reactivated to facilitate electoral campaigning. The rest of the time, the party exists as a diffuse network of individuals, held together by a deeply entrenched patronage system.

Both sets of factors mean that the party system is characterised by mistrust and antagonism between the NRM and the opposition parties on the one hand and, for different reasons, among opposition parties on the other. While competitive politics does, by definition, set parties against each other, the mistrust that pervades inter-party relations in Uganda is particularly acute, and may threaten the democratic process as a whole.

ii. NIMD approach and establishment of IPOD

NIMD has a successful track record of facilitating interparty dialogue in a number of African countries. Its programmes in Ghana, Malawi, Kenya and Tanzania, amongst others, have been developed to address a variety of political challenges from which the Institute has been able to draw lessons in good practice. Specifically, this extensive experience has allowed NIMD to identify the benefits of multi-party dialogue in reducing political tensions through trust and confidence building, solving political conflicts in an informal and non-confrontational manner, coordinating civic and political education activities for political actors, facilitating the dissemination of electoral related communication in an inclusive and transparent forum and providing a platform for organising and lobby around a minimalist reform agenda. Similarly, the NIMD has tried and tested methods of disbursing direct capacity building support to parties from its programmes in Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia and Ghana, which it has been able to draw inspiration from for IPOD.

In addition to demonstrating the rewards that a robust and well-functioning interparty dialogue process could bring to fragile democratic systems, NIMD’s interventions in Africa have also shown that this dialogue process can be sustainable over the long term. In a number of cases NIMD- facilitated platforms have since “evolved into formalised and structured” forums for multi-party dialogue.

NIMD conducted two orientation missions in Uganda in 2009 to “determine the (...) needs of stakeholders and (...) possibilities for an intervention”. During these missions, NIMD studied the political landscape and conducted a number of consultations with representatives of all 6 parliamentary parties. A number of “trends towards democratic regression” were identified including Uganda’s informal political institutions, parties’ personality driven and patronage based operations and the political system’s weak ties with civil society.

NIMD used these and other institutional and political deficiencies in the country to inform its approach to multi-party dialogue support in Uganda. When NIMD established the IPOD platform, its goal was to “secure a safe space for dialogue amongst the parliamentary parties” which would reflect the realities of the Ugandan party system, dominated by the National Resistance Movement (NRM), facing an array of opposition parties that were poorly organised, internally fragmented and with few resources.

The overarching objective was to help develop a well functioning democratic multiparty political system, and planning towards it was based on NIMD’s model of intervention, which delineated the three following complimentary areas of programming:
• Fostering interparty dialogue that addresses issues of national concern;
• Strengthening political parties to become legitimate, accountable and responsive actors, equipped with dialogue, policy development and communication and outreach skills;
• Supporting alliances (communities of change) between political and civil society to create a broad support base for the agenda that emerges out of the dialogue platform.

Under these three headings, NIMD Uganda defined six specific outputs around which activities would revolve:

• Commit the six parliamentary parties to participate in an informal dialogue process.
• Develop consensus on the purpose and modalities for the platform.
• Secure consensus on a shared agenda of minimalistic reforms decided by the parties participating in the process.
• Enhance the trust between parliamentary party representatives.
• Establish a representative NIMD office in Uganda in order to facilitate the dialogue.
• Ensure that the NIMD programme is effectively managed through regular and adequate monitoring and evaluation procedures.

IPOD was formally established on 5th February 2010, with the signing of the IPOD Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) by the six political parties represented in Uganda’s 9th Parliament. NIMD had originally planned to launch the IPOD with the MoU signing in late 2009 in order to time its intervention before the 2011 electoral run took hold in the country, and while some scope for reform remained. However, the signing of the MoU was delayed due to extended internal party consultations within the NRM.

The platform’s governance structure was modelled on NIMD’s Ghanaian multi-party platform. It was planned to include a Summit of Leaders, and provides for a Council of the parties’ Secretaries-General, which is responsible for providing “political guidance and strategic oversight of the programme”7. NIMD set up a NIMD Uganda office to act as an interim IPOD Secretariat and take charge of the day-to-day running of the platform.

In assessing the risks to the programme, the NIMD identified two key factors, which had a significant effect on how the programme has developed in the last three years. First, the lack of buy-in from political parties was mentioned as the critical risk in its intervention in Uganda. Analyses, such as the framework for actor mapping and the SWOT/PES Matrix Political Parties/movements8 suggest that NIMD has made an effort to understand and factor in stakeholders’ incentives in planning the Ugandan multi-dialogue structure.

Partly as a way of ensuring NRM involvement in the forum, the IPOD council can only take decisions by agreement of all the parties. The greater and primary purpose of decision making by consensus at IPOD however is to set the right conditions for trust and cohesion amongst parties, and to facilitate the accommodation and the shaping of a shared agenda through dialogue. It is therefore a deliberate effort to deviate from the confrontational and polarised parliamentary style to create a different dynamic9.

In practice, however, the consensual approach has some limits. While it places all parties on an equal footing, it also means that all parties effectively have a veto on the proposals of the others. For the opposition, the opportunity to engage on such a footing with the NRM was described as a ‘golden opportunity’. NIMD Uganda has sought to maintain this buy-in by informing much of IPOD programming on immediate party concerns and by aligning IPOD strategy with the electoral cycle’s scope for reform.

Second, NIMD’s assessment of risk10 in Uganda also led it to make a deliberate effort to define IPOD success in minimalist terms at the outset. In proposal documents, IPOD is described as a forum, which was geared to preventing a “worsening of the situation”11 in Uganda. This was partly a response to the “main
dilemma”\textsuperscript{12} of launching a multi-dialogue process in the sensitive and politically charged context of the approaching 2011 elections. The instability and disruption electoral competition could bring to the platform was, however, deemed a calculated and manageable risk, which NIMD planned to contain by tempering expectations and focusing on short-term outputs.

iii. Conclusion

The approach to dialogue adopted by NIMD was thoroughly researched, well prepared, and crucially, it depended on the involvement of the NRM if it was to have any meaning, which NIMD was able to secure. The NIMD also clearly sought to downplay the expectations of the participants by setting relatively modest outputs for the process. The principal purpose of the dialogue was simply to provide a forum for discussion amongst the parties, and aside from the vaguely worded ‘minimalistic reform agenda’ there was little reference to the substantive outcomes of discussion.

The key to the early development of the dialogue process was simply to keep all the parties involved. The NRM appeared to regard it as an opportunity to engage with and understand the opposition parties, while for the opposition parties it was a rare opportunity to meet with the NRM on a relatively equal footing. As an added incentive for the opposition parties, membership of the forum was linked to the provision of funding and support for the development of the political parties themselves.

However, although the logic of intervention was sound, there were two elements which some of the political parties appeared to overlook, and subsequently led to divergent expectations. First, the involvement of the NRM in the IPOD forum was dependent on the fact that it would proceed by consensus, meaning that each party effectively had a veto over any decisions of the forum. Second, despite deliberately setting modest objectives, many of the opposition parties appeared to assume that the forum would lead to wide-ranging political and constitutional reform. Both of these factors then shaped the subsequent performance of IPOD, and how it has been regarded by the various participants.
Part 2: Activities and implementation

NIMD established the IPOD platform to facilitate multi-party dialogue and assist the institutionalisation of Uganda’s six parliamentary political parties. It sought to do this by establishing a dialogue amongst the political parties in a neutral forum, enhancing the capacity of the opposition parties, and by improving the links between political and civil society.

It has done this in three main ways. First, regional visits allowed IPOD parties to share lessons and experiences with other interparty dialogue platforms in Ghana, Tanzania and Malawi. Second, IPOD Council and subcommittee meetings have helped build trust among party representatives and allowed them to discuss issues of common concern. And third, direct capacity building support to parties through the provision of training, policy analysts and material support, helped improve parties’ internal capacity whilst also acting as an incentive to preserve parties’ commitment to the platform.

NIMD set deliberately modest objectives at the outset of the programme. As this chapter suggests, the programme has broadly met its initial programmatic goals (with one or two notable exceptions). Yet, despite their attempts to play down expectations of large-scale political reform, many stakeholders appear to be frustrated by the lack of progress in this area.

This chapter examines the implementation of project activities over the life of IPOD, assessing how far objectives have been met, and the structures that were put in place. The chapter starts with an assessment of the regional visits, which kicked off the dialogue process, and then examines the process of dialogue, capacity building and work with CSOs. The fifth section looks at the organisational and administrative structure of IPOD. In conclusion, we suggest that although the programme has met its own objectives, it is being judged by other stakeholders on different criteria, a theme picked up in more detail in Chapter 3.

i. Regional visits

NIMD has successfully used regional visits as part of their projects to encourage peer-to-peer learning, and to facilitate the process of dialogue in the country in which they are working. In Uganda, they were identified as a way to “invest in sharing lessons and experiences on interparty dialogue processes in the region”13.

The first of these, to Ghana in 2009, was described as “the whole beginning of dialogue for IPOD.” The Ghanaian multi-party model was referred to as an ideal model for IPOD to follow, hailed as “the most advanced of the NIMD supported processes.” The IPOD exchange visit to Accra was crucial in securing Ugandan parties’ commitment to the dialogue process and led to the drafting of the IPOD platform’s Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). This “High Level Kick Off” planned by NIMD gathered three representatives from each of the six Ugandan political parties to explore how their Ghanaian counterparts had established and run the Ghana Political Parties Programme (GPPP). One of the results was Ugandan parties’ choice to emulate the Ghanaian platform’s two-tier model14 for the IPOD governance structure. The retreat also gave Ugandan delegates the opportunity to interact with high-level Ghanaian politicians, such as former president John Agyekum Kufor and Presidential Advisor, Paul Victor Obeng.

Subsequent visits followed this initial success. In 2010 the IPOD parties were given the opportunity to observe Malawi’s electoral management systems and examine how the Malawian political parties had contributed to them through their own Centre for Multiparty Democracy (CMD). Two formal meetings with the Ugandan Electoral Commission followed in October of that year. And, following the 2011 election, IPOD delegates visited Tanzania to participate in a “Healing of Wounds” workshop. This visit allowed Ugandan parties to find out about how Tanzanian parties dealt with their own electoral defeat in 2005, and
to draw lessons to apply to their own experience. This was followed up with an IPOD workshop in July 2011 which involved a wider range of stakeholders in Uganda, including representatives from civil society, faith-based organisations, security agencies, the international community and the Electoral Commission.

Crucially, the IPOD agenda setting process was also anchored in the context of regional visits. An exchange visit to Ghana was planned for early 2012 to discuss and finalise IPOD reform agenda items as a basis for future multi-party dialogue. Efforts to define a reform agenda had been ongoing since the first IPOD Council meeting in 2010 but its formal institution has been interrupted by more pressing concerns during and after elections.

In early 2013, some significant progress was made on this front. NIMD Uganda originally planned to organise an exchange visit to Accra, Ghana to reactivate the IPOD reform agenda in collaboration with the GPPP, however, this trip had to be twice delayed until it finally took place in February 2013. On this third attempt, and building on the significant gains which had been secured in November 2012 in Tanzania (discussed below), IPOD succeeded in defining its four areas of reform in the following order of priority: electoral reforms, law and order management, funding of political parties, and constitutional reforms15.

- **Analysis**

The overwhelmingly positive party response to the regional visits suggests that these activities have played an important role in maintaining IPOD momentum and driving collaboration forward. Parties described regional visits to Ghana, Malawi and Tanzania as “good experiences”, which have “broadened (their) horizons” and which they are “keen to learn” from. All stakeholders we spoke with clearly appreciated the value of NIMD’s regional visits, explaining that they “helped (parties) with benchmarking and understand how parties operate”.

NIMD has been resourceful in how it has used experiences from other multi-party dialogue platforms in Africa to inform IPOD planning and programming. The visits have lent credibility to the interparty process in Uganda itself, and provided inspiration and comparable regional experience for parties to draw insights from. Regional visits have therefore served an important purpose in providing opportunities for IPOD parties to engage in discussion with their regional counterparts, share each others’ experiences and improve their understanding of multi-party dialogue processes.

However, there is a sense that IPOD parties have failed to absorb some of the rudimentary lessons in party organisation and procedures from their interaction with other interparty dialogue platforms. All opposition parties expressed the benefits of witnessing functional party processes through these visits but none made any suggestions as to how these could be replicated in the Ugandan context and in their own parties. While the initial 2009 visit to Ghana had been crucial in generating the Ugandan parties’ commitment to IPOD, it has become clear that this commitment was partly grounded on the hope that IPOD would follow a similar trajectory to the GPPP. In this sense, they appear to have contributed to inflating expectations as to what IPOD could achieve for multi-party politics in their own country, and to some extent, to have worked at cross-purposes with NIMD’s effort to keep expectations low.

**ii. Dialogue**

The IPOD platform’s principal purpose in Uganda is to facilitate more effective dialogue between the six Ugandan parliamentary parties. In the three years since it has been established, structures for interparty dialogue have been set up, and IPOD parties continue to engage in the platform on a regular basis. Parties meet at the Council and in subcommittee level, as well as through a range of IPOD activities such as policy debates, regional visits and a number of capacity building exercises such as dialogue trainings and workshops covering issues such as policy development and electoral review to name a few.

In 2010, IPOD held a total of twenty-eight plenary and nine subcommittee meetings. This was followed in 2011 with twenty-five plenary and eighteen subcommittee meetings. In addition to these measures to foster dialogue internally and amongst parties, IPOD ensured the involvement of key stakeholders in the
dialogue process such as the Electoral Commission and security agency representatives. A first meeting with the Electoral Commission was organised early on, on 18th August 2010 and was closely followed up with two further meetings in October 2010 at a time where parties’ concerns on the electoral process was high on their list of priorities. Similarly, IPOD proceedings remained highly relevant to the political context by including meetings with security authorities such as with the Minister of Security and with the Inspector General of the police in the third and last quarters of 2010 respectively.

In addition to dialogue at the institutional level, IPOD also explored options for dialogue with civil society organisations (CSO) in three formal meetings in the second quarter of 2011. On these occasions, IPOD and CSOs considered the option of decentralising dialogue at the district level in order to provide an opportunity for local issues to be discussed, particularly on those relating to accountability.

In 2012, two key IPOD gains were highlighted in the desk review mission reports. The first was with regard to the prospective political parties’ capacity strengthening fund, which was being planned in 2012. IPOD parties came to a political agreement on the formula for the allocation of the planned funds, which at the very least, represented a symbolic success of the trust building function of the platform.

The second is with regard to the IPOD reform agenda setting process. This process had started from the very first Council meeting in 2010 in principle, but had stalled on a number of occasions until late 2012 / early 2013, when IPOD parties finally agreed on four fundamental reform areas to guide future dialogue at IPOD.

Prior efforts to finalise a reform agenda had proven unsuccessful mainly because of the lack of trust between parties during and after the elections. Other challenges to the process are discussed below (political party perspectives). The idea of an exchange visit to Ghana (and eventually to Tanzania as well) was to inform and expose IPOD delegates to the content and process of the agenda setting process in order to facilitate IPOD’s own. However, as this exchange visit continued to be delayed later into 2012 (and approaching Ghana’s own elections), NIMD Uganda made resourceful use of its wider political networks on the continent, and organised an exchange visit to Tanzania in November 2012 to keep the IPOD agenda setting momentum going.

During this visit, IPOD parties laid the foundations to what was to become the IPOD reform agenda. Parties committed to four priority reform areas and this was followed with a visit to Accra, in February 2013, where IPOD parties convened to follow up on these. One outcome was parties’ engagement to develop a short to medium term roadmap for the IPOD dialogue process.

As a brief summary, the main issues and follow up points which IPOD parties agreed to address as a basis for future dialogue are defined below by reform area:

- **Law and order**: Parties’ concerns in this area centered around the excesses of law enforcement and security forces’ equivocal track record in their respect of human rights and the rule of law. Reciprocally, parties considered political leaders’ own conduct within and without the confines of the law. In addition, the provisions included in the Public Order Management Bill, which were being considered in Parliament at the time, were flagged up as a priority to address by IPOD parties.

- **Political Party funding**: IPOD agreed that the first step in this reform area would be to work towards the release of the public funding for political parties provided for in the PPOA.

- **Electoral reform**: Parties wanted a range of amendments related to electoral legislation to be examined, including the Presidential Elections Act and the Parliamentary Elections Act, as well as to strengthen the independence of Electoral Commission. The idea to institute a system of biometric voter registration and verification was further considered as a means of ensuring a more accurate and verifiable voters register.

- **Constitutional reform**: the most important issue here is that of presidential term limits, which parties are aiming to reinstate.
To support this first important milestone in the agenda setting process, IPOD went on to create four sub-committees in July 2013 to work on each pillar of the reform agenda. Each would be able to commission experts to assist its work and commission policy papers to push the agenda forward. The first of these policy papers was being produced on electoral reforms at the time of writing in November 2013.17

Dialogue at IPOD has proven resilient under pressure. In 2013, UPC leadership renewed the IPC process (details below) under a new name “Democracy Seeking coalition” as a result of frustration borne out of the slow pace of progress at IPOD. NIMD Uganda reacted accordingly to this development by maintaining contact with the leaderships of the opposition parties in order to secure their continued commitment to the platform18.

From the outset IPOD needed to distinguish itself from the other multi-party dialogue processes in Uganda such as the statutory National Consultative Forum (NCF), the Council of Elders, the Inter-Religious Council of Uganda (IRCU) and the now defunct Inter Party Cooperation (IPC). Stakeholders we consulted distinguished the IPOD platform from other dialogue processes in four main ways.

First, unlike the IPC, which was set up by FDC, CP, JEEMA and UPC in 2008 to specifically oust the NRM from power, the IPOD extends its membership to the ruling party. Furthermore, NIMD Uganda’s third-party facilitative role has helped preserve the platform’s impartiality in doing so. This is in contrast to the Council of Elders and NCF, for instance, which include NRM representation but which are perceived to be dominated by its interests.

Second, IPOD has a wider remit than the NCF’s electoral reform single-issue focus, and provides for discussion on additional reform areas, such as law and order management and funding of political parties.

Third, IPOD further distinguishes itself from the NCF in that it has limited its membership to parliamentary parties only. The country’s statutory platform includes representation from all 38 registered political parties and in our consultations we were told that this diluted representation of the parliamentary opposition has been exploited by the NRM and allowed it to “have its way with everybody”.

NIMD Uganda was concerned that IPOD’s work on electoral reform could duplicate NCF’s own work on the issue. For this reason, it has made continuous efforts to collaborate more closely with the NCF, as demonstrated by its most recent plans to hold a joint seminar on electoral reforms.

Finally, some IPOD stakeholders have found NIMD Uganda to be more flexible. One party representative said that, contrary to other dialogue fora, IPOD does not “just make a suit and want parties to fit in” and instead tailors programming to specific party initiatives, concerns and priorities.

• Implementation of dialogue activities

In the period since the IPOD has been set up, interparty dialogue between Uganda’s six parliamentary parties has been ongoing, if intermittent. Dialogue at IPOD began in February 2010 when the attention of political parties’ was fully focused on electoral campaigning, security and regulation ahead of the 2011 elections. Political parties had expressed concern about the EC’s management of the electoral process and about how the security forces would manage related outbreaks of violence. IPOD turned to work on addressing these issues, first with the common IPOD position on electoral amendments, which it presented to the Parliamentary Legal Committee and second, with the establishment of the Eminent Persons Group (EPG), which was a group composed of one representative from each party with a mandate to “anticipate and forestall any violence or violent disputes in known ‘hotspots’ or conflict areas and “resolve political violence or violent conflicts where these might arise”19.

The IPOD position on electoral amendments did not lead to the full-scale reforms proposed20, but it was considered to be “small but significant example of successful cooperation across the political spectrum”21 and had also engaged IPOD parties more directly with parliamentary processes.
The most recent IPOD initiative to broaden support for interparty dialogue has been at the district level. IPOD planned pilot district dialogues to “promote awareness and support for the IPOD dialogue process as a way of solving political differences”\textsuperscript{22}. These district dialogues took place, but after some delay and modification from original plans. This was because Council members failed to reach consensus on whether the district dialogues should be hosted by IPOD or not. According to the wording of the IPOD Council December 2012 internal review, “there were disagreements regarding how they would be conducted and doubts as to whether they fall within the IPOD memorandum of understanding”. District dialogues were eventually held in 2013 but parties decided to host them individually which led NIMD Uganda to drop its plans of appointing an IPOD district dialogue coordinator. To date, JEEMA, DP, CP and NRM have held district dialogues to which they invited members of other parties to attend.

More broadly, deliberations at IPOD have created friendships and cemented relations among party representatives mainly because of frequent interactions and the time they have had to get to know each other and develop trust at the individual level. While this has improved communication and relations among opposition parties which on a number of occasions have even attempted to forge a common front against the NRM in the run up to presidential elections, it has not necessarily translated into improved relations between the NRM as a political organisation on the one hand, and opposition parties on the other. The opposition parties all suggested that the NRM does not take the process seriously, arguing that the NRM representatives are not senior enough and, consequently, because they always have to refer decisions to the party leadership who then take long periods of time to respond. While Secretaries-General and policy analysts represent the opposition parties, those representing the NRM are a cabinet minister and the party’s policy analyst.

Nonetheless, for all opposition parties IPOD has been an invaluable channel of communication with the ruling party. JEEMA further commended the platform’s information sharing function, citing telephone discussions with other party presidents to discuss IPOD issues as an example and DP credited its “vastly improved” relationship with UPC to platform activities.

- **Political party perspectives on IPOD progress**

  The IPOD platform has provided parties with a space and purpose for discussion since it has been set up in 2010 and our consultations do suggest that stakeholders distinguish and value IPOD’s specific contribution to multi-party dialogue support in the country. However, opposition parties are disappointed with the platform’s slow and limited progress to date. NIMD understood that parties’ expectations had to be managed and our extensive desk review confirms that NIMD made a point of reiterating minimalistic ambitions for the platform. Despite this, respondents in our consultations still complained that IPOD had failed to effect substantive change within the wider political system and are frustrated that IPOD has not been able to exert its influence in Parliament.

  There are three contributory factors, which emerged during our consultations.

  First, it took a long time for IPOD to define and agree on a minimalist reform agenda. As illustrated above, IPOD parties had other priorities in the run up and aftermath to the 2011 election, and this delayed the process of developing a reform agenda to guide multi-party dialogue at IPOD. The IPOD Secretariat organised sub-committee meetings to prepare draft agendas to be submitted to the IPOD Council for further discussions following the elections but this process proved to be very time consuming. Agreement on highly contentious issues such as presidential term limits and the composition of the Electoral Commission was difficult to reach and when it was, subsequent internal party consultations acted as a further brake to the agenda setting phase. The IPOD agenda effectively started and stalled but has begun to take shape since November 2012. The visit to Ghana helped to finalise the four main IPOD agenda items in early 2013 however, despite this progress, IPOD parties say that little substantive and “real” discussion on reform has taken place at the IPOD to date.
Second, IPOD is not delivering tangible outcomes and, as illustrated by the agenda setting phase, parties attribute this to, first, the policy to proceed by consensus at the IPOD Council, and second, to the protracted internal party consultations.

Indeed, proceeding by consensus and internal party consultations have delayed some activities from taking place and prevented other important initiatives from getting off the ground. However, IPOD also suffers because of the disconnect between the forum representatives and their caucuses in parliament. Even if positions are finalised at IPOD, they are unlikely to go beyond the IPOD level and translate into national policy because IPOD parties’ access to parliamentary processes through their caucuses is, currently, sealed off to them. IPOD has taken some initiatives to address this issue by organising meetings between IPOD and party caucuses but, with the exception of the DP, these have been unsuccessful. The IPOD Council 2012 Review recognised this disconnection as a key issue however, parties in consultations did not give it enough weight as an obstacle to progress at IPOD. In the NIMD July 2013 IPOD mission report, further plans to hold meetings between IPOD parties and their caucuses were identified as a priority but a different approach, which would gather parties and caucuses as a cross-party group, rather than in separate party meetings, was suggested. In this format, the MPs would be nominated by the party and the meeting would be convened by IPOD/NIMD. So far, one such meeting has taken place and we were told that “the outcome was positive”.

Third, the IPOD’s highest organ of dialogue, the Summit of leaders, has failed to come into effect and evidence from consultations suggests that this has come to overshadow what smaller gains have been made through the platform. The Summit was originally planned to be held in the summer of 2010 but interparty leadership tensions have prevented any progress on this front since then. IPOD stakeholders are frustrated that in three years, the leaders of Uganda’s six parliamentary parties have not yet met to discuss and, essentially, validate IPOD as a platform for political dialogue.

Leadership tensions have been the main obstacle to the Summit and, as the 2016 elections approach, these are more likely to intensify and work against the probability of holding high-level dialogue at IPOD. However, its prolonged anticipation has heightened some parties’ expectations as to what the meeting would achieve. Most parties are disappointed that the Summit did not meet because they believe that this will achieve substantive change for IPOD. Party representatives claimed that without it, “Council decisions will stay on paper and IPOD discussions would have no meaning”. Some expressed even higher hopes for the Summit affirming that it was “crucial in terms of translating decisions made at IPOD as legislation or policies”.

• Analysis

Going forward in the multi-party dialogue process at IPOD, NIMD Uganda needs to make three decisions: first, on the fate of the Summit of Leaders, second, on the scope of the IPOD reform agenda and third, on IPOD’s role in district dialogues.

The Summit of party leaders should not be a priority concern in the short term. NIMD Uganda needs to reconsider whether or not this Summit should remain part of the IPOD governance structure in the next planning phase. If the Summit is maintained as an IPOD objective, NIMD needs to manage two overlapping expectations. First, it needs to moderate the expectation that the summit will actually take place before the next elections. Second, it needs to gauge what the parties are expecting to come out of it if it does, and respond to this accordingly.

In the case of the reform agenda, NIMD Uganda needs to restrict agenda items to what can be realistically achieved. For example, IPOD opposition parties want IPOD to address presidential term limits yet NRM respondents clearly told us that the ruling party “does not believe in term limits”, and its power of veto at the Council will make sure to keep it this way.
Finally, IPOD needs to determine whether it can develop more work at district level. Some parties do not consider this to be worth pursuing on account of the “bigger issues which are being avoided at IPOD”. As in the case of the presidential term limits, this is an issue of prioritisation at IPOD. Parties need to think more carefully about the probability and desirability of activities happening before engaging in the protracted and potentially dead-end discussions in working towards them.

### iii. Party capacity

The second strand of NIMD’s work in Uganda is to enhance the capacity and capabilities of the political parties, in order to strengthen the party system as a whole and ensure the continued involvement of the parties in the IPOD process. This support has been in the provision of: electoral campaigning material, skills training to party members and a range of party capacity building services.

NIMD supported the political parties in developing and disseminating election materials in the run up to elections. A comparative manifesto of all six parties was developed and advertised in several national newspapers. UPC and DP produced their party manifestos through IPOD and all parties recorded e-manifestos, which IPOD then broadcast on radio stations.

Training and activities in policy-making, dialogue and mediation have been held at IPOD to improve interparty communication and enhance party members’ skills. Overall, the IPOD programme has been on track and delivered however, preparations for the prospective political party strengthening fund in 2012 did cause some delay to a number of workshops and district dialogues planned that year and prevented four trainings from taking place.

IPOD parties have been able to hold regional policy workshops and engage in policy debates through IPOD to further develop their policy-making capacity. DP and UPC have held 3 and 2 regional policy workshops respectively, and JEEMA, FDC, and CP have held 1 each. With regard to the policy debates, IPOD had originally planned to hold two of these per year. These would be recorded and broadcast on television for the public in effort to encourage issue based politics and politics that would offer space for alternative policy choices to be debated. The first policy debate was held in April 2012 and focused on the state of the economy. A second policy debate (planned for December 2012 but delayed) was on the question of an alternative Electoral system. At the time of writing, a third policy debate on the exploitation of Uganda’s natural resources was being planned (for the end of November 2013).

External consultants and IPOD Secretariat facilitated a course on dialogue, negotiating and mediation in late 2011 and this was followed up by IPOD’s Training of Trainers programme (ToT) where 3 members per party received training in facilitation and training as well as in communication and conflict resolution. The IPOD ToT programme has taken on impressive proportions, and has spread to more than 250 party representatives to date.

NIMD has also sought to increase the resources and capacity available to the political parties by providing each with a policy analyst. This part of NIMD’s provision of capacity building support focuses on the areas of policy making and communications at the secretariat level. IPOD parties’ policy analysts are trained and remunerated by IPOD and their development is carefully monitored and followed up with monthly interactive meetings and progress reports. The IPOD’s own December 2012 review picked up on some challenges in policy analysts’ development and these monthly meetings in particular, namely that reporting procedures needed some standardisation, in order to facilitate knowledge sharing.

Since IPOD has been set up, each party has benefitted from additional office equipment and access to broadband internet. IPOD direct support helped improve parties’ organisational capacity at headquarters and communication with sub-national levels of the party structure and smaller parties which could not hold national delegates’ conference or open regional offices have been able to as a result of IPOD membership.
• Analysis

Consultations with parties suggest that IPOD policy-making support has been useful to parties but in different ways. NRM has been most concerned with analysing the organisation and policies of their parliamentary caucus, while opposition parties have preferred to prioritise policy forums which would include participation from sub-national levels and to develop various issue-oriented papers.26

There is evidence that the very existence of interparty dialogue has had some tangible effects on internal party organisation, in that we were told that some parties had no choice but “to examine themselves” in order to be able to present a common party position at the IPOD forum. The pressure for parties to “dialogue amongst themselves before dialoguing with others” was said to have improved internal cohesion for the smaller parties in particular.

This, together with the benefits accrued through IPOD capacity building training and material support, has improved party structures and helped IPOD work towards its second objective of “strengthening political parties to become legitimate, accountable and responsive actors equipped with dialogue, policy development and communication and outreach skill”.

Several interviewees suggested that this has in fact become the main motivation to some parties’ continued participation in the dialogue process. However, although all parties valued this support, it has been more important to some than others. The FDC, for instance, considers capacity building support at IPOD to be an “added bonus, but not the most important”27 and the NRM does not think that this aspect (and level) of direct party support is necessary in its case. Smaller opposition parties, meanwhile, deem IPOD training on dialogue and public relations to be critical and astutely noted that “it is one thing to establish party structures but another to have competent people manage them”. In this respect, IPOD capacity building support serves a crucial purpose.

IPOD party capacity support has provided a number of services and resources, which have increased parties’ visibility among the Ugandan electorate, improved parties’ policy-making credentials and strengthened central party headquarters. However, we have not yet seen evidence of how these have translated into the wider Ugandan political process.

iv. CSO engagement

The NIMD model of intervention commits one branch of its programming to developing closer ties between civil and political society. In Uganda, activities towards this were not a priority at the time of the intervention. CSO engagement had been identified as an early risk in IPOD proposal documents because of the threat it could pose to NRM’s engagement in the platform but plans were made to start “exploring activities under this objective after the 2011 elections”.28

Three years on, although political parties and civil society groups work closely together from time to time in pursuit of common goals, the objective to support (on-going) alliances between the two sides is still distant, with IPOD’s civil society based programming having delivered no notable results. The Council’s own review of IPOD in 2012 acknowledged this shortcoming and urged future discussions at IPOD to consider this issue more carefully specifically asking “the IPOD council (...) to (...) develop modalities of (civil society) engagement other than simply engaging for the sake of publicity.”29

One reason the Council’s review gives for the lack of progress resonates with Uganda’s culture of mistrust. The review claimed that engagement with CSOs was avoided because IPOD parties were concerned that some CSOs might have ulterior motives. Namely, some believe that political organisations, particularly those allied to the NRM, could present themselves as CSOs in order to infiltrate the IPOD platform and use it to their advantage.30 But even if only genuine civil society actors are involved in IPOD work, respondents expressed the additional concern that their participation may jeopardise the political vocation of the platform.
Consultations have further clarified that the reason why CSO work is underdeveloped is simply because it is not a priority for political parties. There has been some minimal CSO involvement in activities to date, namely at IPOD’s “Healing of Wounds” workshop and in the district dialogues, but it remains that parties have not put their minds to developing this strategic strand of the IPOD mandate. In terms of future programming, NIMD Uganda has identified the district level as “the more realistic and propitious locus” for establishing a better connection between political and civil society.

- **Analysis**

  Engagement between the political parties and CSOs can only be consistent and fruitful if designed or built around clearly identified common objectives between them. Occasional, usually sporadic collaboration around specific issues (such as the resistance to the government’s decisions some years ago, to gift a forest to a sugar growing company to grow more sugar) points to common aspirations and interests. In light of this, NIMD Uganda needs to decide how to help the two sides to work together in more consistent and structured ways, or even to take a decisive step to abandon efforts at building formal alliances between political parties and CSOs for the time being, until parties are better entrenched within IPOD.

  Given the imminence of the next cycle of elections, and the related issues which will take priority in the parties’ short-term plans, it seems unlikely that progress in CSO engagement at IPOD will occur prior to 2016. NIMD Uganda needs to focus on the more pressing issues of deciding how to handle the issue of the Summit of Leaders given recent experience, and of making more realistic plans and concrete progress with regard to the IPOD reform agenda. At this point in time, it seems (more) realistic that internal IPOD matters such as these should take precedence over pursuing the NIMD’s third CSO oriented strategic objective in Uganda.

  **v. Organisational structure and capacity**

  The NIMD model of intervention adapts its implementation structures on the availability and suitability of partners in its countries of intervention. In the case of Uganda, the NIMD decided to set up a country office to act as the IPOD Secretariat as an interim measure, until a Board of Directors composed of party representatives could take over. The Secretariat has so far played a crucial role in coordinating the day-to-day operations of the platform. Its structures and staff have grown to adapt to the expansion and development of IPOD, and IPOD parties are all very satisfied with the services and support it has provided them with.

  The NIMD Uganda office is headed by an NIMD Country Representative who is assisted by a Programme Officer and also includes an office manager, a finance officer, an administrative assistant and two support staff. In the period 2010-2013, IPOD activities have multiplied and Secretariat resources have been gradually expanded to absorb them. Subcommittees working on a variety of themes such as electoral and local government bills and security and electoral violence have been set up within IPOD at the outset and since IPOD’s reform agenda has been finalised, four subcommittees have been planned to cover the agenda’s four pillars of reform. To date, those on security issues and electoral reforms are active but the remaining two are on hold. In our consultations, we were told that this phased approach is best at this time as the Secretariat is currently at full capacity and would be overburdened if all four subcommittees were active.

  NIMD’s original intentions had been to make the IPOD a locally registered and locally run organisation after the 2011 elections. NIMD Uganda’s Secretariat responsibilities were to be fully transferred to a parties’ own Board of Directors.

  This has not yet happened but we found out in consultations, that IPOD stakeholders agreed across the board that IPOD still needed “babysitting” by NIMD. Parties themselves do not think they have the capacity to take on the extra responsibilities of the Secretariat, and do not want to dispense with external support until smoother working conditions have been established between themselves.
Despite this, NIMD has kept the wheels in motion in working towards a party-owned IPOD Secretariat by organising regional visits to Malawi and Kenya in 2013 for the IPOD Secretariat to observe how Secretariat responsibilities were transferred from NIMD to a party-owned Board of Directors.

In terms of measuring progress, the Secretariat plays an important role in monitoring and evaluating IPOD’s work. As one respondent put it “NIMD Uganda staff is always interested to find out how you are utilising the materials you have been given”. In addition, the quarterly IPOD Council Internal Reviews have served as a very useful process of introspection for parties. The December 2012 Review had in fact, picked up on some of the key issues and obstacles stunting IPOD’s development. In a wider NIMD organisational perspective, IPOD staff have helped feed lessons and insights back into NIMD programming and organisation by contributing to NIMD’s current Storytelling publication.

In addition, NIMD conducts regular monitoring missions to Uganda to assess programme progress and to stay abreast of changing political developments in the country. There have been eleven monitoring missions since December 2009 (one in 2009, four in 2010, three in 2011, two in 2012 and one in 2013) and these have allowed challenges as well as lessons learned in programme implementation to inform future IPOD planning.

• Analysis
In the period since the IPOD has been set up, the IPOD Secretariat has been crucial in coordinating and facilitating the platform’s activities and operations. All respondents have been satisfied with its performance and support, and none expressed any specific areas for improvement. Parties have developed a good relationship with NIMD through the Secretariat and in their liaison with NIMD Headquarters staff and the extent to which this has contributed to IPOD achievements to date should not be overlooked. The unanimous opinion was that the Secretariat’s contribution to IPOD has helped set good conditions for interparty dialogue and that NIMD Uganda staff have “gone beyond what they are meant to provide”.

vi. Conclusion.
Since IPOD was launched the forum has broadly met original intentions and objectives. IPOD has provided a purpose and structure to multi-party dialogue in Uganda and several respondents in consultations identified a number of tangential benefits. Several interviewees stated that “people would understand how important inter-party dialogue was if IPOD was not there”. And the general feeling amongst all stakeholders was that despite IPOD’s limits in bringing about the desired change in Ugandan politics, the platform had made some crucial first steps in opening and facilitating dialogue amongst parties. Respondents did value that, at the very least, IPOD had diffused some interparty animosity to allow parties to talk to each other.

There are though two areas where IPOD has not delivered on its programmatic plans, namely the Leaders’ Summit and the work with civil society. The Leaders’ Summit is loaded, probably excessively so, with significance for the political parties who seem to believe that the meeting will entirely change the dynamic of the IPOD forum. We have not seen any evidence to indicate that this is the case, but for as long as it remains an unfulfilled IPOD objective, it will continue to shape political perspectives of the dialogue process and possibly distract parties from more substantial matters. Similarly, the strand of work with civil society envisaged in the original plans has not developed, and the prospects of it developing in the near future appear very slim given the looming next cycle of national elections with all its implications for party priority setting.

In this context, we draw three conclusions from our analysis.

First, IPOD needs to manage expectations much more effectively, and ensure that if it commits to certain activities, then it makes them happen, or puts a realistic medium to long-term timescale on their achievement. This applies to the Leaders Summit, the strand of civil society work and the district dialogues.
We understand that politics is unpredictable, and that activities will be subject to delays from time to time, but IPOD/NIMD will be judged against what they say they are going to do, and whether they actually do it.

Second, the forum needs to ensure that the political parties are not selective in the lessons they take from IPOD activities. Most obviously, the regional visits were important in allowing the political parties to see how multi-party dialogue worked and the sorts of results it might achieve in terms of political reform. However, the implementation of constitutional reform now seems to be the only benchmark against which they are judging IPOD. The strengthening of the party system and Uganda’s political culture also depends on the political parties learning lessons about their own internal organisation and structure. As we explain in the next chapter the opposition parties spend a lot of time complaining about the political weather. They are blaming external factors for the lack of progress, when part of the responsibility lies with them to improve their own organisation and strategy.

Third, IPOD’s organisational structures seem suited to the current activity, but will need to continue to adapt to the needs of the various stakeholders. We recognise the importance of the decision not to make the IPOD secretariat entirely self-sufficient yet. Given the tensions within the IPOD Council and the high level of mistrust between parties, it is understandable that IPOD stakeholders would worry at the prospect of handing over the Secretariat’s mandate. In the current context, we could anticipate the risk that a handover at this stage, might turn the Secretariat into another ground for party rivalries and tensions to play out in. The IPOD Council’s December 2012 internal review acknowledged this stating that until the “current mind set” changed, third party management from NIMD would be required.

As mentioned, there are some frustrations that the pace of political change has not been as great as many of the participants wanted. Yet, despite the parties’ disappointment with the lack of substantive constitutional reform, exit at this stage does not appear to be an attractive option. The platform has developed a momentum which means that none of the parties want to be the first to walk away, fearing the adverse effects of being blamed for the demise of inter-party dialogue in Uganda. We deal with this theme, and the reason for unfulfilled expectations, in more detail in the next chapter.
Part 3: Political developments and IPOD

The previous two chapters sought to assess the soundness of the NIMD approach to multi-party dialogue in Uganda by looking firstly at the logic of intervention and the implementation of project activities. It seems that although NIMD broadly met the programmatic objectives it had set for itself, IPOD does not seem to be meeting the expectations of other stakeholders. Notably, it appears that the political parties, public and donor communities expected IPOD to have achieved more tangible progress, particularly with regard to the wider political environment in Uganda.

We believe that many of those widely-held assumptions of progress in the first three years of IPOD's existence were (and are) unrealistic. But those expectations are increasingly becoming the benchmarks against which multi-party dialogue is being judged by stakeholders. NIMD needs to recognise these concerns, respond to them, and create a common understanding of the likely outcomes of the dialogue process in Uganda.

This chapter examines how and why stakeholder expectations have grown, focusing particularly on the perspectives of the political parties. It suggests that wide-ranging constitutional reform seems unlikely in the near future, and that the opposition parties need to be encouraged to implement changes which recognise this reality. Whereas the previous chapters dealt with organisational and programmatic issues, this chapter deals with how the wider political environment is likely to shape the development of IPOD, and makes several proposals to alter the process and structure of IPOD as a way of actively managing stakeholder expectations.

i. Evolving attitudes towards IPOD amongst political parties.

NIMD clearly sought to downplay the expectations of the participants from the outset by setting relatively modest outputs for the process. The principal purpose of IPOD was simply to provide a forum for discussion amongst the parties. The tangible outcomes were deliberately limited, and aside from the vaguely worded ‘minimalistic reform agenda’ there was little reference to the expected substantive results.

This was an entirely logical approach. The first phase of the project needed to ensure that all the key political actors were actively engaged and involved, and that dialogue itself continued to take place. The single most important variable in that process was ensuring that the NRM were willing to participate in the IPOD forum.

However, the terms on which the NRM were willing to be involved reflect the central strength and weakness of IPOD, namely, that it proceeds by consensus. It is unlikely that the NRM would have become involved in a forum where it would be bound by the majority opinion. This had two implications. First, IPOD would not be seen as a decision-making body, but rather a forum for discussion and dialogue. Second, it depended on unanimous agreement, meaning that any party could effectively veto a proposal from the others.

All the political parties appear to have recognised those political realities at the outset of IPOD, but have become increasingly frustrated at the perceived lack of progress since. As the previous chapters explained, the IPOD council has met regularly and has continued to exist as a forum in which the different political parties can air issues, and has run sub-committees to investigate specific policy issues. The parties also welcomed the regional visits, the support to manifesto development, the provision of resources and the training sessions for party staff including sessions on leadership and conflict resolution.

But the bulk of the interviews we conducted with opposition parties focused on the failure of IPOD to meet their expectations. To some extent this was inevitable, in that any evaluation interview tends to draw out more criticism than praise. Yet, much of this criticism revolved around their frustrations at the broader
political environment, and IPOD’s failure to change it. Specifically, they seemed to assume that IPOD would inevitably lead to wide-ranging political and constitutional reform.

The touchstone for all of the opposition parties, and the country against which they appear to be judging their progress is Ghana. Chapter 2 highlighted the significance of the initial visit to Ghana. At the time it was regarded as a very successful exercise which helped to initiate the dialogue in Uganda, bringing the different political parties together around the central idea of inter-party dialogue. It did, undoubtedly, give impetus to the dialogue process in Uganda. However, it appears that the opposition parties took different lessons from the Ghana experience about what IPOD should achieve than did the NRM.

During interviews with the opposition parties, all of them mentioned that Uganda had failed by comparison with Ghana. There, inter-party dialogue had resulted in agreement around a wide-ranging agenda for constitutional reform, which increased electoral competition between the political parties and ultimately resulted in a change of government. All of the political parties spoke in terms that seemed to assume that this was now the only criterion against which IPOD’s success could be judged.

We recognise that these perceptions are perhaps naïve and unrealistic. There are numerous lessons that the opposition could have taken from the regional visits, about the importance of political organisation and strategy for instance. However, we can also understand how they have evolved over the last three years, partly as a result of their frustration that IPOD has failed to deliver few substantive gains. There remains an ambiguity around the role and function of IPOD, which allows the different stakeholders to interpret it in different ways, and this has manifested itself in three main ways in the last couple of years.

First, during interviews about the function of IPOD there was a distinct difference of opinion between the opposition and the NRM. Opposition parties clearly felt that the forum should have a more substantive agenda, and should be a decision-making body. They cited several examples (most frequently the agreement within IPOD to reform the electoral commission in 2010 which was then opposed and defeated in parliament by members of the NRM) where they thought they had reached agreement, or were pressing the NRM into action, only to find that nothing happened.

For their part, the NRM were adamant that IPOD was a deliberative forum, a place in which the political parties could make proposals and air differences. IPOD was thus the start of the discussion, not its conclusions. They pointed out that even in parliament not every discussion resulted in a vote, and it was important to understand IPOD’s vital role in suggesting rather than deciding.

Second, given those two diametrically opposed views, it is not surprising that the opposition parties and NRM had different views about process and outcomes. The opposition focused on the limited role IPOD played in shaping any political decisions. It has no formal connection to government or parliament. The membership of IPOD is distinct from the parliamentary parties, links with parliament are weak and there is little connection between the content of IPOD’s discussions and parliamentary debates.

For the opposition – even if they accept that the NRM view that IPOD itself should not be a decision-making body - it is not clear what process exists to connect the discussions in IPOD to mechanisms which do have decision-making power. Although the opposition parties could see the value of a forum in which all political movements could air issues of concern, they do need a sense of process which would lead to a more concrete agenda, and tangible outputs.

Third, as mentioned in Part 1, the discussions emphasised the disconnection between IPOD’s internal discussions and political developments outside. Many of the interviewees pointed to the Public Order Management Act (POMA), which had been passed by parliament, as evidence of the gap between the NRM’s words in IPOD, and their deeds outside. Several party members suggested that while they could talk in a friendly fashion to the NRM inside IPOD, their members were being beaten up on the street as part of a wider attempt to repress political opponents. But there was clearly a large amount of confusion amongst
the opposition parties about the provisions of POMA, and what it meant in practice for restricting political activity. One interviewee commented that the members of the opposition being beaten up were invariably the ones out looking for a fight. (We offer these only as reflections of comments that we heard to highlight the divergence of opinion, and are unqualified to pass judgement on the level of political repression in Uganda.)

The failure to achieve meaningful political reform through IPOD has meant all the opposition parties question the motives of the NRM within IPOD. Whereas the NRM told us that their participation in IPOD would help to professionalise the opposition parties, so that voters could have a genuine choice at elections, the opposition parties believed that the NRM’s presence was solely for cosmetic reasons, to burnish their credentials with the donor community. IPOD, in other words, was window-dressing. As one interviewee put it, “the NRM is not interested in genuine political opposition. It needs opposition parties, but wants to find ways of keeping them in intensive care, on life support, so that they offer no real threat.” The problem for IPOD is that ultimately, both these perspectives have a degree of truth.

While a degree of constructive ambiguity is always useful in politics, the divergence of opinion about what IPOD should be doing makes IPOD vulnerable. Unless IPOD identifies its own measures of success, it is likely to have them imposed upon it, by the political parties and wide public opinion. Managing stakeholder expectations means that IPOD needs greater clarity in its purpose and measures of progress. We return to these themes at the end of this chapter.

ii. IPOD’s role in strengthening the opposition parties.

Even with greater clarity of purpose, there will be pressure on IPOD to show some impact on the wider politics of Uganda in the next few years. It is likely that issues of wider political and constitutional reform will continue to dominate discussions about, and within, IPOD. But the prospects of any such wide-ranging reform appear very slim.

The relationship between the opposition parties and the NRM is unlikely to change dramatically over that period. Rather, the approach of the next election will reinforce the imbalance between the NRM and the opposition parties. The prospect of the direct grant funding mechanism might increase their resources, but the NRM will still have far greater capacity and control of the levers of power. And it is likely that the next election will be fought on broadly the same basis as the last one.

If the scope for achieving deep-rooted political change is limited through IPOD, there are other opportunities that IPOD could seize to shape the political agenda. Altering the political culture of a nation is likely to depend in part on constitutional reform, but ultimately it depends on changing political behaviour, and the way in which political actors engage with each other.

IPOD obviously has a vital role in shaping the way in which the political parties engage with one another. But there is a specific task in relation to improving the organisation and strategy of the opposition parties. At present, the opposition parties do not seem capable of offering voters a viable alternative to the NRM. (And, as the NRM told us, their engagement in IPOD is partly to get the opposition parties to a position where they do offer a realistic alternative to government.)

First, the opposition parties are more disorganised, fragmented and undisciplined than the NRM. There is clearly latent public support for the opposition (or at least a degree of apathy towards the NRM), but the parties are too dysfunctional to properly capitalise on those opportunities. Yet, rather than recognising their own deficiencies, the parties too often use the dominance of the NRM as an excuse for their failure to make headway.

The majority of our conversations with the opposition parties concentrated on the unfairness of the system, not on how they might get better. In response to one question about how they might improve,
one party president commented, “It’s not us, it’s the environment”. In short, they spend too much time complaining about the weather, and not enough on working out how they adapt to it.

Second, this means that within IPOD the opposition parties seem ill-equipped to engage meaningfully with the NRM. It appears that over the lifetime of IPOD the NRM has responded to various requests for meetings with ministers or security chiefs. Yet, for reasons which need to be further explored, the opposition parties have failed to use them. Too frequently they seem to want to engage in gesture politics, enabling them to criticise the NRM from the outside, but not take responsibility for negotiating compromises.

In short, the current approach of the opposition is simply reinforcing the dominance of the NRM. Their biggest weakness is that they seem to be confusing tactics with strategy. They are using big issues to criticise the NRM and generate publicity, but failing to focus on what they can actually achieve.

However, although the NRM is dominant, it is not monolithic. The party consists of different factions, and does not appear to have a huge amount of cohesion or coherence, other than its desire to stay in power. The priority for the opposition parties, if they are to offer a meaningful choice to voters, is to a) improve their own professionalism, coherence and organisation and b) develop a strategy through IPOD where they can win genuine concessions from the NRM. In focusing primarily on the big issues of political reform, they are arguing in the most contentious areas where they are least likely to win, especially in a forum that proceeds by consensus. They are, in other words, fighting on territory that favours the NRM.

Where IPOD can be of significant benefit in the next few years, is in helping the opposition parties professionalise, and helping them to develop a long-term strategy. Major reform is unlikely in the near future, but improving electoral competition in Uganda also depends on ensuring that the opposition parties are more astute and organised.

For the NRM, the major challenge is to acquire and nurture the trust of political parties in its motivations and aspirations so that the opposition begin to see it as a honest interlocutor rather than an adversary always out to outfox them.

iii. Proposals for demonstrating progress in IPOD.

In managing the expectations of IPOD’s stakeholders and the wider public, we make four proposals to alter the forum’s working mechanisms. At present the sole focus of stakeholder attention and the measure by which it is principally judged is constitutional reform. The underlying intention of these suggestions is to move that focus to other areas of its activity, by emphasising new areas of work, diversifying IPOD membership, improving links to parliament and producing material for public consumption. The final point in this section highlights the central role that the IPOD secretariat will have in making these changes work.

1. Create different mechanisms for dialogue

The main difficulty in managing expectations and showing progress is that IPOD appears to operate in one gear, and at one speed. As we have mentioned, the fact that IPOD proceeds by consensus is both its greatest strength and its biggest weakness. It means that decisions have unanimous support, but it also means that progress can be slow and frustrating. This has two implications. First, for the opposition parties, they have one route through which to channel all their grievances, and if that is blocked they have no alternative, increasing the sense of frustration. Second, IPOD can only be judged by the progress made in that main forum.

It may make sense to increase the number of gears available by using IPOD as a forum for different types of discussion. For instance, some meetings would be used to take decisions, some would be used to reach common positions on policy issues and some would be simply to air proposals. Specific issues might then progress from one forum to the next in a policy-making chain (proposal > policy position > decision). The
political parties would need to agree the delineation between these different forums, and the issues that would be delegated to each. It may also make sense to vary the membership in each of the forums, perhaps including some core members and rotating members, perhaps including members of parliament (see point 2, below) in some of these discussions.

Similarly, it may be that the main meeting of IPOD could delegate inquiries of specific issues by making greater use of sub-committees. These committees could draw in a wider range of stakeholders, by taking evidence and using experts and advisers, thus also increasing the public profile of IPOD itself. Several parties argued that the inclusion of experts would enhance the quality and content of IPOD discussions.

The virtue of this system is that the most contentious issues would start as a proposal for discussion, and proceed by consensus, thus keeping the NRM involved. There is a danger that many issues might not progress beyond proposal stage. But the option of different forums, means that different issues could be treated in different ways, making it much easier for IPOD to show visible progress.

2. Create stronger links to parliament

One of the striking aspects of the review was the extent to which the parliamentary parties existed almost in isolation to the broader political parties. Many members of parliament that we spoke to, were highly sceptical of the value of IPOD, believing that it had little connection to their work. NIMD and IPOD have sought to bridge these gaps, but to little effect so far.

The limited ability to carry a decision of the forum through parliament was cited several times, particularly in relation to the electoral commission reforms prior to the 2011 election, which although apparently agreed by IPOD were not supported in parliament. It highlights two problems. First, that decisions agreed by political parties in IPOD, do not necessarily reflect the views of the party’s parliamentary members. Second, there is no way of ensuring that decisions from IPOD make it on to the parliamentary agenda.

Members of Parliament are potentially important advocates for IPOD, and could bring new expertise and authority to IPOD discussions. However, this would mean giving those members involvement and ownership of the IPOD process. This could be done in a number of ways, by involving MPs in IPOD forums, holding IPPOD meetings in parliament, strengthening organisational links between parties and their parliamentary caucuses and providing IPOD briefings specifically written for the parliamentary parties. IPOD may also consider providing financial incentives, through new forms of funding to link the parties and their parliamentary caucuses.

3. Outputs as well as outcomes

Even with the changes above, it is still inevitable that the pace of political change will be slow. The fact IPOD holds its meetings in private is positive, in that it reduces the incentive for posturing and increases the likelihood of negotiation and compromise. But, it is likely to have greater momentum if there was some public awareness of its role and activities.

IPOD is currently being judged on outcomes that are probably some way off. As part of its management of expectations, the forum should consider producing outputs, such as publications, for public consumption. These could provide a commentary and explanation of progress of IPOD deliberations and, as such, help to emphasise the progress being made. For example, IPOD may seek to produce published papers on the discussions of the meetings. Even if it simply published the policy positions of each of the political parties, as a guide for voters, this would increase the profile of the forum and serve a valuable role in the run up to the elections.

4. Professionalising the opposition parties

As we outline above, effecting changes to the political culture of a country may depend partly on political and constitutional reform, but it also depends on changing the way political actors engage with each other.
This second element is as important to IPOD as the first. We suggested that the opposition parties need to up their game, and become more effective representative of public concerns, and more effective interlocutors in negotiating with the NRM.

There are three ways in which IPOD might improve the performance of the opposition parties, and thus improve electoral competition. First, by helping the parties become clearer about their own internal policy positions. If the IPOD delegates needed to represent and defend their party’s position they are more likely to go through an internal process of consultation and policy development. Second, the opposition parties need a strategy which is likely to see them win concessions from the NRM through IPOD. Third, if IPOD develops a more public profile, such as producing guides for voters, the parties may see it as a way of expanding their electoral base.

5. Co-ordination and communication

Such changes are unlikely to happen without a conscious effort on the part of IPOD staff, and will place an increased burden on them. The staff were widely praised for their commitment, handling and management of IPOD by our interviewees. They are clearly pivotal to the success of IPOD as a whole. But, regardless of any proposed changes, we sensed that they were facing increased pressure to demonstrate progress and impact in IPOD, particularly from the donor community.

There are four challenges for the IPOD secretariat in the next phase of its work. First, the secretariat is central to the negotiations between the political parties. If it is agreed that the forum will use different formats, and vary the membership of those discussions, the secretariat will be the ones who will need to broker that agreement. It will mean ensuring that all the political parties feel that they are not losing control, and having something to gain from the new procedures.

Second, as part of the IPOD strategy, it seems inevitable that the forum will need to be clearer about its milestones and indicators of success. As we suggested in the previous chapter, if certain activities are unlikely to happen, IPOD should agree to ditch them, or enforce a realistic long-term timescale on them. By the same token, IPOD should consider establishing progress indicators for meetings to be held, links with parliament to be developed, issues to be discussed and publications to be produced over the course of a year, for example. These would help manage public expectations and show progress. Again, such indicators would need to be agreed by the parties.

Third, as part of that expectation management, the secretariat needs to develop a communications strategy for IPOD. That strategy should have both internal and external dimensions to it. At one level, it should seek to highlight progress within the forum to a public audience, through publications and briefing material.

But, equally, the secretariat is central to the process of communication within and between the political parties themselves. In many ways, this is the more important dimension. Given the fact that so many of the political parties are fragmented, incoherent and disorganised, the secretariat could play an essential role in ensuring that the messages from IPOD are consistently and clearly disseminated throughout all the political parties. (The knowledge that IPOD briefings will go to different parts of the parties is also likely to encourage the parties to improve their own internal procedures for approving policy in the first place. Point 4, above.)

iv. Conclusion.

Although it has faced a number of problems, and not met the expectations of all participants and stakeholders, if IPOD did not exist, something like it would need to be invented. Although the opposition parties were critical of progress, they did recognise the benefits of the forum. Developments have been slow, but the international experience of political party assistance is that progress is always painstaking, frequently unpredictable and usually haphazard. Despite their complaints, none of the political parties
seem genuinely to be contemplating withdrawal, which suggests they did understand the merits of involvement. And, it seems, NIMD is aware of the political dynamics, and actively seeking to manage them.

The challenge for IPOD, and the NIMD, is to manage the expectations of all stakeholders, including the donor community. During our meetings we got the sense that all stakeholders could do with a clearer sense of what constitutes success for IPOD. International experience emphasises that multi-party dialogue will wax and wane, taking two steps forward and one (or two, or three) steps back. But the fact that the forum exists, and that all the participants are still engaged, if grumpily, should not be overlooked. The forum may not have given the opposition parties the wide-ranging constitutional change or decision-making power that they sought, but these were never realistic expectations.

In summary, IPOD offers tangible (and sometimes intangible) benefits for the development of political parties and the party system in Uganda. Although many of the opposition parties are focused on using it to change the rules of the game, its deeper value may lie in the parties using it to understand how the existing rules are interpreted and applied. The existence of IPOD offers potential for building a common political culture between the parties. It may offer the opportunity to develop a web of connections linking the different political movements, establishing norms of political behaviour and establishing a common understanding of how to play the game. In establishing the terms of engagement between the parties it may also foster a greater professionalism amongst the parties as a whole.
Part 4: Conclusion – Strategic Challenges for IPOD.

As we have pointed out during this review, we believe that the IPOD forum is a valuable and important forum for the development of multi-party politics in Uganda. In our discussions with some representatives of the donor community there were pointed questions about whether IPOD offered value for money, was being managed in the correct way and whether it should have achieved greater progress.

We understand the nature of such questions and find that IPOD has performed effectively in its first few years. We would draw attention to the fact that IPOD was established shortly before an election campaign, which are not the best circumstances in which to foster multi-party dialogue. Progress towards wide-ranging political reform has been slow, to the frustration of many stakeholders. But, NIMD were very careful in setting their objectives, and included deliberately modest goals for the first few years of IPOD. This reflects the political reality of such programming that, ultimately, the pace of political change will be determined by the participants in a particular country, not by the organisation seeking to provide a neutral forum for discussions. IPOD has clearly sought to present as many opportunities as possible to promote greater electoral competition, but much of the responsibility for seizing such opportunities lies with the political parties.

It seems particularly important for the donor community to ensure that IPOD continues. The question as to whether IPOD offers value for money should be turned on its head. In other words, if IPOD was abolished, what other measures would the donor community feel obliged to fund in its place? The chances are that they would be more expensive, and arguably less useful, than having an established forum for dialogue, despite its weaknesses.

Thus, in conclusion, we recap briefly the three strategic challenges that IPOD will need to manage in the next few years, it will need to: manage stakeholder expectations; ensure that the political parties take greater responsibility, and; show evidence of progress.

i. Management of stakeholder expectations

As we have suggested, the gap between NIMD’s modest objectives – which have broadly been met – and the inflated expectations of stakeholders is becoming a problem for IPOD. Although the forum has met its programmatic objectives, it progress is being judged increasingly harshly by wider public opinion. This is partly because both internal and external stakeholders in IPOD – political parties, parliamentary parties, donor community, media and public – all seem to believe that IPOD should have made much more progress on a political reform agenda.

Many of these expectations seem to us to be unrealistic in the current political climate. The political dynamics between the NRM and the opposition parties suggest that agreement on constitutional reforms is unlikely in the next few years. But they are becoming part of the wider accepted wisdom in Uganda as most public discussion of the forum revolve around such progress.

In the previous chapters we made several recommendations to improve the management of expectations by varying the forms of discussion in IPOD and diversifying its activity, so that the sole focus is not simply constitutional reform.

However, as part of that process it may be useful for the IPOD secretariat to engage with the various stakeholders directly. We are aware that the secretariat has undertaken stakeholder mapping in the past, but it is unclear how it has been used to manage the perceptions of stakeholders. As in every political process, different stakeholders will have a distinct sense of their own interests and how they are likely to be advanced through IPOD. Understanding those incentives should provide the basis for a secretariat strategy which allows IPOD to more effectively manage, and where possible coincide, those various interests.
ii. Ensuring political parties define the right problems

Second, the perception of the opposition political parties is that the blame for a lack of progress lies entirely with the governing NRM. One party representative told us “It’s not us, it’s the environment.” Another said, “It’s impossible to get political reform unless your opponents are people of good will.”

These sentiments contain three problems. First, it means that the opposition parties are avoiding responsibility for their own failings and thus failing to address their own deficiencies. Second, they spend too much time complaining about things over which they have no direct control, and can do little about immediately. Third, this means that their political strategies tend to be more about gestures and protests than dealing in measures that might bring about meaningful political change.

IPOD and NIMD recognise these difficulties. The challenge for IPOD is to ensure that all the political parties (NRM and opposition) learn the right lessons from the dialogue process. All the political parties would benefit – although perhaps in different ways - from better internal organisation, stronger processes, coherent policies and a wider membership base. But the opposition parties have most to gain in the short-term by upping their game, and offering the NRM greater political resistance.

The NRM is unlikely to give away power freely. The opposition parties need to stop basing all their arguments on that expectation, and start developing a political strategy that moves the NRM into a position where it feels it needs to negotiate with a serious opposition. The more that IPOD can do to strengthen the party capacity element of its programme, the more likely it is that it will achieve meaningful political change.

iii. Showing evidence of progress

Finally, part of the management of expectations will depend on IPOD showing tangible progress. Some of this will come from diversifying activity, as mentioned above. Constitutional reform is unlikely in the short-term and IPOD needs to be explicit that it will be a long arduous and difficult process. But the IPOD strategy should also be to show movement towards those long-term goals, by highlighting the achieving smaller and more incremental changes that are designed to lead to that end. Programmatic indicators need to be explained not just by their completion, but by their relationship to, and impact on, the wider political environment.

IPOD and NIMD have been careful about setting realistic goals, but these have tended to be mechanistic outputs, which mean something to programme managers, but have a limited effect on the perceptions of the wider stakeholder community. There are ways of tying such indicators to milestones of wider political change, but they also need to be explained in a way that the stakeholder community understands. In short, the programmatic indicators, which tend to be quantitative, need to be linked to wider political indicators, which are more likely to be qualitative. For example, support to the manifesto process could be measured quantitatively and qualitatively, because of the production of manifestos and the effect on voters (and their perceptions of parties). Similarly, our proposal to produce more material for public consumption could be developed in the same way, both as an output, and a contribution to outcomes.

iv. Conclusion

Although IPOD has met almost all of the programmatic objectives that it set for itself, the reality of politics is that IPOD is increasingly being judged by most stakeholders on whether constitutional reform is enacted. Although it seems unlikely that any of the political parties will leave the forum, and thus bring an end to multi-party dialogue, there does appear to be a danger that it could lose momentum unless it can find ways of showing some progress. All the stakeholders will need a greater sense of tangibility in its discussions, outputs and outcomes.
Appendices

Appendix 1: IPOD Mid-Term Review Terms of Reference

1) Mid-Term Review (MTR) background information

NIMD in general

Seven Dutch political parties founded the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD) in 2000, to assist political parties in new and developing democracies and to deepen and sustain their young political systems.

Since the establishment of its secretariat in 2002, NIMD now supports over 150 political parties and democratic movements in 25 countries in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, Asia and the Caucasus. NIMD engages directly with political parties to strengthen their organisations and brings parties around the table to discuss and agree on democratic reform agendas. NIMD’s programmes are country-owned and tailor-made.

NIMD works with political parties and democratic movements in new and developing democracies to improve political cooperation, increasingly through facilitation of interparty dialogue as its main intervention strategy, and by working directly with political organisations to strengthen their organisational and policy capacities.

In general, NIMD programmes are built around three main strategies:

(i) fostering inter-party dialogue that addresses issues of national concern;
(ii) strengthening political parties to become legitimate, accountable and responsive actors, equipped with dialogue and policy development skills and
(iii) supporting alliances between political and civil society to create a broad support base for the agenda that emerges out of the dialogue platform.

NIMD programme in Uganda

Political context

Uganda has gone through severe political turmoil and internal strife: since independence it has witnessed five military coups. The last twenty-five years demonstrated a period of relative political stability and impressive and stable economic growth. For almost twenty years, political parties were banned under the no-party system. The political space for competitive party politics opened up again in July 2005, when Ugandans voted for a multiparty political system in a Referendum and the first multi-party elections in over twenty years were held in February 2006. These elections were an important formal milestone for Uganda’s revived multiparty democracy and have brought new actors into the political arena.

The political playing field, however, still remains uneven and Uganda’s multiparty system is still grappling with establishing and strengthening strong and effective political institutions, including Parliament and political parties, to effectively perform their representation, oversight and monitoring roles against a background of a personalised political system and a civil society that is still grappling to effectively perform its watchdog and monitoring roles. Moreover, informal systems – often neo-patriarchal - tend to hold considerable sway, undermining Uganda’s nascent democracy. Also the military remains an influential factor in political life as reflected by the reservation of seats for it in the legislature. During the 2011 general elections, President Museveni secured a new term as President and his party the NRM gained even more seats compared to the 2006 elections.

Electoral system and party landscape

Uganda has a presidential system with a ‘first past the post’ electoral system for parliamentary elections. Because of the ruling NRM’s strength in Parliament (winning 70% of the 375 elected seats in 2011), the country has a de facto dominant party system. Six of Uganda’s thirty eight registered political parties are represented in the 9th Parliament. The ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM), in power for 26 years, holds 263\(^1\) elected seats. The main opposition party, the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC), holds 34 seats. Older parties, including the Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) and the Democratic Party (DP), have fewer seats in parliament, respectively 10 and 12 seats, but remain important players in Ugandan politics. The Conservative Party (CP) and Jeema have 1 seat each and 43 seats are occupied by independents.

The party-political landscape can be characterised as weak, personality driven and regionally based. In general, political parties are poorly institutionalized with weak systems for internal democracy and accountability, limited
infrastructure, rudimentary communication, management and outreach systems and capacities and limited levels of political organisation and a weak financial base. The ruling party is no exception to this.

Over the last twenty years, the Ugandan political landscape has seen a relatively active and vocal civil society particularly during the movement political system. The transition to multiparty politics presented new opportunities and challenges for civil society. Key among these are to re-define its space and roles in governance under a multiparty political system and developing civil society and political party relations for synergies in the governance process.

**Rationale for the inter-party dialogue platform**

Against a background of a volatile political environment and the fear for violent elections, NIMD launched its programme in the fall of 2009. Centre stage in its approach was the set up and consolidation of an informal interparty dialogue process, which did not yet exist despite an existing legal provision to create one. The platform was also introduced in an environment where the relations between political parties, as the main vehicles for representation and oversight in a multiparty system, were characterised by a lot of animosity and confrontation. The rationale behind the platform, known as the Interparty Organisation for Dialogue (IPOD), was to create a safe meeting space in an inclusive, confidential and informal setting outside the parliamentary limelight to allow parties to get to know each other and gradually built up (interpersonal and interparty) levels of trust.

The dialogue platform started with a modest aim and expectation to have the political parties agree to dialogue as an approach to building Uganda’s multiparty political system. The platform could furthermore offer an opportunity for parties to organise around a shared reform agenda (initially limited to electoral issues) and to open up opportunities for dialogue with the leadership of all parliamentary parties, including the ruling party. Lastly, it could serve as a mechanism for letting off steam and for peacefully mitigating conflicts in the run up to the elections and its immediate aftermath. It is important to note the political tensions between the ruling party and the opposition, among opposition parties, and within each of participating parties when describing the political landscape during the inter-party dialogue process.

Since the beginning, developing the capacity of participating parties has been a theme within IPOD. The parties’ ability to analyze and formulate policy has been supported, and training of parties’ officials in dialogue and conflict resolution has been undertaken. In addition, since early 2012, IPOD has considered the possibility of additional funding for the organizational strengthening of political parties that would be channelled and administered by NIMD. An in principle agreement among all IPOD member parties on the formula for allocation of resources was reached in October 2012, leading to consultations on implementation modalities lead by NIMD, which are still ongoing.

Since its inception, the Uganda programme was co-funded by the Uganda multi-donor basket fund. Initially under the Deepening Democracy Programme (DDP) and since this programme came to an end in December 2011, by its successor, the Democratic Governance Facility (DGF).

Under the partnership agreement with DGF which runs from May 2012 to December 2013, NIMD has committed itself to an external Mid-Term Review. DGF and NIMD agreed that it would be useful to extend the period for the MTR to include the start-up phase of the programme. The aim of the MTR is to measure the progress achieved since its inception in September 2009 and on the basis of the lessons learned so far, the MTR should provide recommendations on the next period of the Uganda programme.

2) **Objectives of the MTR**

The main objectives of this mid-term review are to:

1. Identify and assess the results of the Uganda programme between 2009-2013, focusing on both the programmatic results as well as the organisational capacities of NIMD Uganda and the IPOD secretariat.
2. Analyse the results and where possible relate the first effects of the programme on the political party system in Uganda and the political culture emerging.  
3. On the basis of the lessons learned so far, provide recommendations for the next phase of the Uganda programme in 2014-2016.

Within these objectives, some of the specific themes and issues to be explored are as follows:

- Expectations of the participating parties in the IPOD dialogue process (past and future)
- ‘Ownership’ and level of participation of the parties in the IPOD dialogue process
• Effectiveness of the IPOD institutions (‘Council of SGs’, committees, ‘Summit of Presidents’) and methods of work (study visits, trainings etc).

• Relevance of IPOD as dialogue mechanism relative to other key political processes in Uganda (Parliament, National Consultative Forum (NCF), ‘intra-party’ processes, informal mechanisms).

• Main challenges/obstacles to the inter-party dialogue process and key leverage points for progress.

In the MTR, the progress identified, the results achieved and the challenges faced for the Uganda programme should be placed within the political context of Uganda.

3) Scope of the MTR
The scope of this review is to focus on the Uganda programme in the period between September 2009 to September 2013 and to review the activities funded by both the DGF/DDP and Dutch MFA during this period, thus including both the bilateral programmes as well as the cross-party activities.

4) Methodology
• The MTR will be executed jointly by an international consultant and a local consultant. A possibility to include an NIMD staff member as peer reviewer will be discussed with the consultants.

• We expect the MTR to be conducted through in-depth interviews based on a semi-structured questionnaire.

• A desk review of existing documentation should be part of the inception report, which will also include an outline for the field visit and more details on the methodology and central questions.

• A possibility to be further considered is to organise a 1.5 day workshop during the Uganda field visit, for a small group of Uganda-based academics and practitioners involved in supporting political dialogue processes (NIMD/IPOD, ‘Elders Council’, NCF, informal mechanisms) to reflect on the political environment, the relevance of political dialogue as well as on the challenges/opportunities experienced by different approaches undertaken since 2009.

• As part of the MTR a stakeholder approach is to be applied. All the topics should be addressed from a stakeholder perspective and with use of triangulation.

• This MTR is considered to be a learning process in itself and participative and appreciative methods are to be employed.

• The consultants are expected to comply with best practices within evaluation, including the principles of impartiality and independence, credibility and usefulness as per OECD/DAC evaluation principles.

• NIMD, both in The Hague and the Uganda office, as well as DGF will ensure that the evaluators have access to all relevant and necessary documents and that meetings with relevant stakeholders can be set up.

• The MTR will be jointly coordinated by the NIMD Senior Programme Manager responsible for Uganda (with input from colleagues at NIMD Uganda and the NIMD PME coordinator) and the DGF Component Manager.

5) Planning of the MTR
This MTR is scheduled to take place in the third quarter of 2013, including a 10-day field visit in October 2013. In preparation of the field visit, a mission preparation note will be submitted to NIMD on 4 October 2013. At the end of the field visit, a debriefing will be held in Uganda with DGF and NIMD-Uganda staff and possibly, to be decided with the NIMD-Uganda team, with the SGs of IPOD member parties. The draft report shall be discussed with NIMD staff members before the final report is to be submitted by 15 November 2013.

6) Budget
The available total budget for this MTR is €34.200 including fees for international and local consultants, international and local travel, accommodation and subsistence and facilitation costs for organising meetings during the field visit. A detailed budget is prepared by NIMD and will be managed by the NIMD Senior programme manager. DGF has kindly offered to finance the MTR. The final bill will be based on actual expenses made, with proof of these expenses. In case
of expected over expenditure, the consultant will inform NIMD and DGF for approval as soon as these over expenditures are foreseen and before such expenses are made.

7) **Deliverables**
   - Inception report/mission preparation note, 4 October 2013
   - Draft report, first week of November 2013 (ideally presented in The Hague followed by a discussion with NIMD staff members to provide communal input into the draft report).
   - Final Report + summary 15 November 2013
   - PowerPoint presentation outlining the key findings and recommendations, suggested date 18 October 2013 (last day fieldvisit).

8) **Composition of the team:**
   1 international consultant (lead of the evaluation) and 1 local consultant with the possibility to include an NIMD staff member as a peer reviewer.

9) **Use of the report**
   On the basis of insights provided in this review, NIMD management and staff will enter into a discussion with DGF on the next phases of the Uganda programme.
Appendix 2: Review Team and GPG Review Methodology

The review of NIMD was conducted from September to November 2013. The team’s findings were drawn from an extensive desk review of NIMD documents and publications, direct and remote consultations with a range of internal and external NIMD stakeholders and a field visit to Kampala to meet with IPOD stakeholders.

Methodology for this review

GPG’s expertise in party-to-party collaboration and agency support work in the wider democratic development field has allowed us to devise an evaluation framework based around three main components of assessment:

- **Congruence analysis** Congruence analysis allows for evaluation of the levels of fit between an organisation’s overarching goals, the objectives of organisational programmes, the programme activities and specific deliverables on the ground. In order to be effective, it is important to have a clear understanding of how programme activities and the outcomes that they deliver connect to programmatic objectives and wider overarching goals.

- **Internal evaluation** is a process measuring the quality and substance of project outputs. Is the internal structure of the organisation - including its resource management, financial processes and project planning – resilient enough to meet project objectives? How effectively are resources being deployed? What is the standard of outputs, both with reference to industry standards and other international benchmarks?

- **External evaluation** would be used to assess whether the programme’s outputs are having the desired effect. Is the project meeting its set objectives? If so, are these objectives relevant in the local context in which project activities are being implemented? Have stakeholders benefited from the work, and to what extent do they own it? What real impact have the deliverables had?

This framework will be used for evaluation of NIMD’s work in Uganda. The proposed framework is flexible, and we would be able to tailor it to incorporate the specific needs and concerns of NIMD staff and partners following consultation at the beginning of the project.

The evaluative framework would be implemented through three main stages, set out in the table below. These are:

- **Desk review and research:** In consultation NIMD and its project partners this stage will assess the relevance of programme activities to contextual needs, and will map project resources, internal systems, partners, programmes and activities.

- **Field visit:** The desk review will enable us to establish a number of hypotheses about the strengths and weaknesses of the programme. The purpose of the field visit will be to test these hypotheses with political parties, project partners and other stakeholders. We would place particular emphasis on interviewing direct and indirect beneficiaries of programme activities to gather qualitative data to assess impact. This will include a workshop with those involved in supporting the political dialogue process in Uganda.

- **Consultation, review and final report:** We envisage that by the end of the field visit we will have a number of conclusions and recommendations. We will seek to clarify and substantiate these conclusions in conversation with NIMD staff, the political parties and others in the two weeks after the field visit, and submit a draft report to NIMD.

Review team:

**Greg Power,** GPG Director

Greg Power has been involved in political and parliamentary reform for around 20 years. He co-founded Global Partners in 2005 to deliver projects to strengthen representative politics, and has since worked in the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, Central and Eastern Europe and Latin America.

He provides direct support to politicians and ministers in such countries, developing strategies and managing the process of political reform. He has also provided advice to a variety of international organisations and donor agencies helping, amongst others, the Danish foreign ministry to establish their multi-party institute, and International IDEA to evaluate their work on political parties. He writes widely on issues such as the application of political economy analysis, donor approaches to reform, and parliamentary transparency. He was the author of the first Global Parliamentary Report, published by the UNDP and IPU in 2012.

He was previously a special adviser to British ministers Rt Hon Robin Cook MP and Rt Hon Peter Hain MP, working on strategies for parliamentary reform, constitutional change and the wider democratic agenda in conjunction with the
Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit and Downing Street policy staff. Greg directed the Parliament and Government Programme at the Hansard Society, the UK’s leading think tank on parliament and parliamentary reform. He also ran their Commission on Parliamentary Accountability.

**Nedjma Ouerdane, GPG Knowledge Management**

Nedjma joined Global Partners Governance (GPG) in 2012 to work on the evaluation of the international network, Parliamentarians for Global Action (PGA), for the Swedish International Development Agency (Sida). Her work in evaluation continued in 2013 with the review of the Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy (DIPD) for the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA).

Nedjma’s role within the organisation involves providing research and strategic analysis for current projects, and drawing key insights from these and from wider governance support research to inform and develop the GPG knowledge base and practice. She holds a BA degree in European Studies from King’s College London, an International Diploma from Sciences Po Paris and an MSc in Comparative Politics from LSE. Her thesis examined the politics of self-determination in the Western Sahara and in East Timor in a comparative perspective within the framework of international legal standards.

Nedjma is bilingual in French and English, and is currently learning Arabic

**Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, Independent Researcher**

Frederick Golooba-Mutebi is a Kampala- and Kigali-based independent researcher specialising in politics of development, state-building and post-conflict reconstruction, political reform (including democratisation and the role of political parties), and the political economy of service delivery.

He is a honorary research fellow with the school of environment and development (University of Manchester); and a Visiting Research Fellow and Lecturer at the School of Public Health, University of the Witwatersrand Johannesburg.

He was formerly associated with the Africa Power and Politics Programme (ODI); the Crisis States Research Centre (LSE); and the Chronic Poverty Research Centre (ODI & Manchester). He was educated at Makerere University and the London School of Economics and Political Science. He has consulted for numerous bilateral and multi-lateral development agencies, political foundations, and governments.

From 2005 to 2011 he was a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Social Research, Makerere University. From 2001 to 2004 he was a Research Officer and Postdoctoral Fellow at the MRC/University Public Health and Health Transitions Unit (Agincourt), School of Public Health, University of the Witwatersrand Johannesburg. He has conducted research in Uganda, Rwanda, South Sudan and South Africa, and published articles, reports, and newspaper features and columns on politics, health, local government, poverty, refugees, and witchcraft. He is a columnist for The East African newspaper.
Appendix 3: Desk Review Documents

NIMD The Hague
Mission Report May 2013
Mission Report July 2013
Request for Budget revision NMD-IPOD
Annual Plan,
Staff Contracts
Salary issues
Budget Memo
IPOD update July 2013
Annual Plan and Budget
Activity Plan
NIMD proposal
Ghana Exchange visit*7- IPOD visit Ghana
Draft mission report exchange
Draft communique agenda
Budget exchange visit to Ghana
Agenda Exchange visit to Ghana Annex1
Ipod agenda 4 reform areas annex2
IPOD exchange visit to Ghana 11-15 feb
Articles of Association
Budget Revision
Certificate of cooperation
Annual report
Budget Memo
Annex 1 - NIMD Uganda 2012 annual work plan with results DGF proposal (final May 2012)
Annex 2 NIMD Uganda Budget 2012 2013 DGF proposal (final May 2012)
Annex 3 - NIMD MAP Uganda 2012-2016
NIMD Uganda programme DGF proposal 2012-2013 (final May 2012) signed by HOP DGF
NIMD Uganda program August 2012
Signed contract DGF NIMD 2012 2013
ToR August Mission Uganda
Budget Dialogue Workshops 2012 draft1
dialogue training concept note
Dialogue workshop paper
DIALOGUE WORKSHOPS CALENDAR
Mission Report - Uganda (August 2012)
Cover letter NIMD MAP Uganda
Mission report Kdj september 2012
NIMD MAP Uganda 2012-2016
Mission Report January 2012
Preliminary IPOD Retreat Report
Draft concept Note IPOD review 14-15 December 2012
Annual Report Update Uganda
Cover Letter for DDP - funding request
DRAFT proposal for DDP Uganda
Double signed budget memo Uganda field office
Annual Plan Uganda 2011 DDP format
IPOD Exchange visit to Tanzania, Reactions from ARP Coordinator
Three-tier healing process
NIMD Annual Plan
ToR IPOD training dialogue December 2011
AP Uganda vs 3
NIMD Annual Plan UGANDA 2011 tabellenboek 9-12-10 – EXCEL
Q 6 narrative report for DDP
Q 3 cover letter Q8 report
Q 3 Q8 narrative report for DDP
Q 3 DDP Financial Report Jan-Sep 2011
Q 4 Assurance report Dubois 01.08.2009-31.12.2011 version 16-4-12
Q 4 cover letter final report NIMD to DDP
Q 4 NIMD-DDP Audit Report 31 December 2011 12-4-12 signed Uganda
Q 4 Q 9 narrative report for DDP
Q 2 DDP Fin Report Jan-Jun 2011- EXCEL
Q 2 Cover letter Q7 report DDP
Q 2 Q7 narrative report for DDP
Manifestos Press
Context analysis Uganda final version
POLITICAL PARTIES AND MULTIPARTY DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION IN UGANDA-Draft-Josh (3)
Uganda planning table for DDP 2009-2010
Narrative Annual plan Uganda 2009-2010
Double signed contract DDP
Briefing Note High level kick off Ghana 21-24 oct
Draft Programme
Activities resulting from Ghana
Missieverslag UGANDA February 2009 SO
Mission report Uganda
Mission report policy workshop
Last version MOU 5 Feb 2010
Uganda planning table 2010- EXCEL
Terms of Reference - Policy Analysts
Detailed TOR Backer
Draft Programme policy workshop
Party brochures * 6
Q1 Narrative report for DDP - Q 1
6feb article MoU signing
Q1 Letter DDP first quarterly report
Q1 Annex 1 Ugandan Political Party Representatives at the Ghana Retreat
Q1 Annex 2 Ugandan Political Party Representatives at 3 December Meeting
Mbabazi pledges coop
Q2 Letter DDP second quarterly report
Interparty dialogue
Interparty dialogue pg2
Q2 DDP reporting second quarter (Q2) 2010- EXCEL
Q2 Narrative report for DDP - Q 2
Q3 Cover Letter for DDP - Q 3
Q3 Financial report for DDP - Q 3- EXCEL
Q3 Narrative report for DDP - Q3
Q3 Annex 1 IPOD ELectoral Amendment Bill Proposals March 10 2010
Q3 Annex 2 IPOD Presidential Elections Amendment Proposals March 10 2010
Q3 Annex 3 IPOD Parliamentary Elections (Amendment) Proposals March 10 2010
Annex 4 INDEPENDENT - article on Conference
Q4 Cover Letter for DDP - Q 4
Q4 narrative report for DDP
Q4 DDP Q4 2010
Q4 Q4 narrative report for DDP
Q5 Financial report DDP Q5 (2)
Q5 Narrative report for DDP
Q5 NARRATIVE REPORT 2009 Uganda
Background Note Stakeholder Workshop
NIMD PowerPoint presentation Uganda 1
Draft Programme for Ghana SGs visit to Uganda
NIMD expert meeting on party assistance
NIMD draft publication: The power of inter-party dialogue: Our stories
26 May 2009 first draft discussion paper
Draft Intervention Logic and Evaluation Framework
Memo NIMD expert meeting on party assistance, 26 May 2009
NIMD Bilateral support strategy African political parties 2011-2016
Political Party assistance brainstorming session NIMD 26/05/2009
NIMD theory of change, draft version
Regulating political party financing: Some insights from the praxis
IPOD Quarterly Review December 2012 and 2013
NIM programme for supporting Interparty Dialogue and Political Party Strengthening in Uganda 2012-2016

**NIMD Uganda**
Electoral Reform Working Group meetings minutes
Draft ToR Electoral Reform Working Group

**Other**
Lars Svåsand, Department of Comparative Politics, University of Bergen, Evaluation of direct party support: Inception report
IOB Evaluation: Evaluation of Dutch support to Capacity Development, The case of the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD)
Dutch MFA country report – Uganda Republic of Uganda
Reality Check Multiparty Politics in Uganda Assoc. Prof. Yasin Olum (PhD), Konrad Adenauer Stiftung
Appendix 4: List of Stakeholders Consulted

**NIMD Staff**
Karijn De Jong, Senior Programme Manager
Hans Christiaanse, Financial Programme Officer
Shaun Mackay, Country Representative, NIMD Uganda
Henry Kasacca, Programme Officer, NIMD Uganda
Eugenia Boutylkova, Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Coordinator
Augustine T. Magolowondo, Africa Regional Programme Coordinator
Pepijn Gerrits, Director of Programmes
Jerome Scheltens, Programme Manager Tanzania and Libya

**Ugandan Political Parties**

**Conservative Party**
Hon. Ken Lukyamuzi, President General
Semusu Mugobansonga, Secretary General
Fred Mutengesa, Treasurer
Henry Tumukunde, Vice President Western Region
Ssebina Grace, IPOD Representative
Asiya Kamulali, IPOD Representative

**Justice and Peace Forum (JEEMA)**
Asuman Basalirwa
Omar Kalinge-Nyago

**Democratic Party (DP)**
Deo Hasubi Njoki
Herbert Rutagwenza
Hon. Matthias Nsubuga Birekeraawo
Santos Alima

**Forum for Democratic Change (FDC)**
Augustine Ruzindana
Mukalazi Kibuuka
Mugisha Muntu
Rose Nassanga

**Uganda People’s Congress (UPC)**
Gideon Twinomugisha
Edward Kakonge
Joseph Bossa
Okello Lucima

National Resistance Movement (NRM)
Hon. Daudi Migerek
Hippo Twebaze

Parliament
Hon. Nandala Mafabi
Hon. Semujju Nganda
Hon. Bayiga Lulume
Hon. Odonga Otto

Others
Andrew Mwenda, Journalist
James Ogoola, former Principal Judge
Elizabeth McKinnell, British High Commission Kampala
Simon Osborn, NDI Uganda Country Director
Nicolas De Torrente, Manager, Democratic Governance Facility (DGF)
Notes

159.28% in 2011 and 68.45% in 2006, Reality Check, Multiparty Politics in Uganda, p. 127
2 Project proposal Interparty Dialogue Uganda September 2009-June 2011, p. 8
3 Ibid
4 Ibid
5 Ibid
6 Country Context Analysis (20/08/2010), p. 6
7 IPOD Memorandum of Understanding
8 Country Context Analysis Uganda (20/08/2010)
9 Correspondence with NIMD staff
13 Project proposal Interparty Dialogue Uganda September 2009-June 2011, p. 9
14 Ibid, p. 10
15 IPOD Agenda-setting visit to Ghana, Sharing Experiences and Lessons on Agenda Setting, 11-15 February 2013, DRAFT IPOD Communiqué.
17 Email correspondence with NIMD Uganda
18 Mission report: UGA13-01-MS p1
19 IPOD Quarterly Report October to December 2010, p. 7
20 Successful amendments were: Provision of free copied of the voters roll to all registered PP, composition of the tribunal to settle election disputes, allowing PP to observe elections. Quarterly Report, April – June 2010, p. 4
21 Country Context Analysis Uganda (20/08/2010)
22 Email correspondence with NIMD Uganda
23 Email correspondence with NIMD Uganda
24 IPOD Retreat Report, p 4
25 Email correspondence with NIMD Uganda
26 Frederick Golooba-Mutebi and Lars Svåsand, Report on interviews with political parties in Uganda.
27 Frederick Golooba-Mutebi and Lars Svåsand, Report on interviews with political parties in Uganda.
30 “It was also feared that engagement of the civil society at the time may not be useful since some organisations are being labelled “political” and only disguising as civil society”, Review of the IPOD Dialogue Process 14-15 December 2012
31 Email correspondence with NIMD Uganda
32 Email correspondence with NIMD Uganda
33 Based on desk review documents received at the beginning of this consultancy in October 2013
34 “the current mindset and progress of the programme not being opportune to set in motion a transition to full local ownership and management of the programme”, Review of the IPOD Dialogue Process, p 1.
35 Global Partners Governance has produced many publications on this theme. Including The Politics of Parliamentary Strengthening and has recently published a series of Political Insight Papers designed to apply political economy analysis to governance work.